University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law
Dissertations

McGeorge School of Law

12-2009

Integrated Water Law: Local to International
Margaret J. Vick
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, mjvick@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mcgeorge-dissertations
Part of the Water Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Vick, Margaret J., "Integrated Water Law: Local to International" (2009). University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law Dissertations.
2.
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mcgeorge-dissertations/2

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Integrated	
  Water	
  Law:	
  
Local	
  to	
  International	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
September,	
  2009	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Margaret	
  J	
  Vick	
  
	
  

≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈≈

Submitted to Prof. Stephen C. McCaffrey to fulfill the requirements for the JSD degree in
International Water Law, Pacific McGeorge School of Law.

Copyright © 2009
Margaret J. Vick
All rights reserved. No part of this dissertation may be reproduced in any form, except for the
inclusion of brief quotations in review, without permission in writing from the author.

Publications containing selected portions of this dissertation:
Global change in four semi-arid transnational river basins: Analysis of institutional water
sharing preparedness, co-authored with Malin Falkenmark and Charlotte de Fraiture,
forthcoming 33 NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM 310 (2009)
International Water Law and Sovereignty: A Discussion of the ILC Draft Articles on the Law of
Transboundary Aquifers, 21 PACIFIC MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUSINESS & DEVELOPMENT LAW
JOURNAL 191 (2008)
The Senegal River Basin: A Retrospective and Prospective Look at the Legal Regime, 46
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL 211 (2006)

Preface
My experience with water “law” for irrigated agriculture first occurred at the age of 5
when I moved with my family to a home on small acreage in the Elephant Butte Irrigation
District on the Rio Grande. There I played in the irrigation water, visited with the ditch rider and
picked wild asparagus from the ditch banks. I developed a childhood understanding that the
water necessary to grow the cantaloupes, cotton, onions and sorghum in the fields around my
home came not from the clouds but from the ditches delivering water to each field in turn
throughout the valley. It was a place where I could smell the water approaching through the
ditches the same way you can smell the rain approaching in the desert. My great grandparents
and grandparents tried to farm on their homesteads in central New Mexico using water from the
clouds, dry-land bean farming, and they soon switched to cattle grazing.
Many years later I arrived in a law school class on water law taught by Frank J. Trelease
the preeminent water lawyer of the 20th Century. The study of water law with Prof. Trelease
confirmed my views about the ownership of water. It must be beneficially used and every
irrigator knows water cannot be wasted—it is not only illegal, but immoral in that waste on one
field means the field at the end of the ditch will remain dry. The right to the water is owned. It
is measurable and it is defensible against others who interfere with that right. In the southwest if
there is a shortage of water the most junior users go without, first in time is first in right. This is
the way it is!
During my career I have been very fortunate to have opportunities to represent tribal
governments in the determination of their water “rights.” The Tribes of the southwest have
water “claims” which may only be converted to “rights” by a court decree or legislation. Most

i

“claims” were ignored for more than 100 years but in recent decades these claims have converted
to rights through general stream adjudications and water rights settlements.
It is with this background that I entered the classroom of Stephen C. McCaffrey in
International Water Law in the 2004 spring semester and began the intellectual quest to
understand the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and equitable and reasonable
participation; a form of water law not based on priority or volumetric measures. This
dissertation is an attempt to discuss the legal difference between these systems of water
allocation—the local use based on rights to water and the international and transboundary
allocations based on equality of right and is a reflection of my learning about the process of
water allocations. Throughout this 200 page discussion of water law, local to international, the
principle character remains the irrigator at the end of the ditch.
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Introduction	
  
“In a group of mountains a small river has its source. A dozen or a score of creeks unite
to form the trunk. The creeks higher up divide into brooks. All these streams combined form the
drainage system of a hydrographic basin, a unit of country well defined in nature, for it is
bounded above and on each side by heights of land that rise as crests to part the waters. Thus
hydraulic basin is segregated from hydraulic basin by nature herself, and the landmarks are
practically perpetual. In such a basin of the arid region the irrigable lands lie below; not chiefly
by the river’s side, but on the mesas and low plains that stretch back on each side. Above these
lands the pasturage hills and mountains stand, and there the forests and sources of water supply
are found. Such a district of country is a commonwealth by itself. The people who live therein
are interdependent in all their industries. Every man is interested in the conservation and
management of the water supply, for all the waters are needed within the district. The men who
control the farming below must also control the upper region where the waters are gathered
from the heaven and stored in the reservoirs. Every farm and garden in the valley below is
dependent upon each fountain above.
All of the lands that lie within the basin above the farming districts are the catchment
areas for all the waters poured upon the fields below. The waters that control these works all
constitute one system, are dependent one upon another, and are independent of all other systems.
Not a spring or a creek can be touched without affecting the interests of every man who
cultivates the soil in the region. All the waters are common property until they reach the main
canal, where they are to be distributed among the people. How these waters are to be caught
and the common source of wealth utilized by the individual settlers interested therein is a
problem for the men of the district to solve, and for them alone.
But these same people are interested in the forests that crown the heights of the
hydrographic basin. If they permit the forests to be destroyed, the source of their water supply is
injured and the timber values are wiped out….
Then the pasturage is to be protected. The men who protect these lands for the water
they supply to agriculture can best protect the grasses for the summer pasturage of the cattle and
horses and sheep that are to be fed on their farms during the months of winter….
Thus it is that there is a body of interdependent and unified interests and values, all
collected in one hydrographic basin, and all segregated by well-defined boundary lines from the
rest of the world. The people in such a district have common interests, common rights, and
common duties, and must necessarily work together for common purposes.”1
John Wesley Powell painted this vision of utopian water management for the western United
States in the late nineteenth century. It did not come to pass. Political borders were drawn to
create states in the vast western territory of the United States, as in all the rest of the world,
1

John Wesley Powell, Institutions for the Arid Lands, originally appearing in Century Magazine 40:111-16, May

≈1≈

without regard to the boundaries established by “nature herself.” Farms in low lands develop
water delivery infrastructure and the systems, rules and laws for distribution and sharing. The
pasturage is protected by those who run livestock and the forests by the timber interests. The
challenge is that each of these regions may be within a different local jurisdiction which has its
own priorities for water management that do not and cannot control those within another
jurisdiction.
We live in an age of globalization and interconnectedness, however, too many of us live as
though the small segment of the hydraulic basin in which we are located is disconnected from
our downstream neighbors or that our use of a transboundary watercourse does not have
consequences within the basin. We do not recognize the natural system that Powell described
more than 100 years ago as the same system that provides our water. The natural system
operates without regard to political boundaries but it is greatly impacted by those boundaries.
The legal systems for allocating and sharing water within and across political boundaries are
explored herein. Each hydraulic basin is unique in its natural systems and development history
such that agreements, allocations, and management do not easily transfer from one basin to
another. However, frameworks for analyzing systems and lessons learned from one hydraulic
basins are crucial to effective management in another. Within all basins water laws are used to
resolve conflicts among users and provide security for continued water use.
The nature of water law is explored in its many variations beginning with local water laws
such as prior appropriation which is based on property law, riparian rights protected in tort, water
agreements treated as contracts and equitable apportionment. Each discipline of law; property,
tort, contract and equity, operate on the same resource at the same time. Water laws may be as
complex and varied as the resource to which they are applied.

≈2≈

The following quote from the Restatement First, Torts, captures some of these complexities.
“Water, like air and light, is a fugitive, wandering thing, flowing over and through land,
but seldom remaining for any length of time in one place or within the confines of any
one person’s possession. One’s dominion over it while it is upon his land is temporary,
and since it ordinarily flows onto the lands of other persons, it is a thing common to the
lands of all through whose possession it passes. Unlike air, it is limited in quantity, and a
substantial use of it by one may prevent others from having it. This does not mean that
individual rights or privileges in respect to it are different in principle from what they are
in respect to other physical things. It simply means that there is more likely to be a
conflict of interest over the use of waters than over the use of other things, and that the
rights and privileges of individual users are subject to greater limitation out of regard for
the common interests of all.”2
In addition to the various water laws, another broad theme discussed herein is the
confluence of two legal systems governing utilization of a single water source. Local laws for
allocation of water among individuals and sectors of society develop at the local level and reflect
the natural conditions, the culture of the population and the most common utilization of the
water. Local laws develop from the bottom and work their way up into state, provincial or
regional laws. The principles of international and transboundary water law have developed at
the highest levels of government and impact water allocation and utilization from the top down.
The principles of international water law are set forth in watercourse agreements negotiated state
to state and those which have crystallized as customary international law binding on all states.
Transboundary water law developed in the United States in the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court when called upon to resolve disputes among the states of the United States.
The first part of this paper examines local laws for the allocation of water noting that these
develop to accommodate the natural hydraulic system and the needs of the people. At the local
level, law often creates “rights” to the use of water and this concept is explored. Transboundary
(interstate and international) water laws often do not create “rights” to water, but establish
equitable principles for sharing a fluctuating natural resource. These equitable principles are
2

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF Torts, §850 Scope Note (1939).
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deconstructed and distinguished from the “rights” which may be held at the local level. Theories
of legal pluralism are used to explain the relationship between the local and transboundary laws
governing the same resource.
Part II explores building a bridge between a rights based system at the local level and the
equitable principles for sharing water that guide utilization of a transboundary river. That bridge
is a negotiated agreement among the basin states. This part discusses the role of law in
watercourse negotiations. Law may establish the boundaries within which negotiations take
place and level the playing field among states within a basin with asymmetric power distribution.
Also discussed is a methodology to incorporate local water rights into an equitable
transboundary system using the Winters reserved rights doctrine of the United States.
Part III is an examination of selected transboundary agreements examining different water
sharing arrangements and the institutions created to implement the arrangements. Flexibility
within basin institutions is essential to respond to changing natural conditions and human uses.
For this exploration of water law, we start with the application of a classic discussion of law,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, by Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed.3

3

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. R. 1089 at 1090 (1972).
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Part I
Water Allocation: Local and International

What is water law? What is international water law or as is described, the law of
international watercourses? Part I examines the first question from the bottom-up, looking at
local water law development that may, or may not be codified by a governmental entity. The
latter question is examined from a top-down perspective, the development of legal principles
through customary practice and agreement of nations as codified in an international convention
negotiated at the highest level of global governance.4
Calabresi and Melamed in their seminal article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,5 assert that society establishes entitlements through
the legal systems it adopts.6 The rules of property, liability and inalienability within that legal
system protect the entitlements by favoring one party over another in a conflict.7
The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is one we call the problem of
“entitlement.” Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more
people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor.8

This statement is the foundation of a legal system. However, the law governing a single
watercourse exists at multiple levels, top to bottom, within multiple societies. The Colorado
River in the western United States is a highly developed transboundary watercourse and the

4

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN Doc.
A/Res/51/869, May 21, 1997 [hereinafter 1997 UN Convention].
5
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. R. 108 (1972).
6
Id. at 1090.
7
Other scholars writing about entitlements maintain that the classifications of property, liability and inalienability
are types of entitlements, not rules for their protection. See Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1992-1993).
8
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2 at 1090.
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subject of multiple transboundary agreements,9 the oldest nearly a century old,10 as well as scores
of judicial opinions.11 Within the United States the Constitution and the cases interpreting it
create a hierarchy of laws from international to local. Making a simplistic example of the
Colorado River, the River is first divided to meet the Treaty obligations between the United
States and Mexico.12 Next, the portion of the river available for use in the United States is
divided into an upper and lower basin according to the terms of an interstate compact approved
by Congress.13 The upper division states apportion their share of the river by Compact14 and the
lower division states apportion their share of the river according to the terms of an Act of
Congress.15 Each state within each basin has its own “water law” that governs the rights and
privileges of users within that state. If the water within the Colorado basin is not sufficient to
supply all legal uses the individual users may have their rights limited by state, states are limited
by the Compact establishing the lower or upper division apportionments, and the upper and
lower basin apportionments are limited by international treaty obligations. Each level may use
only that portion available after division among the “higher” levels of apportionment.
I use the term “vertical legal pluralism” to describe this transboundary legal structure.
Vertical legal pluralism affects all transboundary watercourses. Chapter I examines elements of
9

The term “transboundary agreements” is used to include treaties among states and compacts among states of the
United States.
10
La Plata River Compact November 27, 1922, 43 Stat. 796 (1925).
11
See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936), Arizona v. California,
344 U.S. 919 (1953), Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964),
Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006) among others that have been decided by the United States Supreme
Court.
12
Treaty between the United States and Mexico relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
Rivers, and the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico, Feb. 3, 1944 and
supplementary Protocol Nov. 14, 1944, 3 U.N.T.S. 314.
13
Colorado River Compact, signed November 24, 1922, Ariz, Cal., Colo. Nev., N.M., Ut., Wyo. The 1922 Compact
was approved by Congress through the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) which provided
that the 1922 Compact would enter into force upon the approval of 6 of the 7 basin states and by proclamation of the
President. This occurred with the proclamation of President Hoover on June 25, 1929.
14
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 1948, Ariz., Colo., N.M., Ut., Wyo., 63 Stat. 31 (1949)
15
Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) codified at 43 U.S.C. §617 (2000).
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this vertical structure beginning with selected examples of local laws and an examination of the
various legal principles upon which water laws are based.
Chapter Two examines the law governing international watercourses16 as a top-down
legal system. This chapter provides an in-depth examination of the international legal principles
of equitable utilization and reasonable use.
Chapter Three explores the tension between rights-based local water laws and principles
of equitable and reasonable utilization upon which international law is based and asks if the law
of international watercourses has faced what Calabresi and Melamed describe as the first issue of
any legal system, the problem of entitlement.17 In other words, the question posed is whether the
term “water rights” means the same thing up and down the vertical spectrum of legal pluralism.
In Chapter Four the dispute over the Vermejo River,18 a small transboundary stream in
the states of New Mexico and Colorado, is examined as an example of the relationship between
the law of transboundary equitable apportionment and the local laws of prior appropriation and
reasonable use.

16

The definition of “international watercourse” is that from the 1997 UN Convention supra note 1 “A watercourse,
parts of which are situated in different States.” (Art. 2(b)) A watercourse is defined as “a system of surface waters
and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a
common terminus.” (Art. 2(a)).
17
Calabresi & Melamed supra note 2 at 1090.
18
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. (1982) and Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
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Chapter	
  1:	
  Local	
  Water	
  Law	
  
Irrigation societies around the world have developed water governance systems to meet
their local needs. 19 The systems of governance are similar in that each includes a mechanism to
determine who may use the water and for what purposes and each has a mechanism to make
adjustments when either the watercourse or the uses change. 20 Many of the local systems base
the right to use water in property law. Some even permit the selling of a water right separate and
severed from the land on which the water was originally used. A survey of local water
governance systems from around the world reveals that “cultivators from the valleys of northern
Laos to the tributary creeks of the upper Rio Grande in New Mexico physically constructed the
apparatus for water diversion and socially constructed locally recognized and locally defensible
access to the appropriated water.”21
The examples in this chapter illustrate that the normative rules for use of a common
resource develop within the community that shares the resource. Institutions legitimize and
enforce the rules, however, the water law for allocation of the resource to users remains
inherently local developing from the bottom up.
William Eskridge22 provides three assumptions regarding law from the bottom-up:
•

Law comes from the bottom up. Official law is influenced, often decisively, by what
goes on in communities subject to their commands. What officials say is law neither
exhausts the subject nor ends debate.

19

NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS (Bryan Randolph Bruns & Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick eds., International Food Policy
Research Institute, 2000).
20
H.L. Joep Spiertz, Water Rights and Legal Pluralism: Some Basics of a Legal Anthropological Approach in
NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS supra note 16, 162, 165-175 (2000).
21
E. Walter Coward, Jr., Preface, NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS supra note 16, 17 (2000).
22
William N. Eskridge, Jr. in his article Public Law from the Bottom Up (97 W. VA. L. REV. 141 (1994)) makes the
argument that changes to public law develop through a struggle of “nomic” communities within society and develop
from the bottom-up.

≈10≈

•
•

Choice of law is not neutral. It is deeply ideological, generational, and subject to shift in
response to changed circumstances.
Our obligation to obey the law is based upon its normativity and not just its official
pedigree. Every time the polity tries to suppress a vision of law, it risks its legitimacy,
because it risks alienating groups whose vision has been suppressed.
Eskridge emphasizes that while law may “effervesce” up from the bottom, state

institutions interdependent of each other, influence the development of law through the local
community anticipation of their responses and the potential veto or displacement of the emerging
changes in law.23
Lundqvist states the “need for clarification of rights and obligations” in water
management and maintains that effective water management occurs at the user level.24 When
state institutions become separated from the user, water management is not cohesive and national
water laws and national control of resources may either be ignored or de-legitimized creating a
situation in which water law is not accepted by the water user.25 Within a system of vertical legal
pluralism the legitimacy of each level of water law depends on the legitimacy of each subsidiary
level.
The water laws of prior appropriation, acequias, riparian rights, Moroccan springs and
subaks, are discussed below as examples of local water laws that “evolve from the bottom-up as
individuals competing for resource uses assert their claims to be free of other competing uses.”26
The local water laws discussed herein are those dealing with the creation of rights and
entitlements to the use of a watercourse. These rights may be private or communal, but all

23

Id. at 163-164.
Jan Lundqvist, Rules and Roles in Water Policy and Management, Need for Clarification of Rights and
Obligations, 25 IWRA, WATER INTERNATIONAL 194, 196 (2000).
25
Id.
26
Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or TopDown, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 73, 77 (1999).
24
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include methods for allocation and the protection and enforcement of those uses considered
legitimate.27
H. L. Joep Spiertz analyzes the conflict among competing laws regulating the utilization
of a water resource in his work on legal pluralism.28
Legal anthropology teaches researchers in the field of natural resource management,
property regimes, and water rights, not to start from the normative oratory of the legal
profession, nor from the recitals of local traditional law. Instead, the place to begin lies
in people’s daily experience regarding their normative environment, with all its
ambiguity, variation and contradiction. It explicitly draws attention to what can be called
“the how, and the when and where” of the significance of law in social practice.29
Spiertz urges a study of water law by examining the practices of users which includes the
local law developed from the bottom-up. The sovereign control of water resources, a top-down
approach, may incorporate local law, as is discussed in the context of prior appropriation below,
or it may be in conflict with local law in which case it risks losing local legitimacy.
Jan Lundqvist urges the same approach. Water users are the ultimate stakeholders in any
government, regulatory or management plan. It is the human dimension, the societal rules and
understandings of water use that management must consider in addition to the engineering of
water availability.30
“It is, of course, important to have an overriding policy and regulatory arrangements
through which the multiple and vital functions of water in society and in ecosystems can
be handled. From this perspective, governments have a critical role to play. However,
due to historical circumstances, in particular the colonial impassible rule and its
aftermath, the governments in many countries in the south have developed water and
environmental policies that have tended to separate people from management tasks
previously part of a social, cultural, and community based system and instead have
spearheaded grand engineering solutions.”31

27

Id. at 79-83. Local bottom-up development of these rights conserves on resources and enforcement costs as
homogenous societies develop cultural norms for right and wrong behavior in relation to the resource. Id.
28
Spiertz supra note 17.
29
Spiertz supra note 17 at 184.
30
Id.
31
Spiertz supra note 17. at 195.
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The 2003 United Nations World Water Development Report identified the importance of
rights to water for effective governance.32 In the chapter on Governing Water Wisely for
Sustainable Development the report notes that “In many developing countries, local regulations,
customary laws and traditional rights assign rights and responsibilities that differ from state
regulations. It is therefore important for formal rights to consider traditional practices.”33
Referencing the work by Lundqvist the report emphasizes the importance of “water
rights” that are clearly defined in order to have effective water governance. Water rights and
obligations “stipulate who is entitled to what quantity and quality of water, and when they are
entitled to it.”34 They are most often based in property law.
The Report identifies and defines four types of property rights in water:
•

“Open access property: There is no defined group of users or owners and the
water resource is open to anyone.

•

Common property: The group in charge of the resource, such as a local
community or a particular user group, has a right to exclude non-members from
uses and benefits. Members of the management group have both rights and
obligations with respect to use and maintenance of the water resource.

•

State property: Water users and citizens in general have an obligation to observe
use and access rules determined by the controlling government agencies.

•

Private property: Within the existing institutional framework the owner has the
right to decide on water access and uses. Those without rights or financial means
to acquire water are excluded from consumption.”35

The following discussion of selected local water laws begins with the prior appropriation
doctrine of the western United States and the acequias which are located primarily in northern

32

WATER FOR PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE, THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT, Ch. 15
(2003).
33
Id. at 374.
34
Id.
35
Id at Box 15.3 at 375.
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New Mexico a state which follows the doctrine of prior appropriation. The other examples
include riparian rights as developed in the eastern United States, allocation of spring flows in
Morocco, and the subak system in Bali which is similar to the historic system for water
allocation in Sri Lanka.36
Prior	
  Appropriation	
  
In the arid regions of the western United States a system of water law developed which
gives a priority of use to the first person or entity to utilize the watercourse.37 This priority is
good against all later users regardless of their location on the watercourse so long as the use is
beneficial. The meaning of “beneficial use” and the determination of which uses are beneficial
develops within each legal system as conflicts arise over water allocations. Most prior
appropriation systems define “beneficial use” as including mining, agricultural, domestic and
municipal uses.38 However, as societal preferences change, in-stream flows for ecological
protection and recreation have been added as legally protected beneficial uses.39
Once the water is applied to beneficial use a priority date is established. If demand
exceeds supply, as often occurs in the arid regions of the western United States, the first in time
to utilize the water has the first right to its continued use and the later priority rights holders do
not receive water.40 Water may be diverted and conveyed hundreds of miles from the
watercourse.41

36

Water allocation within Sri Lanka is described by the International Court of Justice Vice President Weeramantry
in his separate opinion in the Case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project. Case concerning the GabcíkovoNagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of Sept. 25, 1997, 1997 ICJ 7; repr. in 37 ILM 162 (1998), also
available on the ICJ web site, www.icj-cij.org.
37
See, Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855) and Clough v. Wing, 17 P. 453 (Ariz. 1888)
38
See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 97 (1997) (1984).
39
See JOSEPH L. SAX, ET AL, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 141-143 (4TH ed 2006).
40
SAX, ET AL supra note 36 at Ch. 3, GETCHES, supra note 35 Ch. 3.
41
See, A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769 (2001).
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Using the definitional matrix from the World Water Development Report set forth above
the owner of a prior appropriation right has a private property right. 42 Each user who complies
with the prescribed common law and statutory requirements43 obtains a usufruct right which may
be enforced against junior appropriators through the judicial system. The doctrine of prior
appropriation is summarized by the phrase “first in time, first in right.” The first person to divert
water from a watercourse and put that water to beneficial use, as that term is described under
local law, has the superior legal right to the continued use of water subject to laws for
abandonment and forfeiture of the right. When a watercourse becomes fully appropriated, the
rights equal or exceed the supply, “those without rights…are excluded from consumption”44
unless a market or transfer mechanism is established.
The prior appropriation doctrine is traced to gold miners in California in the midnineteenth century.45 Public lands were open for mineral exploration with property rights
granted from the United States to the first person to stake a claim to the minerals. The right to
water, which was essential to the mining operations, developed along with the rights to the land.
The first reported judicial opinion addressing prior appropriation, Irwin v. Phillips,46 notes the
inapplicability of riparian law in a region in which much of the riparian land is owned by the
government.47 With the statement that “[c]ourts are bound to take notice of the political and
social condition of the country which they judicially rule,”48 the court upheld the local practice to

42

Supra note 32. See also GETCHES supra note 35 at 82-85 for a discussion of prior appropriation and private
property.
43
GETCHES supra note 35 at 74-75. Many states have added a requirement to register or obtain a permit.
44
Supra note 32.
45
See John D. McGowen, The Development of Political Institutions on the Public Domain, 11 WYO. L. J. 1, 8-14
reproduced in FRANK J. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 20-22 (3rd ed. 1979).
46
5 Cal. 140 (1855).
47
Id at 145.
48
Id at 146.
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respect the use of water by the person who first diverted it, and the doctrine of “prior
appropriation” was recognized.
The rapid development of the arid western states was facilitated by the prior
appropriation doctrine. The doctrine was developed to meet the needs of an expanding and
growing economy based on agriculture and mining. However, it encouraged a “race to the river”
and an over-appropriation of water. It supported the western philosophy that a drop of water
reaching the ocean is a drop of water wasted.49
In summary, the United States Supreme Court described the doctrine of prior
appropriation as follows:
The common-law rule respecting riparian rights in flowing water never obtained in either
state [Wyoming and Colorado]. It always was deemed inapplicable to their situation and
climatic conditions. The earliest settlers gave effect to a different rule whereby the waters
of the streams were regarded as open to appropriation for irrigation, mining, and other
beneficial purposes. The diversion from the stream and the application of the water to a
beneficial purpose constituted an appropriation, and the appropriator was treated as
acquiring a continuing right to divert and use the water to the extent of his appropriation,
but not beyond what was reasonably required and actually used. This was deemed a
property right and dealt with and respected accordingly. As between different
appropriations from the same stream, the one first in time was deemed superior in right,
and a completed appropriation was regarded as effective from the time the purpose to
make it was definitely formed and actual work thereon was begun, provided the work
was carried to completion with reasonable diligence. This doctrine of appropriation,
prompted by necessity and formulated by custom, received early legislative recognition
in both territories and was enforced in their courts. When the states [Wyoming and
Colorado] were admitted into the Union it received further sanction in their Constitutions
and statutes and their courts have been uniformly enforcing it.50
The doctrine of prior appropriation does not support conservation and gives little
consideration to the ecology or “natural” resources associated with the watercourse including
native fish and vegetation. Such uses do not fit the statutory requirements for diversion of water
for defined beneficial uses resulting in an increasing list of endangered native fish in the western
49

See A. Dan Tarlock, International Water Law and the Protection of River System Ecosystem Integrity, 10 BYU J.
PUB. L. 181, 186-188(1996).
50
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 459 (1922).
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United States. In many states the doctrine has not evolved to meet the needs of an urbanizing
society. It is politically difficult to address these issues in part because of the private property
nature of the water rights.51 However, rarely are junior appropriators without water nor has a
lack of water slowed growth and development as states build additional water storage, bring
water through major works from other basins, modify restrictions on groundwater withdrawal
and encourage market based water transfers.52
Acequias	
  
“Acequia” is the Spanish word for ditch, in particular an irrigation ditch. But the use of
this term in the northern part of the state of New Mexico means much more. Acequias include
governance, community and culture all of which coalesce around the acequia that delivers the
water.53 The water is the common property of the acequia community.54
The state of New Mexico has an ancient history of indigenous Pueblo irrigation societies
within the Rio Grande valley. The Spanish first settled near these Pueblos in 1598 and remained
until driven out during the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. Upon reconquest in the late 17th century the
Spanish settled in ranchitos developing an irrigation society around acequias. Under Spanish
rule the early settlers developed “acequias de commún” or “de communidad” (shared ditches) to
develop the physical infrastructure necessary for a village to survive in the arid and often hostile
region. Labor for construction and maintenance was divided proportionately based on benefit.55

51

See generally ARIZONA WATER POLICY, MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN AN URBANIZING, ARID REGION, BONNIE
G. COLBY & KATHERINE L. JACOBS EDS. (2007) for a discussion of the difficulties of managing a water system using
laws which do not integrate the natural water cycle.
52
A. Dan Tarlock, NATURAL RES. J. (2001).
53
See generally JOSÉ A. RIVERA, ACEQUIA CULTURE, WATER, LAND & COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST (1998) and
SYLVIA RODRÍGUEZ, ACEQUIA, WATER SHARING, SANCTITY, AND PLACE (2006).
54
See WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT supra note 29.
55
RIVERA supra note 47 at 52-53.
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Within many acequia communities today water remains a public good shared by all
within the community. The diversion works, the physical acequias, are community assets the
maintenance of which is performed by the community for the benefit of all. The community
selects a commission and a mayordomo56 who is the “ditch boss” and community leader. He
divides the water and the maintenance responsibilities among the parciantes, a term used to
describe both the land parcels and the owners. Each community has its own rules of governance
and methods for sharing the resource.
Among the earliest written rules for water delivery are those for the Margarita Ditch in
San Patricio, New Mexico. In 1903 the community documented the community rules, the
“Reglas y Reglamentes,” setting forth the basic governance of the acequia. The mayordomo
is instructed to deliver water for 1 ½ days to each derecho de aqua (water right) beginning with
the farthest downstream and rotating to all members,57 except that on Sundays the waters are
reserved for irrigation of family gardens.58 The derecho de aqua is described as a share with
each share measured by diversion time. Large parcientes might have more than one share while
individuals using water only for domestic purposes have less than one share.
The history and operations of the acequias in the Taos Valley in northern New Mexico
are documented by Rodríquez.59 The upper reaches of the Rio Pueblo de Taos is within the Taos
Pueblo and used for irrigation and domestic purposes by the Native Americans within the
Pueblo. The downstream acequia communities also rely on the Rio Pueblo for irrigation and
domestic purposes. Conflicts between the Pueblo and acequia communities erupted in the late

56

Rivera notes that historically the superintendent of the irrigation ditch settled on mayordomo sometime before
1852 when legislation called for annual elections by all local ditch irrigators of a mayordomo. RIVERA supra note
47at 55.
57
Id. at 80-82.
58
Id.
59
RODRÍGUEZ supra note 47.
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19th century. Rodríquez reports that after legal battles in Territorial Court, representatives of the
Pueblo and the Town of Taos met at the courthouse and agreed upon a water sharing
arrangement. In times of shortage the residents of the acequia community of Fernando de Taos
are permitted to divert the water from twilight Friday until dawn on Monday. The irrigators
taking from the Acequia Madre (the “mother ditch” or main irrigation canal) have its use all day
Monday. The rest of the time the Pueblo may divert all the water.60 Most years the
mayordomos, charged with delivery of water to the acequias, and the Governor of Taos Pueblo,
charged with delivery of water within the Pueblo, meet to discuss and confirm this arrangement
and their shared responsibilities.61 This major division of water between the Taos Pueblo and the
downstream communities is still followed more than 100 years after the agreement was
reached.62
Among the parciantes within the Taos valley the water is allocated using a time rotation
similar to what is described above on the Margarita Ditch. However, when sufficient water is
available for all, diversions are made upon request to the mayordomo who delivers it based upon
who requested the water first. In times of shortage, all within the acequia share what is
available.
The El Rito de La Lama Acequia in Taos County distributes water based on shares with
each share measured in units of time. Each parciante may open its gate on the ditch for the
assigned amount of time which is determined by the use to be made of the water. The 1998
litigation among the parciantes of El Rito Acequia highlights the concepts of shares in water and
the customary governance of acequias.

60

Id. at 36-39.
Id. at 40-42.
62
Id.
61
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El Rito Acequia Association has water rights that were adjudicated in state court in 1963
and 1980. For purposes of this discussion, water rights are measured by shares with one share
equal to a diversion of the full flow of the ditch for one hour once a week. The Association
holds 168 shares. One parciante owned by the Wilsons has rights to 102.5 shares, the equivalent
of 61% of the water. Disputes within the Association arose over the Wilsons’ horses and their
contamination of the water in the ditch which is used by “downstream” parciantes as their sole
domestic supply. The Association voted to require the Wilsons to fence their horses away from
the acequia. The Wilsons attempted to take control of the Association and challenged the
election of commissioners and the mayordomo.
Each acequia member had one vote in the election of the commissioners and the
mayordomo. The Wilsons argued that New Mexico law required voting to be in proportion to
water use. The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the traditional method of governance
holding that no single method of voting was prescribed by New Mexico law.63 Custom and the
rules of the acequia control its governance noting that most acequias vote for the commissioners
and mayordomo based on one vote per parciante. However, sharing the responsibility and cost
for ditch maintenance varies among acequias with most basing assessments on water shares. .
Distribution of water according to acequia rules is recognized in the laws of the territory
and later the state of New Mexico. The traditional practices were first codified in the Kearny
Code for the New Mexico Territory in 184664 and incorporated in the Treaty of Guadalupe

63

Wilson v. Denver, 961 P.2d 153 (N.M. 1998). The acequia commission voted to require the upstream parciante
using 61% of the water to fence the acequia to prevent contamination from his horses and protect the water quality
for downstream domestic use. The land owner sued in state court claiming the voting process was invalid claiming
that New Mexico law required voting based on percentage of water use.
64
ORGANIC LAW FOR THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO COMPILED UNDER THE DIRECTIONS OF GENERAL KEARNY, in
OCCUPATION OF MEXICAN TERRITORY, S. Doc. No. 896, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 10175 (1912).
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Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico in 1848.65 The New Mexico territorial laws of
1851 and 1852 confirmed the acequia rules and incorporated them into territorial law.66
The acequia system is incorporated in New Mexico law by statute.67
The New Mexico Constitution adopted in1910 recognizes acequia water rights in Article XVI
Section 1: “All existing rights to the use of any waters in this state for any useful or beneficial
purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed.” The New Mexico Constitution further provides
that “The unappropriated water of every natural stream, perennial or torrential, within the state of
New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for
beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of the state. Priority of appropriation shall give the
better right.”68 Thus, New Mexico law recognizes the acequia system within the state water law
system of prior appropriation.
These two systems of allocation are not always compatible. The surface waters within
the state are over-appropriated. Market transfers of water rights which are severed from the
appurtenant land permits growth and development within the existing supply of water. Conflicts
arise between acequias that do not permit or want water to be removed from the community and
the state law permitting market transfers. The state legislature passed a law requiring the State
Engineer to consider impacts to the community and water users within the community prior to
65

Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States, signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat.922.
66
Sec. 8, Rev. Statutes and Laws of the Territory of New Mexico, Ar. I, ch. I, Act of the 20th July, 1851, “Que de las
acequias ya establicidas no se embaraze su curso.”[That the course of ditches (acequias) already established shall
not be disturbed.]; Sec. 9, Act of 7th Jan. 1852, “Que todos los ríos y Corrientes de aqua en este Territorio,
anteriormente conocidos como acequias públicas, son por este decreto establecidos y declarados a ser acequias
públicas. [That all rivers and streams of water in this Territory, formerly known as public ditches (acequias), be,
and are hearby [sic] established and declared to be public ditches (acequias). Sec. 21, Act of 7th Jan. 1852, “El
arreglo de las acequias que ya están trabajadas quedar establecido tal como se hizo y permanace hast ahoy….[the
regulations of ditches (acequias) which have been worked, shall remain as they were made and remain up to this
day….] Quoted from José Rivera, Irrigation Communities of the Upper Rio Grande Bioregion: Sustainable
Resource Use in the Global Context, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 731, 737-8 (1996).
67
N.M.STATUTE ANNOTATED §72-1-1 to §72-19-103.
68
N.M. CONST. Art. XVI, §2.
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approving a severance and transfer of water rights. This does not resolve all disputes between
the culture and life within the ancient acequia societies and the modern demands for water.69
When one parciante within an acequia no longer takes its diversion of water and no longer
assumes its responsibilities, it creates technical difficulties for water conveyance and increases
the maintenance burdens for the remaining parcientes.
The legal issues created when an equitable system of water rights held by the members of
the acequia community are incorporated into the quantitative rights system of prior appropriation
are presented in the state of New Mexico. State law permits individuals to sever and sell water
rights. Yet, the priority right may be held by the acequia Association with individuals having
shares of that right or it may be held by the parciantes. These issues remain to be resolved.

Moroccan	
  Springs	
  
In the piedmont region of Morocco springs supply water for irrigation. Geertz70 reports
on two systems for allocation of water rights among the local farmers. The first is a timed
system, l-ma dyal s-sa’a (water by the hour) or b-l magana (by the clock) and the second is a
queue system called mubih.71 Within each system “the underlying principle…is individual
personal ownership of water … underneath them all is the concept that water, like land, housing,
clothing,…is property, something that someone owns.” The right to water may be bought, sold,
leased, loaned and inherited separate from land because it is private property.72
The timed system, l-ma dyal s-sa’a, is based on water delivery from a particular spring
measured by the flow of the ditch for a specified amount of time. The time for water delivery is
scheduled at fixed intervals so that a water right might be scheduled for nighttime on Wednesday
69

See RIVERA supra note 47 Ch. 5 & 6 for a discussion of current and anticipated future difficulties for acequias.
Clifford Geertz, The Wet and the Dry: Traditional Irrigation in Bali and Morocco, Human Ecology Vol. 1, No. 1
at 23 (1971).
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for 3 ½ hours and again every 6 days. All users have ownership of the diversion rights as
measured by the diversion system.
The queue system, mubih, establishes a rotation of users from a particular ditch. Each
water right holder receives sufficient water to irrigate his land then the water flows down the
ditch to the next land and continues in turn along the ditch system until it is again the turn of first
land owner. Each water right is for a particular purpose. If additional water is needed because of
a change in use or for a particular purpose such as planting, the owner negotiates with the other
users along the ditch. An observer of this system describes it as characterized by trading and
bargaining.73 The system or combination of systems is particular to the spring and the
community that relies on that spring.
In 1995 Morocco adopted a national Water Law to regularize what were characterized as
haphazard water laws. The Water Law confirms that all waters are under the public domain and
are not subject to private ownership. Use is by concession and payment of charges. However,
the Water Law recognizes ancient customary rights whether or not registered with the national
government.74 The local uses and water rights developed by custom have been incorporated in
each national water law of Morocco which is continued by the current Water Law.75 The
property rights developed at the local level remain intact within a system of state ownership of
the resource.76
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Subaks	
  
Bali and Sri Lanka irrigation is organized using a communal system that delivers water
from storage reservoirs or tanks to lands within a well defined service area. Irrigation is part of a
complex cultural and religious society.77 Within Bali the subak irrigation system provides each
landowner within the subak an equal right to enough water to irrigate his rice fields. Bali has an
abundance of water in its equatorial climate however the timing of delivery of water is critical to
the maintenance of rice production. The subak system is locally organized with each land owner
having a share of responsibility for construction and maintenance of the irrigation system. The
amount of water is allocated annually after negotiations with farmers and officials based on the
land area to be irrigated. Minor adjustments are made over time to allow for differing soils and
drainage features on individual lands permitting more or less water to be diverted by the
irrigators. The collective system assigns a water right to each plot of land that remains with the
land if the land transfers ownership. The subak also includes social, cultural and religious
relationships to water. All irrigators within one subak plant at the same coordinated time which
is also coordinated with subaks within the same region using common water resources.
Vermillion reports on a group of Balinese farmers who migrated to North Sulawesi,
Indonesia and started the subak system on new parcels of land.78 The water requirements and
timing of deliveries had to be established for each new field. The farmers are described as
“borrowing” water from their neighbors or from the system until the fields were adequately
prepared and drainage patterns established. In summary, the Bali system of “rights” is one that
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See Geertz supra note 61, Douglas L. Vermillion, Water Rights in the State of Nature: Emergent Expectations in
an Indonesian Settlement, Ch. 2 in NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS supra note 19, H.L. Joep Spiertz, Water Rights and
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attaches sufficient water to the land parcel to produce rice.79 When lands are uniform, each
parcel receives the same amount of water, when the lands vary in their characteristics the amount
of water necessary to grow rice is adjusted.80 The “rights” within a subak are enforced through a
complex structure of societal norms and religious practices.
The tank system in Sri Lanka is similar in its organization to the subaks of Bali, however
the availability of water each season is more variable.81 Sri Lanka “is renowned for its hydraulic
civilization in which natural resources have been managed over thousands of years.”82 The
system of water allocation in Sri Lanka is characterized by seasonal planning. Like Bali, an
ancient system of “tanks” captures water during the rainy season.83 The tank system permits
farmers to determine the available supply of water for irrigation during the dry season.

At the

beginning of each irrigation season, the farmers, sometimes along with government
representatives, meet and negotiate the distribution of the available supply. “Underlying water
allocation for irrigation are two generally recognized principles. The first is that of equity of
water distribution. Equity is defined as ensuring that every farmer gets water in proportion to
landholdings and second, priority is given to standing crops over those not yet planted.”84
This system developed to meet the needs of the local communities and is described as
“suited to irrigation systems with storage capacity, a single dominant crop, and variable water
supplies.”85 The water resources are managed as a public good with users continuing the
centuries old practice of contributing to maintenance of the systems for storage and delivery but
79
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do not make any payment for water use.86 Sri Lanka is attempting to implement a new water law
to accommodate changes in use from agriculture to industrial uses within the southern Ruhuna
Basins.87 The centuries old system which provides water for social and cultural uses in addition
to agriculture may be difficult to change. Fears over the loss of these traditional rights prevent
acceptance among many farmers.88

Riparian	
  Rights	
  
In the water rich eastern region of the United States water rights are based common law
riparian principles.89 The use of a watercourse is an aspect of the ownership of riparian land
provided that the water is used on riparian lands.
Riparian law in the United States is based on the English common law of natural flow.90
Each riparian has a right to the natural flow of an undiminished watercourse adjacent to his
property. Diversions for domestic use and irrigation of personal garden plots are permissible
uses even though the natural flow is somewhat diminished. However, return flows from riparian
lands theoretically replenish the watercourse and are available for use downstream. Riparian law
based on natural flow fostered navigation and mill use, but did not accommodate consumptive
use91 of water for other economic purposes.
As waterways lost significance for navigation and “milling,” the common law changed
from riparian rights based on natural flow to rights based on reasonable use. The concept of
reasonableness is discussed more fully in connection with utilization of an international
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watercourse,92 but for this purpose reasonableness is measured by the impact of one use on the
uses by other riparians.93 If one property owner diminishes the flow of the watercourse such that
another riparian may no longer use her water in the same reasonable manner as before the new
use may be unreasonable. It is a comparative determination. What constitutes a reasonable use
has changed as the economics of water use and the demands for water for economic development
have changed. However, within a riparian system users who comply with the requirements for
land ownership and make a reasonable use of the water obtain water rights which they are able to
protect from interference by others using the same watercourse.94
The reasonable use standard is enforceable in tort by the riparians who are impacted by a
use alleged to be unreasonable. This one-on-one enforcement does not promote economic
development or efficiencies within a watercourse. Today, most states following the riparian
doctrine of reasonable use have assumed control of water resources and issue water permits.95

Conclusion	
  
The above examples illustrate that legal rights to water are established under different
legal systems from the bottom-up by the users within a local area. This is “water law”
throughout the world. The governmental system of laws often recognizes and incorporates the
local water law within the regulatory scheme. In the case of prior appropriation, the courts
acknowledged and accepted the system of water allocation in existence along the streams which
was then adopted and adapted in other states and incorporated into state constitutions and
legislation. The acequias exist within a state system of prior appropriation and as demand for
water continues to grow in this region of the United States, the policy decisions must be made to
92
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maintain the community system or defeat it by permitting individual sale and transfer of water
rights from within the acequia communities. The 1995 Water Law of Morocco incorporates the
local traditional uses including the private property rights to water which are contrary to the
national policy. Reports from Sri Lanka indicate that farmers who rely on the traditional local
water law are resisting national efforts to implement a national water policy that might alter their
traditional rights. Local water laws become an aspect of community and support traditional
users. In locations of variable water availability such as Bali and Sri Lanka, the variability is
incorporated within the water allocation system. As water availability becomes more variable
throughout the globe, those local laws that are the strongest and provide the most protection
against loss of water may be the most resistant to the changes required to adapt to changing
conditions. It is at the local water user level that adaptation to global climate change must occur.
The next section moves to the opposite end of the pluralistic legal structure; the allocation
of water among states sharing a common watercourse. It examines the international law of
equitable and reasonable utilization asking if the state has a “right” to water in the same sense as
the private property rights recognized at the local level in the examples of prior appropriation
and the Moroccan springs discussed above or is international water law more like the traditional
law of riparian rights based on reasonable use. This begins with a look at the customary
international law of equitable and reasonable utilization of an international watercourse.
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Chapter	
  Two:	
  International	
  Water	
  Law	
  	
  
This chapter discusses the two major principles of international water law as codified in
the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses;96 equitable and reasonable utilization and the prevention of significant harm to
other riparians. As of this writing the 1997 UN Convention has not entered into force97 however
it remains the primary authority for international water law. The Convention is based on draft
articles prepared by the International Law Commission after 20 years of extensive study of
international agreements and practices.98 It was approved by resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly on May 21, 1997 after negotiations in the Sixth Committee convened as a
Working Group of the Whole in which all states had the opportunity to participate.99 The
principles upon which it is based were discerned by the ILC from state practice and have
crystallized into customary international law.100
This chapter first examines the origins of the doctrine of equitable and reasonable
utilization in the work of the International Law Association and the International Law
Commission and then examines the meaning of “equitable” separate from the meaning of
“reasonable” in relation to utilization of watercourses. With this background, Chapter three uses
the litigation over the Vermejo River in the state of New Mexico to discuss the vertical pluralism
on a transboundary watercourse. This builds a foundation for a discussion of the complexity of
water law.
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Equitable	
  and	
  reasonable	
  utilization	
  
Equitable and reasonable utilization is a comparative principle by which a use or a
planned use in one state is measured against uses in other watercourse states.101 As discussed in
the following section, “equitable utilization” and “reasonable utilization” are different
comparative standards, however, international instruments and publicists use the terms together
and sometimes interchangeably.102
The equitable and reasonable standard may be more effective when applied in the
negative to determine which uses are not equitable and reasonable. The International Court of
Justice made such a determination in the Danube Case103 when it was asked to determine
whether a diversion by Slovakia was an equitable and reasonable utilization of the Danube.
In 1977 Czechoslovakia and Hungary entered a treaty for the joint development of the
Danube to improve navigation, provide flood control and produce hydropower.104 The works
were to be headed by a dam at Dunakiliti to divert the flow through a canal to a hydroelectric
plant at Gabčíkovo constructed by Czechoslovakia. The works contemplated by the 1977 Treaty
terminated with a dam downstream at Nagymaros to be constructed by Hungary.105 When
Hungary failed to complete the works at Dunakiliti and failed to construct the dam at Nagymaros
in violation of the treaty, Czechoslovakia proceeded to construct a diversion dam wholly within
its territory at Čunovo in order to use the facility at Gabcíkovo and partially develop the
hydropower aspects of the project. The Čunovo Dam diverted eighty to ninety percent of the
flow of the Danube into a canal in Czechoslovakia to supply the hydropower plant at Gabcíkovo
101
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before returning the flow to the Danube downstream. The 1977 Treaty calls for diversion of this
same amount of water from the joint dam at Dunakiliti, however since the Čunovo diversion was
not a joint work the ICJ determined that it was not part of the treaty regime. Therefore, the ICJ
applied the customary international law principle of equitable and reasonable sharing of an
international watercourse concluding that the unilateral assertion of control over the river by
Czechoslovakia was an internationally wrongful act which deprived Hungary of its equitable and
reasonable share of the watercourse.106
This case provides guidance about the meaning of equitable and reasonable utilization.
First the ICJ determined that as a matter of international law each state has a “basic right to an
equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse.”107 Second,
the Court held that a unilateral diversion of 80 to 90 percent of the flow deprived the downstream
state of its share of the watercourse.108 The Court did not establish what would have been an
equitable or reasonable diversion, instead, the Court urged the parties to continue to cooperate to
reach an agreement for the continued operation of the works as constructed.109
Equitable and reasonable utilization are recognized by the Court as principles of
customary international law that have crystallized and been codified in the 1997 UN Convention.
The following section discusses equitable utilization and reasonable utilization as two distinct
standards. The former is based on the principles of equitable apportionment developed in the
litigation between states of the United States and the latter based on the principles of riparian
law.
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The ILC preparatory work for the 1997 Watercourse Convention developed the term
“equitable and reasonable utilization” but focused on equitable utilization in the commentary
with little discussion of the term reasonable.110 The discussion of reasonable use which follows
is primarily based on riparian law in the United States.

As is discussed below, the

determination of reasonable use at the user level informs the meaning of reasonable utilization
of an international watercourse.

Equitable	
  utilization	
  

McCaffrey and others111 have written extensively on equitable utilization and the

counterpart in the domestic law of the United States, equitable apportionment. This section
briefly describes equitable utilization.
Born of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in interstate apportionment cases beginning
in the early twentieth century, and supported by decisions in other federal states, the
doctrine of equitable utilization was applied to international watercourses as the basic,
governing principle by the International Law Association’s 1966 Helsinki Rules. Its
status as the fundamental norm in the field has recently been confirmed by the decision of
the International Court of Justice in the Case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary/Slovakia)….[T]he 1997 UN Convention also appears to treat equitable
utilization as the overarching principle governing the use of international watercourses, as
did the draft articles adopted by the ILC on second reading in 1994.112
The International Law Commission notes that the rule of equitable utilization can not be
applied unilaterally by any state to determine “the amount of water a State may divert, the
quality of water to which it is entitled, or the uses it may make of an international
watercourse.”113 Implementation of this standard “depends ultimately upon the good faith and
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co-operation of the States concerned.”114 Equitable utilization is also described as a post hoc
measure and a standard to be used by a third party to resolve a dispute among a limited number
of conflicting uses. It is difficult to apply prospectively.
McCaffrey says, “According to the doctrine of equitable utilization, each state has a
legally protected interest in an equitable share of the uses and benefits of an international
watercourse.”115 The comparative basis of this standard is discussed below, but first a more indepth look at reasonable utilization.

Reasonable	
  utilization	
  
Turning now to the concept of reasonable utilization; reasonableness is a legal standard
under domestic law in the United States for individual conduct when determining negligence or
liability. Tort law requires an examination of all the facts and circumstances measuring the act
against an “objective” standard of a reasonable person in the same situation. Riparian rights are
based in tort. Reasonable use is not “immoderate” or “excessive.”116 It is defined as “fair,”
“proper,” “just,” “moderate,” “suitable under the circumstances,” being synonymous with
“equitable.”117
For purposes of this deconstruction of “equitable and reasonable utilization” the author
does not assume that the two terms are synonymous for to do so would mean one or the other is
irrelevant to the law of international watercourses. Whereas equitable utilization may be
conceptualized as dividing the whole of the watercourse among the watercourse states and other
watercourse interests such as ecological preservation, fisheries and navigation, reasonable
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utilization looks at water applied for a particular purpose to determine if the purpose for which
the water is being used is reasonable given the facts and circumstances on the river.
Reasonable as a riparian standard
Reasonable is a term of art in riparian water law in the United States. It is not the focus
of this paper to explore the derivation and nuances of reasonable within the laws of the various
states of the United States.

Therefore the following discussion of reasonable use in riparian

law is based on those common law principles set forth in the American Law Institute
Restatement (First118 and Second119) of the Law of Torts.
The standard of reasonableness developed in the courts to resolve disputes between two
competing users. The party alleging injury must first establish that her use of water is reasonable
and second, that the other party’s use interferes with her reasonable use.120 If the complaining
party cannot establish that her water use is reasonable she does not have a legally protected
interest. This initial determination is not a comparative analysis and is based on the first four
factors of §850A: “the purpose of the use, the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake, the
economic value of the use, [and] the social value of the use.”121
This basic principle of reasonable use in riparian law is set forth the Restatement Frist, as
follows:
The Reasonable Use theory. Under the Reasonable Use theory the primary or
fundamental right of each riparian proprietor on a watercourse or lake is merely to be free
from an unreasonable interference with his use of the water therein. Emphasis is placed
on a full and beneficial use of the advantages of the stream or lake, and each riparian
proprietor has a privilege to make a beneficial use of water for any purpose, provided
only that such use does not unreasonably interfere with the beneficial uses of others.
Reasonable use is the only measure of riparian rights. Reasonableness, being a question
of fact, must be determined in each case on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that
118
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case. Reasonableness is determined from a standpoint of a court or jury and depends not
only upon the utility of the use itself, but also upon the gravity of its consequences on
other proprietors.122
Conflicts over the use of a watercourse are resolved by first examining if the use by the
complainant is reasonable. If not, the complainant does not have a legal interest in the water that
the court will protect. The reasonableness of the interfering use is then examined. If both uses
are reasonable and they conflict, the court uses the factors in Restatement Second Torts §850A123
to determine an equitable solution.
The reasonable use theory of riparian law contains three basic principles; 1) water is
shared by riparians on an equitable basis, 2) no single user may unreasonably interfere with the
reasonable use of another riparian, and 3) if there are conflicting uses the utility of the use must
outweigh the gravity of the harm in order to be considered reasonable.124
Another point of note in the Restatement First description of reasonable use quoted above
is the type of legal right held by a riparian. “[E]ach riparian proprietor has a privilege to make a
beneficial use of water for any purpose provided only that such use does not unreasonably
interfere with the beneficial uses of others.”125 This privilege is shared by all riparians on a
watercourse.126 It is a privilege because each riparian may exercise it, but each of the uses is
subject to being reduced or defeated when another riparian holding the same privilege exercises
hers. Each riparian may interfere with the use by each other riparian so long as the use is
reasonable. If one use is not reasonable there is no legal privilege or right to continue the use
and an injunction may issue. If both uses are reasonable a conflict of uses is resolved by an
122
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examination of “the practicality of avoiding harm by adjusting the use or method of use”127 and
“the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by each proprietor.” In the event an
equitable adjustment is not possible to permit both uses to continue simultaneously the factors of
§850A are used. These situations are explained as follows:
If two uses can coexist, because one causes no substantial harm to the other, or because
harm can be avoided by adjusting the quantity or method of one use or the other or
because sharing a temporarily short supply is reasonable, the rights may be said to be
equal. If, however, the normal water supply is insufficient for all potential uses, equal
treatment may be impossible. One riparian's right to make a new use may be affected by
the fact that other riparians have already put the water to use. To allow the new use will
wholly or partially destroy the existing use or take one riparian's supply of water from
him and give it to the new user. In these cases the law must choose one use or the other
on the basis of the factors stated in §850A, Clauses (h) and (i), and discussed in the
Comments to those Clauses.128 [§850A is reproduced at the end of this chapter.]
A water right based on reasonable use is a comparative standard under which “one cannot
always be absolutely sure just what uses he can or cannot lawfully make of the water; and even
though a use may, in its inception, be reasonable, circumstances may change to such an extent
that it will become unreasonable.”129

	
  

	
  

Reasonable	
  in	
  international	
  instruments	
  

The term reasonable as used to describe the utilization of an international watercourse
appears in draft articles prepared by the International Law Commission without definition or
much explanation. In contrast, the term “equitable” is discussed extensively with a significant
body of state practice, case law from federal states, and treaty language to assist with the
interpretation. This section will trace the inclusion of reasonable utilization in the 1997 UN
Convention as a separate concept from equitable utilization.

127

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 114, §850A(f).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 114, §850 comment f.
129
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) supra note 113, Scope Note at 346.
128

≈36≈

Helsinki Rules: The Helsinki Rules130 adopted by the International Law Association in
1966 were the first comprehensive documentation of legal principles for utilization of
international watercourses. Article IV provides that “each basin State is entitled, within its
territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an
international drainage basin.”131 Article V indicates that “what is a reasonable and equitable
share within the meaning of article IV [is] to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors
in each particular case….”132
Reasonable as used in Articles IV and V relates to each state’s share of water. The
factors to determine that share are listed in Article VI and include “the comparative costs of
alternative means of satisfying the economic and social needs of each basin State,133 the
availability of other resources, 134 the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of
waters,135 the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means of
adjusting conflicts among uses;136 and the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be
satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.”137 These factors are very
similar to the factors in the Restatement that determine the reasonableness of a riparian right.138
Reasonableness as a measure of use is reinforced by examining Articles VII, VIII, and X
of the Helsinki Rules. Article VII provides that the “present reasonable use” of a watercourse
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cannot be denied in order to reserve water for future uses in another state.139 Article VIII,
paragraph 1 provides that “an existing reasonable use may continue in operation unless the
factors justifying its continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the conclusion that it
be modified or terminated so as to accommodate a competing incompatible use.”140 Modifying
“use” with reasonable indicates that only reasonable uses are protected. This is reinforced in
Paragraph 3 of Article VIII confirming that a use that is not reasonable does not receive legal
protection, “A use will not be deemed an existing use if at the time of becoming operational it is
incompatible with an already existing reasonable use.”141 The concept of reasonableness as used
in the Helsinki Rules appears to be the basic measure of an equitable share in the same manner it
is the measure of a riparian right.
The next sections trace the incorporation of reasonable in the work of the International
Law Commission which led to the draft articles adopted by the UN General Assembly as the
1997 UN Convention.
Schwebel, ILC Draft Articles: In 1981 Special Rapporteur Stephen Schwebel included in
his Third Report142 the first complete set of draft articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses.143 This draft does not use the word reasonable to modify or
describe utilization of an international watercourse. Draft Article 6, Equitable participation,
provides:
1. The waters of an international watercourse system shall be developed and used by
system States on an equitable basis with a view to attaining optimum utilization of
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those waters, consistent with adequate protection and control of the components of
the system.
2. Without its consent a State may not be denied its equitable participation in the
utilization of the waters of an international watercourse system of which it is a system
State.
3. An equitable participation includes the right to use water resources of the system on
an equitable basis and the duty to contribute on an equitable basis to the protection
and control of the system as particular conditions warrant or require.144
The Schwebel commentary on this draft article indicates that the “right of each State to
share equitably in the uses of the waters of an international watercourse system is indisputable
and undisputed”145 explaining that States have the right to “reasonable and equitable sharing of
the uses of the waters.”146
Schwebel discusses the Helsinki Rules and ILA Commentary thereon regarding equitable
and reasonable use147 yet the concept that use by each basin state must be reasonable was not
included in his Draft Articles. Schwebel discusses of reasonable use as the basis of the United
States argument in the dispute with Canada over the Kootenay River,148 but uses this discussion
to support equitable use in the draft articles. However, the factors for determination of an
equitable use incorporated in the Schwebel Draft Article 7 include those from the Helsinki Rules
which are very similar to the factors used to determine the reasonableness of a riparian use.
These include: comparison of uses by other states,149 the “social and economic need for the
particular use,”150 the “efficiency of use of water resources of the system,”151 and the potential of
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the use to cause pollution.152 Each of these factors relate to the use of water within a State, which
may be a measure of reasonableness.153
Evensen, ILC Draft Articles:154 In 1984 the ILC Special Rapporteur Jens Evensen
prepared a revised set of draft articles. His Article 6 includes reasonable as a measure of a
state’s share of an international watercourse.
Article 6 General principles concerning the sharing of the waters of an international
watercourse.
1. A watercourse State is, within its territory, entitled to a reasonable and equitable share
of the uses of the waters of an international watercourse.155
2. To the extent that the use of the waters of an international watercourse within the
territory of one watercourse State affects the use of the waters of the watercourse in
the territory of another watercourse State, the watercourse States concerned shall
share in the use of the waters of the watercourse in a reasonable and equitable manner
in accordance with the articles of the present Convention and other agreements and
arrangements entered into with regard to the management, administration or uses of
the international watercourse.156
Evensen introduces the term reasonable to the text of the draft articles but limits it in
both paragraphs 1 and 2 to modifying the “share” of a watercourse that a state may use.
In Draft Article 7 Evensen157 incorporates reasonableness as a limitation on the domestic
use of an international watercourse:
Article 7. Equitable sharing in the uses of the waters of an international watercourse.
The waters of an international watercourse shall be developed, used and shared by
watercourse States in a reasonable and equitable manner on the basis of good faith and
good-neighbourly relations with a view to attaining optimum utilization thereof
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consistent with adequate protection of the international watercourse and its
components.158
Evensen first introduces this form of “legal standard”159 directing how an international
watercourse may be used within a state; it “shall be developed” and “used…in a reasonable and
equitable manner…with a view to attaining optimum utilization.”160 This draft Article
recognizes the interconnectedness of uses within each state, provides that each state may utilize
its equitable and reasonable share and that each state’s share must be used in an equitable and
reasonable manner. Equitable and reasonable utilization are determined using a list of factors,
many of which carry forward from the Helsinki Rules to the Schwebel draft articles. The Draft
Article 8 factors for the “determination of reasonable and equitable use”161 include “conservation
by the watercourse state,”162 a comparison of efficiencies of use among watercourse states,163
pollution “as a consequence of the particular use,”164 “other interference with or adverse effects,
if any, of such use for the uses, rights or interests of other watercourse States,”165 and the
“availability to the States concerned and to other watercourse States of alternative water
resources.”166 Each of the factors mentioned here relates to use of water within the state and may
be used to determine if such domestic use is reasonable. There is some overlap in that some of
the factors, such as the availability of other water resources may also be used to determine the
equitable share for each state.
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Evensen may be credited with introducing the concept of reasonable use to the ILC draft
articles regarding equitable use of an international watercourse and also for explicitly adding the
important concept that uses within a watercourse state are to be reasonable.
McCaffrey, ILC Draft Articles: Special Rapporteur Stephen C. McCaffrey comments on the
previous draft articles in his second report in 1986.167 McCaffrey chronicles the changes from
“shared natural resource” articulated by the first Special Rapporteur Richard D. Kearny and
developed by Schwebel to the language of the most recent drafts “sharing in the use of waters in
a reasonable and equitable manner.”168 He reviewed the draft articles by Evensen in light of
strong State objections to the concept that an international watercourse is a “shared natural
resource.”169 McCaffrey notes the work of Evensen to replace the language and concept of a
watercourse as a shared natural resource with the principle that “States were entitled to a
reasonable and equitable share of the benefits arising from an international watercourse.”170
McCaffrey states that “[T]he expression ‘the watercourse system and its waters are…a shared
natural resource’ had been changed to ‘the watercourse States concerned shall share in the use of
the waters of the watercourse in a reasonable and equitable manner’”171 in order to address state
objections.
McCaffrey discusses two sides to equitable and reasonable utilization which he
incorporates into a new draft Article 5. The first is that each state is entitled to an equitable and
reasonable share of an international watercourse; the second is that no state is entitled to more
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Stephen C. McCaffrey, Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
1986, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/399, Par. 71-75.
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Id. at Par. 38.
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Id. at Par. 23.
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Id. at Par. 23.
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Id. at Par. 14 discussing Evensen Second Report supra note 149, par. 55.
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than its share or to a share that interferes with another states’ equitable and reasonable share.172
McCaffrey includes an extensive survey and discussion of treaties, positions taken in diplomatic
exchanges, state practice, judicial decisions, arbitral awards, other international instruments, the
views of publicists and municipal court decisions.173 Based on this extensive survey McCaffrey
concludes:
It is clear…that there is overwhelming support for the doctrine of equitable utilization as
a general, guiding principle of law for the determination of the rights of States in respect
of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.174
The bedrock upon which the doctrine of equitable utilization is founded is the
fundamental principle represented by the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. As
seen above, this maxim is a generally accepted principle of law governing the relations
between States. In the context of the use of a watercourse which separates or traverses
two or more States, this means that one of those States may not use or permit the use of
the watercourse in such a way as to cause injury to the other(s). Thus the States are
referred to as having “equal” or, perhaps more accurately, “correlative” rights in respect
of use of the watercourse, a concept which finds expression in the doctrine of limited
territorial sovereignty: a State has the sovereign right to make whatever use it wishes of
waters within its territory, but that right is limited by the duty not to cause injury to other
States.175 (citations omitted)
McCaffrey goes on to discuss the parameters of equitable use in this second report176 but
does not discuss in this or later reports the addition of the requirement of reasonable use to the
draft of what became Article 5 of the 1997 UN Convention.
What may appear as a subtle change in wording from the Evensen draft Article 6 to the
McCaffrey draft Article 5 may in fact be a change in meaning with the new Article 5 reflecting
more the concept of domestic water use contained in the Evensen Article 7 with the
understanding that an equitable apportionment must take place in order for there to be an
equitable and reasonable domestic utilization.
172
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The Draft articles as reported to the General Assembly and as adopted in the 1997
Convention read as follows:
Article 5. Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining
optimal utilization thereof and benefits therefrom consistent with adequate protection of
the watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation
includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the
protection and development thereof, as provided in the present articles.177
It appears from the plain language of the first sentence of the first paragraph that the
Convention sets a standard for the domestic use of water within a watercourse state vis-à-vis
other states. This incorporates the concepts from Evensen Article 7. The principle contained in
this first sentence of Article 5, does not receive consideration in the reports or commentary.178
As with drafts prepared by each of the previous special rapporteurs, McCaffrey includes a
non-exclusive list of factors to determine equitable and reasonable utilization. Four of the listed
factors apply directly to domestic water use: “the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in
one watercourse State on other watercourse States;”179 the “existing and potential uses of the
watercourse;”180 the “conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water
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Y.B. I.L.C. 1991, A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2), Part D. The only change made prior to the adoption by
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resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;”181 and “the
availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, to a particular planned or existing use.” 182
The ILC submitted its report to the General Assembly on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses in 1994.183 Each draft article recommended to
the General Assembly is followed by extensive commentary indicating that each watercourse
state may use an equitable portion of the watercourse but not elaborating on the “reasonable”
aspects of the provision. The first sentence of Article 5 requiring that “[w]atercourse states shall
in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner” is the same as developed in the McCaffrey Draft Articles.184

Conclusion	
  
The forgoing discussion demonstrates that the 1997 UN Convention includes the
obligation for states to use an international watercourse reasonably. Equitable utilization and
reasonable utilization are distinct concepts in domestic water law, the former is the standard for
sharing or apportioning an international or interstate watercourse, the latter is the standard for
use of that watercourse. In order to determine a reasonable utilization it is necessary to have
information about domestic uses within each watercourse state. This may be a necessary
intrusion on state sovereignty in order to attain “optimal and sustainable utilization”185 of the
international watercourse. The commentary to the 1997 UN Convention does not include a
discussion of reasonable use. However, this is a long standing measure of water use in riparian
law. The following chart demonstrates the similarities in the factors for determination of

181

Id. Art. 6(f).
Id. Art. 6(g).
183
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May-22 July 1994, U.N.
Doc. A/49/10, Chapter III.
184
Compare McCaffrey Draft Articles contained in 1994 ILC Report supra note 172 and Art. 5 of the 1997 UN
Convention.
185
1997 UN Convention, Art. 5(1).
182

≈45≈

reasonable use in riparian law and the Article 7 factors from the 1997 UN Convention indicating
that the history and development of reasonable use in domestic law as embodied in the
Restatement First may inform determinations about what is reasonable use of an international
watercourse.
Reasonable use is not a fixed standard or a quantified measure of water. The domestic
riparian law standard of reasonableness is utilized on watercourses in regions with plentiful
water supply. It is also a principle that may be used in circumstances when demand exceeds
supply. For example, is it reasonable to continue to divert water to grow rice if the supply
downstream is diminished to a point that it is insufficient to supply the population with drinking
water? The principle of reasonable use may provide flexibility to require changes in use to meet
changes in natural conditions and changes in use.
Following the chart, the next chapter discusses the comparative nature of water law based
on equitable and reasonable use and the difficulties inherent in a comparative international legal
standard.
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Comparison	
  of	
  Restatement	
  and	
  International	
  Factors	
  for	
  Reasonable	
  Use	
  
Restatement of the Law of Torts Second
§ 850A. Reasonableness Of The Use Of Water
The determination of the reasonableness of a use of
water depends upon a consideration of the interests of the
riparian proprietor making the use, of any riparian
proprietor harmed by it and of society as a whole. Factors
that affect the determination include the following:
(a) The purpose of the use,
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse
or lake,

1997 UN Convention
Article 6
Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization
1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an
equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of
article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors
and circumstances, including:
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological,
climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural
character;
(b) The social and economic needs of the
watercourse States concerned;

(c) the economic value of the use,
(d) the social value of the use,

(c) The population dependent on the watercourse
in each watercourse State;

(e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes,
(f) the practicality of avoiding the harm by
adjusting the use or method of use of one proprietor
or the other,

(d) The effects of the use or uses of the
watercourses in one watercourse State on other
watercourse States;

(g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of
water used by each proprietor,

(e) Existing and potential uses of the
watercourse;

(h) the protection of existing values of water
uses, land, investments and enterprises and

(f) Conservation, protection, development and
economy of use of the water resources of the
watercourse and the costs of measures taken to
that effect;

(i) the justice of requiring the user causing harm
to bear the loss.

(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable
value, to a particular planned or existing use.
2. In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this
article, watercourse States concerned shall, when the need
arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation.
3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be
determined by its importance in comparison with that of
other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable
and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered
together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the
whole.
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Chapter	
  3:	
  The	
  Vermejo	
  River	
  	
  
The Vermejo River litigation between the states of Colorado and New Mexico186 in the
United States poses a fact situation conducive to analyzing equitable apportionment and the
requirements of reasonable use. It also demonstrates the vertical legal pluralism along a
watercourse.
The Vermejo River is a small stream that originates in the snowmelt of the Sangre de
Cristo Mountains of southern Colorado.187 This tributary flows for a total distance of 55 miles,
most of which is in New Mexico, before reaching the mainstream of the Canadian River. The
facts regarding use of the Vermejo River are simple enough to permit a transparent examination
of the relationships among the state laws of prior appropriation, the interstate law of equitable
apportionment, and the requirements of reasonable use.
New Mexico and Colorado follow the law of prior appropriation, the first in time to use
the water has a superior legal right. The priority dates and the quantification of the rights are
determined in an adjucation, a court proceeding that brings all water users on the same
watercourse into court together. The court enters a decree on which the priorities are listed
chronologically along with a quantity of water which has been beneficially used. In the event of
a shortage on the watercourse, the parties at the bottom of the decree with the latest priority dates
are shorted water.
The New Mexico portion of the Vermejo River was adjudicated in New Mexico state
courts and a water rights decree listing four water rights holders was entered in 1941.188 The
largest and most junior holder of water rights is the Vermejo Conservancy District, a federally
186

Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (Vermejo I); following remand to Special Master, Colorado v.
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funded reclamation project that provides water through “an extensive system of canals and
reservoirs”189 for stock watering190 and irrigated agriculture.191 The four users have fully
appropriated the Vermejo River the result of which is that any new use, whether in New Mexico
or Colorado, reduces the available supply to the most junior rights holder, the Vermejo
Conservancy District.192
In 1975 the state of Colorado granted Colorado Fuel and Iron Steel Corporation, (C.F. &
I.) a Colorado corporation, a conditional water right to divert water from the Vermejo River,
transfer the water out of the Vermejo River basin and use it in the Purgortoire River basin for
industrial development.193 The first litigation was filed by the four New Mexico water users
against C.F. & I194 based on a theory of transboundary prior appropriation.195 Both New Mexico
and Colorado follow the law of prior appropriation and this formed the basis of the district court
order enjoining C.F. & I. from diverting any water that would violate the senior rights held by
the four users downstream in New Mexico. C.F. & I. appealed, which appeal was stayed
pending resolution of the equitable apportionment action in the United States Supreme Court
which had been subsequently filed by the state of Colorado against the state of New Mexico.
The state of Colorado invoked the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court to request an equitable apportionment of the Vermejo River.196 The Court accepted
jurisdiction and appointed Special Master Ewing T. Kerr to hear evidence and prepare a report
which was submitted to the Court in 1982. The parties, Colorado and New Mexico, then
189
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appeared before the Court on exceptions to the Special Master’s Report. The Court summarized
the findings of the Special Master:
“The Special Master found that most of the water of the Vermejo River is
consumed by the New Mexico users and that very little, if any, reaches the confluence
with the Canadian River. He thus recognized that strict application of the rule of priority
would not permit Colorado any diversion since the entire available supply is needed to
satisfy the demands of appropriators in New Mexico with senior rights. Nevertheless,
applying the principle of equitable apportionment established in our prior cases he
recommended permitting Colorado a transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-feet of water
per year from the headwaters of the Vermejo River. He states:
‘It is the opinion of the Master that a transmountain diversion would not
materially affect the appropriations granted by New Mexico for users
downstream. A thorough examination of the existing economies in New Mexico
convinces the Master that the injury to New Mexico, if any, will be more than
offset by the benefit to Colorado.’”197
To summarize further, the Special Master determined that Colorado has a right to an
equitable share of the Vermejo River which the special Master determine to be 4,000 acre-feet
per year. The common law of equitable apportionment as determined by the Supreme Court
provides that each state has an equal right to share in the use of an interstate stream, even when
use in one state interferes with uses in another state.198 There must be a balancing of interests
and benefits.
In the first case, Vermejo I,199 the Court remanded to the Special Master requesting that
he provide findings of fact for the Court sufficient to support his determination that an equitable
apportionment of the Vermejo River would permit Colorado to divert 4,000 acre-feet per year.
Justice O’Connor wrote a separate opinion in Vermejo I concurring in the remand, but
questioning the finding of the Special Master that water use within the Vermejo Conservancy
District in New Mexico was unreasonable and wasteful. Two years later, Justice O’Connor
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wrote the majority opinion in Vermejo II200 holding that Colorado had not met its burden of proof
to establish that it was entitled to an equitable apportionment of the Vermejo River.
Taking these two cases together one discerns the following principles of equitable
apportionment and of reasonable use that elaborate on the holding that “equitable apportionment
will protect only those rights to water that are ‘reasonably acquired and applied.’”201

Equitable	
  Apportionment	
  
The Court recounted the law of equitable apportionment as determined in previous cases,
including the salient principles set forth below:
•
•

•
•

•

“Equitable apportionment is the doctrine of federal common law that governs disputes
between states concerning their rights to use the water of an interstate stream.”202
Equitable apportionment requires a “delicate adjustment of interests”203 considering all
relevant factors including:
o the physical and climatic conditions;
o the consumptive use within the different sections of the river and the return flow;
o the extent of established uses;
o the availability of storage water;
o the effect of wasteful uses;
o damage to uses in one state compared to benefits in another if limitations are
placed on the former; and
o the efficiencies of different uses.204
When the states involved recognize the doctrine of prior appropriation, “priority becomes
the ‘guiding principle’ in an allocation between competing states.’”205
“[T]he equities of supporting the protection of established, senior uses are substantial, it
is also appropriate to consider…conservation measures available to both states and the
balance of harm to benefit.”206
The “doctrine of equitable apportionment clearly extends to a state’s claim to divert water
for future uses.”207
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•

“[E]quitable apportionment will protect only those rights to water that are ‘reasonably
acquired and applied.’”208 It requires not only the “reasonably efficient use of water” but
it also imposes “an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to conserve and augment the
water supply of an interstate stream.”209

The final factor makes clear the relationship between equitable apportionment and reasonable
use in that the Court states that only those uses that are reasonably acquired and applied will be
protected. This is an interesting concept in this context given that the New Mexico courts had
previously adjudicated this stream requiring a determination that all uses are lawful. Examining
the range of principles articulated by the Court it is difficult to discern a standard by which an
equitable apportionment may be made.

Reasonable	
  use	
  
In Vermejo I the Court determined that existing uses in New Mexico could be reduced to
accommodate new uses in Colorado, an equitable apportionment. The Court used the standard of
reasonableness to determine the available supply from which an apportionment may be made
without causing legal harm. In other words, the Court determined that a wasteful or
unreasonable use is not protected under an interstate theory of priority of rights or a theory of
equitable apportionment.
The following are principles articulated by the Court regarding reasonable use or its
corollary, unreasonable or wasteful use:
•

“The question here is not what one state should do for the other, but how each should
exercise her relative rights in the waters of this interstates stream…. Both states
recognize that conservation within practicable limits is essential in order that needless
waste may be prevented and the largest feasible use may be secured.”210
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Id. at 185.
210
Id.
209

≈52≈

•

•

•

•
•
•

•
•

“[I]t is…appropriate to consider the extent to which reasonable conservation measures by
[one state] might offset the proposed diversion [in another state] and thereby minimize
any injury to …users.”211
“Especially in those Western states where water is scarce, ‘[t]here must be no waste … of
the ‘treasure’ of a river…. Only diligence and good faith will keep the privilege alive.
Thus, wasteful or inefficient uses will not be protected.”212
“In calculating the dependable supply we (the Court) placed on each state the duty to
employ ‘financially and physically feasible’ measures ‘adapted to conserving and
equalizing the natural flow.’”213 (emphasis in original)
Each state has a “duty to exercise her right reasonably and in a manner calculated to
conserve the common supply.”214
“What is reasonable…does not admit of ready definition, being dependent upon the
particular facts and circumstances of each case.”215
New Mexico did not act reasonably to take the actions necessary to detect waste and
administer the Vermejo River in a reasonable manner. The following are listed as
examples; the river does not have a Water Master, water use is not measured, there is not
monitoring of use, the State Engineer lacks the staff to detect unadjudicated and
unauthorized uses, the state had not installed gauges at the state line or assisted in the
maintenance of gauges installed by Colorado nor did New Mexico administer the decreed
rights under the Vermejo Decree.216
A finding that a use is unreasonable requires more than a showing that it is not efficient.
The Court will not permit unreasonable waste, but this must be established by clear and
convincing evidence and may only be determined upon a comparison of uses in both
states.
One commentator bemoans this last point indicating that the high standard of proof

established in the Vermejo cases is the demise of equitable apportionment.217 However, a
standard of clear and convincing evidence is necessary in these circumstances not only for the
reasons set forth by the court but because of the inherent nature of the controversy. Colorado
asked the Special Master and the Court to manage the water resource from the top-down, to
substituting itself as Water Master on the stream replacing the states.
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The discussion of a standard of reasonableness is difficult to apply. This case took
evidence on individual water uses, proposed water uses and then attempted to balance the
relative importance of each. The Court, at the behest of a neighboring state, imposed standard
of reasonableness on local water users in order to change a legal entitlement to water. This is
disruptive to the stability provided by local water law. However, the law of equitable
apportionment requires this to be done in some instances. The higher standard of proof is the
balance between intrusion into state sovereignty and local property rights and the equitable
apportionment of interstate watercourses.
In Vermejo I and Vermejo II, the Court held that Colorado must prove the particular
conservation measures that are reasonable for New Mexico to make to reduce demand for water.
Colorado failed to do so. The Court also required proof that the proposed uses in Colorado
which meet the same standard of reasonableness. Colorado failed to prove this as well. For
these reasons, the Court ruled in favor of New Mexico.

Conclusion	
  
Determining equitable apportionment and reasonable use requires an examination of
water use that many states will find intrusive. In Vermejo I and Vermejo II Colorado alleged
unreasonable use by New Mexico and New Mexico countered that the proposed uses in Colorado
must be reasonable as well. A finding of unreasonable use would “free-up” water within an
over-allocated stream making it available to new uses. The determination whether a given use is
reasonable or if the local laws and the administration of local water laws promotes reasonable
use is difficult to determine and requires a fact intensive inquiry. The Vermejo River cases
demonstrate the potential to use a standard of reasonableness to provide flexibility in the
management of transboundary waters.
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As discussed in Chapter One, the laws for the allocation of water develop to address local
resource conditions and policy objectives. The evaluation of local uses with an interstate
standard of reasonableness may result in a different determination of reasonableness than is
made based on local law.218

218

See also, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) for a discussion of the
conflict between local water rights and deliveries under the requirements of an interstate compact.
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  Chapter	
  4	
  Water	
  Laws:	
  Entitlements,	
  Rights,	
  Duties	
  and	
  Privileges	
  
Chapter One discussed selected examples of local water laws which developed from the
bottom up to serve local needs. Chapter Two examined the principles of international water law
discerned from state practice and codified by the International Law Commission in what became
the 1997 UN Convention; water law from the top-down. The Vermejo River example, discussed
in Chapter 3, lets us examine the relationships among local water laws, in this case prior
appropriation and acequias, and the relationship between local water laws, principles of
equitable apportionment among states of the United States and the principles of reasonable use.
This Chapter examines the legal basis of water allocation and the different meanings of “water
rights,” the entitlements, rights, duties and privileges that permit use of a watercourse. The
classic work Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral219 by
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed provides an economics and the law perspective of
different water laws. The classic articles, Some Fundamental Legal conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning220 and Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning221
by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, provide the basis for a tautological discussion of “rights” to
water. The reasoning from these articles is applied to local and international water laws to
highlight conceptual differences.
An international watercourse flows through multiple communities, regions and states.
Each user looks up the chain of vertical legal pluralism to determine the controlling water laws.
These may include a local ditch users association, community rules, provincial or regional laws,
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interstate apportionments and international agreements. At each of these levels similar
terminology of “water law,” “rights to water” and “water rights” is used but the underlying legal
concepts are different. At one level a “water right” is based on community participation with
shared benefits and burdens as in an acequia. At another level a “water right” is a commodity
that is quantified, bought and sold as in a prior appropriation system or the spring allocations in
Morocco. Absent a watercourse agreement, a “water right” at the international level is a “right”
to an equitable share of the watercourse that is indeterminate and, in some instances,
undevelopable without agreement among all riparians.222
Negotiations for watercourse agreements involving multiple states include a wide range
of state and local water laws. This Chapter uses of the work of Calabresi and Melamed and that
of Hohfeld to illustrate that a “water right” does not mean the same thing to all.

Entitlements:	
  Calabresi	
  and	
  Melamed	
  
The first issue which must be face by any legal system is one we call the problem of
‘entitlement.’ Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more
people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor. Absent such
a decision, access to goods, services, and life itself will be decided on the basis of ‘might
makes right’—whoever is stronger or shrewder will win.223
This is the foundation of the law and economics analysis by Calabresi and Melamed. It is
the decision to enforce certain “rights,” to favor one side over another in a dispute, which
protects an entitlement.224 Property rules, liability rules and principles of inalienability are used
to enforce entitlements. A brief examination of these rules in relation to water illustrates
differences in water laws.
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A government may fix entitlements based on economic efficiencies, distributional goals
or what Calabresi and Melamed call “other justice reasons.” The entitlement to pollute or the
entitlement to be free from pollution is a policy decision of the society served by that
government. The government may conduct a similar analysis to decide whether to permit water
to be diverted for an irrigation project. The decision will serve a policy of the government and
the government is assured that the benefits will inure to the society because the legal system will
support the continuation of the use that is favored by an entitlement, in this case irrigation.
“Society can, for instance, give an entitlement away free and then, by paying the holders
of the entitlement to limit their use of it, protect those who are injured by the free
entitlement. Conversely, it can allow people to do a given thing only if they buy the right
from the government.”225
The laws of prior appropriation protect water use with property rules. The water is free
to those who first construct the works and put it to beneficial use. The water right is quantified
and in most jurisdictions may be transferred and sold. In the example above, the irrigator has a
quantified water right which, given a limited supply, is protected by legal rules from interference
by later appropriators.
Water use under riparian laws is protected by liability rules. The reasonable use of water
on one parcel of riparian land is protected against unreasonable interference from other riparians.
Reasonableness and liability for unreasonable use are determined using the Restatement factors
which require comparing the disputed uses.226
The principles of international water law do not fit these rule sets. Each state riparian to
an international watercourse has the right to share in the equitable and reasonable benefits
derived from the resource. This is based on the sovereign equality of states which is crystallized
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as customary international law and is codified in the UN Charter.227 This principle is
incorporated in international water law through the provisions of the 1997 UN Convention.
Article 4 paragraph 1 provides that “[e]very watercourse State is entitled to participate in the
negotiation of and to become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire
international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant consultations.”228 The 1997
UN Convention states explicitly that “[w]atercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal
utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse.”229 The determination of
property rules or liability rules for an international watercourse is a matter for negotiation among
watercourse states.
Water use for vital human needs and a human right to water are gaining acceptance as
entitlements which may be inalienable. However, the international society of states has not
developed enforcement mechanisms and an individual entitlement to water remains uncertain.230
Article 7 of the 1997 UN Convention, the prevention of significant harm, is a rule of
liability. Article 7 is an obligation to prevent significant harm to other watercourse states.
Article 7 includes a mechanism to enforce liability for significant harm. It provides:
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories,
take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other
watercourse States.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States
whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all
appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in
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consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where
appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.231
It can be said that within international water law there is an entitlement to be free from
significant harm caused by another state’s utilization of the watercourse. This is based on the
above provisions of Article 7 of the 1997 UN Convention and the customary international law
principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.232 The ILC Commentary to Article 7 focuses on
harm from pollution and contamination. It is not clear if Article 7 applies to harm caused by
depletion of water by other uses. The ICJ was presented with this question in the Danube Case
and used Article 5, equitable and reasonable utilization, as the basis of their decision. The Court
determined that temporarily diverting 80 to 90 percent of the flow “deprived Hungary of its right
to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube.”233
Is there a state entitlement to particular uses of water or quantified amounts of water that
are enforceable within an international water law system of property rules and liability rules?
“According to the doctrine of equitable utilization, each state has a legally protected interest in
an equitable share of the uses and benefits of an international watercourse.”234 In the event of a
conflict, the conflicting uses are compared using equitable factors. While each state is “entitled”
to use the watercourse, the following section examines whether the right to an equitable and
reasonable share is an “entitlement” that is protected by legal rules.
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Comparative	
  Standard	
  
One state analyzes whether to utilize an international watercourse by determining the
needs within its territory. The determination of whether water and water works to meet those
needs is an equitable and reasonable utilization may only be made by examining e the uses made
by other riparian states. This is a comparative analysis in which the factors for comparison are
not within the control of the government wanting to initiate a new use. Assuming the new use is
equitable and reasonable at the time it is initiated, use does not necessarily mature into an
entitlement enforceable with property rules, liability rules or principles of inalienability. The use
remains subject to diminishment by what may be determined to be more equitable or more
reasonable uses in other states. This creates risks for a state proposing a watercourse
development that, absent a watercourse agreement, remain throughout the life of the project.
The equitable and reasonable utilization framework for the 1997 UN Convention is
valuable in part because it is flexible enough to apply to all states and all watercourses
throughout the world.235 It establishes that each state has the right to share in the watercourse
and diminishes the influence of watercourse “might” based either on economic or military power
or on the relative location of the state on the watercourse. However, it is this flexibility that
makes development based on the rule of equitable and reasonable utilization risky. There are
few, if any, watercourses within the world that contain sufficient water to accommodate all
planned development. If the watercourse accommodates new development today, in time it will
no longer contain sufficient water for additional uses. At any given time during planning,
financing, construction or operation of watercourse works the equities along the watercourse
may change and development in one state may be foreclosed by development within another
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state. This hampers investment in development requiring a water supply that remains available,
predictable and ascertainable throughout the life of the development.236
Water use in the eastern states of the United States is based on riparian law. The
quantification of a riparian use is governed by the rule of reasonableness which compares uses
using similar factors to those used to determine equitable and reasonable utilization in
international law.237 In the latter half of the 20th century consumptive water use increased and
riparian law did not provide the security needed for new water dependant development. The
leading water scholar at that time described the problem as follows:
“A major criticism of the system concerns the element of uncertainty associated with the
reasonable use of water for nondomestic purposes. Because the reasonableness of each
use is determined by the needs of other riparians, unforeseen conditions may arise when
others commence or enlarge uses despite long nonuse of their rights. A further
uncertainty exists in those states where a riparian neither making nor intending to make
use of water can enjoin an existing use as unreasonable with regard to his right.”238
Reasonableness is measured “either by the lack of damage to others or by the relative
insignificance of the damage compared to the value of the use.”239 Equitable utilization may
only be ascertained by comparing a use in one state to uses in all other states on the watercourse.
Both equitable and reasonable are post hoc determinations. On a developed watercourse changes
in watercourse conditions and new uses create new risks to the existing uses as each of them is
measured against the new conditions.
The combination of legal and factual uncertainty240 impairs the security needed to invest
in water intensive development. This is particularly acute within a basin subject to natural
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fluctuations in flow. “What might be a reasonable [or equitable] use in good water years may
become highly unreasonable in times of drought, and some riparians may, thus, lose their right
temporarily.”241 Physical uncertainties may be overcome to a limited extent by storage, but the
construction of storage facilities requires cooperation among the watercourse states to avoid
having the impoundment of flow become a violation of the equitable and reasonable standard.242
It may be impossible to make a comparative analysis. Each state needs the data on
natural conditions (flow, precipitation, climate, etc) and use within each other state to make the
necessary comparisons. Water security necessary for a state to serve its own domestic needs is
not possible without this information.243 The security of a water entitlement while not provided
by the principles of international water law alone may be acquired through agreements among
co-riparians. The principles of equitable and reasonable utilization are better applied as a
standard for negotiation than a basis for establishing a water entitlement. This is discussed
further in Part II.

	
  Rights,	
  Duties	
  and	
  Privileges:	
  Hohfeld	
  
Local water laws based in property describe water use in terms of water rights. This
section explores the law of equitable and reasonable utilization as a right to water. Professor
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld studied and developed the legal language of rights.244 His
scholarship and definitions of legal relationships, though published near the turn of the twentieth
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century, remain a standard of jurisprudential thought today.245 This discussion focuses on the
Hohfeld chart of jural correlatives: right/duty and privilege/no-right.246
Looking at international water law using the Hohfeldian system of rights and duties
highlights the distinctions between a property based water law system such as prior
appropriations and those based on an equitable share of the resource. Water within an
international watercourse is not owned by any one state along its course nor may one state assert
control over the watercourse to the exclusion of other states.247 The watercourse is a resource
shared by all watercourse states.248 Hohfeld defines the right to share in a common resource as a
privilege. The Hohfeldian distinction between a right and a privileges is described by Singer as
follows:
‘Rights’ are claims, enforceable by state power, that others act in a certain manner in
relation to the right holder. ‘Privileges’ are permissions to act in a certain manner
without being liable for damages to others and without others being able to summon state
power to prevent those acts.’249
Singer describes the importance of the Hohfeld correlatives and opposites as follows:
The major contribution of Hohfeld's opposites was to make it plain that to the extent
others have legal liberties, one has no legal rights. Liberties are not by definition limited
to the extent necessary to prevent damage to others, as the sic utere doctrine misleadingly
implied. Legally protected interests are not granted absolute protection, as the concept of
protected rights had misleadingly implied. The sic utere doctrine had the ideological
purpose of reassuring people that the exercise of legal liberties did not threaten their
security. Hohfeld's concept of opposites was ideologically designed to demonstrate that
245
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to the extent individuals have freedom of action, others have no security. The modern
ideological message was thus completely the reverse of the classical message.
It is not true that a legal right has been invaded merely because one has been injured by
another. It is not true that all legally protected interests are protected to the same extent.
It is not true that legal liberties are always accompanied by duties on others not to act in
ways that interfere with the permitted acts.250
Building on an example used by Hohfeld “if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off
the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off
the place.”251 Under a legal system of “rights” such as those under prior appropriation we can
say that if a watercourse has 1000 acre feet of flow and X has a right to use 1000 acre feet of
water from the river. “[T]he correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X” to
not use water from the river. Depending on the extent of the watercourse, there may be hundreds
or thousands of Xs. Rights are allocated to Xs until the watercourse is fully appropriated at
which time everyone else is a Y with a duty not to use water.
Under riparian law and the international system of equitable and reasonable use, Y is
NOT under a duty toward X to not use water from the river. Each X and each Y hold the same
right to an equitable share. Hohfeld classifies the legal relationship between X and Y as mutual
privileges without corresponding duties. Neither X nor Y has a duty not to use the water and
neither X nor Y has a claim against the other for interference unless the use is unreasonable or
inequitable.252 Each state has the privilege to utilize the shared resource subject only to the
privileges held by other states. A privilege is described as a liberty or freedom and does not
have a corresponding duty of non-interference. One state does not have a superior claim to the
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use of the watercourse over any other states. Each riparian exercises the privilege so as not to
violate the other privileges. The example used by Hohfeld illustrates this concept.
“Thus it is said that a man has a perfect right to fire off a gun, when all that was meant,
apparently, was that a man has a freedom or liberty to fire off a gun, so long as he does
not violate or infringe any one’s rights in doing so, which is a very different thing from a
right, the violation or disturbance of which can be remedied or prevented by legal
process.”253
Each state along an international watercourse has the freedom or liberty to utilize that
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner “so long as [the state] does not violate or
infringe any [other state’s] rights in doing so.”254 No use made by State A enjoys a right which
if disturbed by utilization of the watercourse by State B gives rise to a legal remedy unless State
B exceeds the equitable and reasonable limitations of its privilege. The use by State A is not a
right to water with the correlative duty imposed on State B to not interfere. The correlative to a
privilege is no-right.255
For example, assume A irrigates 10 acres of hay which is sold as cattle feed. If A has a
water right in a jurisdiction with the law of prior appropriation that water right includes the right
to have water delivered to A’s point of diversion at a scheduled time in a quantified amount. A
has the right to use the water for beneficial, non-wasteful, purposes on A’s land. A has a claim
against all others with junior priorities who might diminish his full water right. A’s water right is
“good” as against all others with a later priority date who have the correlative duty to not
interfere with A’s use.
Assume B has a water right with a later priority date for municipal supply for a remote
community. B has a right to divert water at a scheduled time in a quantified amount for basic
human needs and B has a claim against all others with later priority dates who interfere with his
253
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right. If conditions are such that the watercourse has insufficient supply to satisfy A and B, B
cannot share A’s water right. B may not use B’s water right if it interferes with A’s water right
no matter the purpose for the use or the location on the river. B has a duty to not interfere with
A’s use. B’s use for vital human needs does not give B a superior claim to a limited supply.256
Equitable interests in water based on an apportionment or share or those based on
reasonable use involve a different bundle of legal rights. Water is a shared resource. Using the
example above, under riparian law if A and B meet the criteria for obtaining the right to use the
water, i.e. riparian land ownership and reasonable use, each share the resource. If conditions are
such that there is insufficient supply to satisfy both the reasonable use of A for irrigation and of
B for domestic supply, A does not have a claim against B to stop a reasonable use of water and B
does not have a claim against A. A third party examining the factors for reasonableness
determines which use is the more reasonable or if both are equal, reduces both.
Assuming the legal relationships among water users may be used to inform relations
among states, the legal principles of equitable and reasonable utilization of an international
watercourse create in each riparian state an Hohfeldian privilege to share in the resource that is
no less and no greater than the privilege of any other state, defensible against inequitable and
unreasonable uses. This is consistent with the international legal principle of equality of rights
among states.257

Prevention	
  of	
  significant	
  harm	
  
The obligation to prevent significant harm is codified in Article 7 of the 1997 UN
Convention. As previously discussed, Article 7 is based on the customary international law
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principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.258 This principle is important to completing the
rights-duties analysis.
When Article 7 is a factor in the determination of equitable and reasonable utilization259
it is a limitation on the privilege to utilize the watercourse. Returning to the nomenclature of
Hohfeld, Article 7 creates a duty to not cause significant harm with a correlative right to be free
from significant harm. This is apparent when examining the entirety of Article 7. The negative
duty is created in the first paragraph requiring states to take appropriate measures to prevent
significant harm. The legal consequences of failure to do so are in the second paragraph
requiring the state to eliminate or mitigate the harm or to provide compensation.
State A has a duty to prevent significant harm which may result from its utilization of a
watercourse. The correlative right held by all other states is to be free from significant harm
caused by utilization of the watercourse in State A. The rules for enforcement of this right are
contained in the second paragraph of Article 7 of the 1997 UN Convention include a requirement
for State A to mitigate or eliminate the harm, and for State A to “discuss the question of
compensation.”260 However, no state has the right to be completely free from all harm resulting
from the utilization of the watercourse because each State has the privilege to utilize the
watercourse and that utilization may result in some harm.

Conclusion	
  	
  
A vertical legal pluralism exists for the allocation and use of an international watercourse.
Those people versed in international law or riparian law are familiar with the comparative
concepts of equitable utilization and reasonable use. Those more familiar with private property
258
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allocations of water rights are not as familiar with the factors for determining equitable and
reasonable and with the uncertainty of the water allocations under comparative water laws.
“Water rights” or “rights to water” are varied and complex. Equitable utilization among
basin states is based on the reasonable use within each state. What is an equitable use and a
reasonable use requires a comparison with all other uses in relation to the natural conditions of
the resource. This is complicated further by the different legal foundations for water law and the
vertical plurality of such laws.
The framework of entitlements as developed by Calabresi and Melamed and the
terminology of “rights” discussed by Hohfeld help illuminate the differences in water laws.
However, precision of language and a common understanding of legal relationships will foster
better communication about utilization of a watercourse bottom-to-top and top-to-bottom.
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Conclusion	
  to	
  Part	
  I	
  
Part I began with a quote regarding the need for legal systems to establish entitlements,
the mechanism whereby the law may resolve disputes by favoring one side over another.261
Using Vermejo I and Vermejo II, let us take stock of that idea.
Local water laws develop from the bottom up to match water resources with the needs of
the community. Local laws often create entitlements, whether this is done on a priority system
as is the law of Colorado and New Mexico or the springs in Morocco. These entitlements
impose a duty of non-interference on all others and are protected and enforced through local
courts or other cultural norms. The stability provided by entitlements fosters development.
An international or interstate watercourse is governed by laws that establish the rules for
sharing the resource among multiple jurisdictions. These water resources are equitably divided
in a top-down system. The Supreme Court of the United States developed the common law
principle of equitable apportionment. The international legal system developed the customary
law of equitable utilization which is “born of the US Supreme Court’s decisions in interstate
apportionment cases….”262 These principles provide each watercourse state the equal privilege
to utilize the common resource. As was discussed in relation to the Hohfeld paradigm of rights
and duties, no state has the duty to refrain from utilizing the watercourse, each has the privilege
which must be exercised within the parameters of reasonable use and the prevention of
significant harm to other watercourse states.
Vermejo I and Vermejo II stand for the principle that an equitable apportionment of a
watercourse includes limiting existing uses in one state for the benefit of another. Water users
with valid entitlements to water based on the local law in one jurisdiction may lose that
261
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entitlement to users within another jurisdiction263 based on a comparison and balancing of the
equitable factors and the comparative reasonableness of the uses.
The second part of the law of international and interstate watercourses is that of
reasonable use. This chapter demonstrated that reasonable use is a principle of international law
contained in the 1997 UN Convention and part of the principle of equitable apportionment as
that doctrine has developed by the United States Supreme Court and as applied in the Vermejo
cases. The standard of reasonable use may supersede local laws on an international or interstate
watercourse. In the Vermejo cases the Supreme Court examined local delivery canals, local
management by the user, and the state management of the watercourse to determine if the uses
within New Mexico were reasonable. The Court also required a showing from Colorado that its
planned future use would also be reasonable, and the case by Colorado for an equitable
apportionment of the Vermejo River failed in part because of a lack of clear and convincing
evidence regarding the reasonableness of the planned future uses in Colorado.
The law of equitable apportionment and equitable utilization may defeat an entitlement to
water based on local law, however, these principles alone do not create entitlements. Use from a
watercourse that is governed by the comparative standards of equity and reasonableness is not
secure from claims from other states whether these occur over time or are reevaluated with each
new demand on the watercourse. State development utilizing an international or interstate
watercourse is a balancing of risks. The State may attempt to control those risks through
assertion of “might” which may include political, economic or military intimidation or the
assertion of discredited legal theories based on absolute territorial sovereignty or absolute
territorial integrity which are discussed in Part II. Or, a state may control its risks by negotiating
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watercourse agreements that take into consideration the needs of each state and the ecological
and environmental preservation of the watercourse.
Societies depend on reliable and legally secure water supplies to serve the population and
to foster and maintain economic development. Part II begins with a discussion of asymmetrical
power on a watercourse. It then looks at two aspects of negotiating watercourse agreements, the
role of law and the quantification of claims for future water security.
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Part II
Negotiating Watercourse Entitlements
[M]erely recognizing that states have equal rights usually does not, by itself, solve the
problem of apportioning the uses and benefits of an interstate or international stream. It
is only the starting point. But it is an essential starting point, because it means that no
state has an inherently superior claim to the use of the watercourse.264
Prof. Trelease posits that water security consists of three aspects; physical certainty, legal
certainty and tenure certainty. Physical certainty relates to the availability of water which may
be improved with infrastructure and river works. Legal certainty provides predictability in the
event of a conflict. Tenure certainty is crucial for investment in watercourse development. It is
the “protection against the loss of the water right by the exercise of lawful acts by others.” 265
Tenure certainty was lacking under the riparian laws of the United States and is a driving force
for the negotiation of transboundary agreements. All states have equal rights to share the
benefits of and from a transbouncary watercourse. As discussed in Chapter Two, the legal
principles of equitable and reasonable utilization are comparative standards. Each use is
evaluated against other uses. Therefore, tenure security requires all states to participate in
watercourse negotiations.
Watercourse agreements may provide all three aspects of water security. States, as
sovereigns, may grant or obtain rights and assume duties vis-à-vis other states by agreement. A
use of an international watercourse that is recognized by the other watercourse states and that
will remain secure during the life of a project may be established in a watercourse agreement.
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Watercourse agreements allocate water in any number of ways including volumetric
quantification,266 percentage of flow,267 shared storage,268 and priorities by sector.269
An allocation secured by a watercourse agreement creates a legal entitlement enforceable
according to the terms of the agreement and allows each watercourse state to respond to its own
preferences for water use subject to the equitable uses in other watercourse states.
Part I concluded that watercourse agreements are necessary to obtain and preserve water
security within the international law of equitable and reasonable utilization. Watercourse
negotiations are as complex and varied as the natural conditions of watercourses. This Part II
explores two aspects of such negotiations; the role of law and a methodology that may be used
by developing states to meaningfully participate in watercourse negotiations.
Chapter 5 begins the discussion of negotiations with a short explanation of three aspects
of negotiations particular to watercourses; first, the subject matter of the negotiation is a natural
system, second, existing intra-state allocations are controlled by national, regional and local laws
and third, the relative location of states to each other and to the watercourse affect their power
positions in negotiations.
Chapter 6 discusses using laws applicable to watercourse negotiations to define the
bargaining zone.270 The 1997 UN Convention and the principles recognized by the International
Court of Justice as customary international law establish the box within which negotiations may
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occur.271 The principles of sovereignty over natural resources, water for human needs and
sustainable development are discussed as soft laws influencing state positions in negotiations.
Chapter 6 also discusses the influence of the World Bank operational principles on watercourse
negotiations. All of these legal mechanisms help to level the playing field and lessen the
potential for domination by basin hegemons.
Chapter 7 discusses a negotiation methodology specific to watercourse negotiations based
on the Winters doctrine of reserved rights from the United States. Developed states have an
inherent advantage in watercourse negotiations in that they know their current water use and may
more easily project their future demand. Developing states may not have a complete picture of
present use or the more complicated calculations for projected future demand. Yet an agreement
for the sharing an international watercourse once entered, is not easily altered.272 Recognizing
these circumstances Chapter 7 adapts the methodology used for presentation of water rights
claims on behalf of Native American tribes in the courts of the United States to inform
international negotiations.

Chapter	
  Five:	
  Watercourse	
  Negotiations	
  Are	
  Different	
  
Watercourse negotiations are different from other bilateral or multilateral negotiations in
three significant ways. An international watercourse is a natural system about which all parties
require a common understanding. It is a fluctuating system that changes seasonally and over
time. Using the Colorado River as an example, the states meeting in 1922 to negotiate an
interstate Compact had stream flow data at Lees Ferry for approximately 20 years indicating a
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mean flow of 16.1 acre feet per year.273 They entered a compact for the volumetric allocation of
water totaling 15 million acre feet per year.274 Recent paleontological tree ring studies indicate
that the historic precipitation patterns examined during the negotiations of the 1922 Compact
were unusually high. The historic average flow is in the range of 13 to 14.7 million acre feet.275
This means that the average natural flow was not sufficient to meet the requirements for
allocations to the states at the time they were made. Total flow of blue water run-off is part of
the basic data required to negotiate a watercourse agreement. Information on groundwater
storage and recharge, precipitation and rain fed water use are also crucial but may be
unknowable given the technology and data collection at the time of negotiations.276 Therefore,
flexibility in the allocation and management of the hydraulic system is key to reaching
agreement.
Watercourse negotiations are limited by, but not controlled by the facts on the ground.
River works may provide storage of floodwaters and run-off during rainy seasons for release
during agreed upon times for multiple purposes. Rivers may be channelized for navigation and
flood protection. Multipurpose projects often provide flood control, irrigation water during dry
seasons and hydropower production, increasing the benefits to all riparian states.
In addition to involving complex natural systems and possible construction of
multipurpose works, international watercourses are utilized according to multiple layers of laws,
customs, traditions and religious practices. The next section discusses legal pluralism in relation
to watercourse negotiations.
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Legal	
  Pluralism	
  
“Legal pluralism argues that understanding water rights needs to start from the local
perspectives of those who use water, their daily experiences, the meanings through which
they conceive of water and rights, and the options they have available for acquiring water
and defending their access to this vital resource.”277
Chapter one discussed the development of water law from the bottom up, (laws to
determine water use that develop at the user level) and the development of transboundary and
international water law from the top down (agreements among states that determine the
allocation of water within large political boundaries). The local laws regulating use and the
international agreements are the bookends, the bottom and top, of multiple layers of law that are
the vertical legal pluralism of water law.
Legal pluralism is a term used by different theorists in different ways, all of which
describe multiple laws governing a single situation or sector of law. International legal theorists
discuss a horizontal pluralism in which a single conflict or situation is governed by multiple,
often inconsistent, legal regimes.278 Koskenniemi279 discusses legal pluralism and
constitutionalism as outcomes from the increasing fragmentation of international law. Absent an
international legal hierarchy the increasing fragmentation of international law into subject matter
sectors results in legal pluralism which is an acknowledgement of the situation and a tacit
tolerance.280 Twining281 and Teubner282 describe legal pluralism as the current fragmentation of
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law into sector regimes. These theorists are concerned with forum shopping for dispute
resolution among the different dispute resolution mechanisms provided by different sectors of
international law which may be applicable to a given dispute. It is often the fact that the sector
selected to resolve the dispute will determine the outcome.283 Legal pluralism acknowledges the
existence of multiple regimes and unlike constitutionalism does not seek to impose a
hierarchy.284
The most cited example of horizontal pluralism is a dispute between Ireland and the
United Kingdom over the Sellafield nuclear enrichment plant. The dispute was presented under
the Convention on the Law of the Sea to the UNCLOS tribunal. It was also presented by Ireland
against Britain before the European Court of Justice under the laws of the European Union. In
this dispute the President of the UN Law of the Sea Tribunal deferred to the European Court of
Justice “in accord with the dictates of mutual respect and comity.” Koskenniemi writes that this
global “comity” or “regime-co-ordination” will need to develop to resemble the private law of
conflicts.285 This is not likely to occur, even with the urging of Judge Stephen Schwebel, former
president for the International Court of Justice who advocates for the ICJ to serve as an appellate
body in such situations.286
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Koskenniemi287and Burke-White288observe the development of a pluralism of regimes
that exist along a horizontal plane. Any of the relevant regimes may be used to resolve an
international dispute with equal authority.
From this perspective, conflicts between, say, trade and human rights, economic
development and the environment, scientific and political expertise can never really be
settled because there is no meta-rationality that would allocate to each its respective place
or hierarchical position. Instead of co-ordination from some higher level, there will be a
series of more or less violent adoption of jurisdiction by one expert institution where the
matter had previously been dealt with by another. No hierarchy is established, but the
centre moves….Each rationality and expert system is involved in a hegemonic project: to
make my rationality govern the whole—to make my preference, the structural bias of our
institution, the general preference. From the UN and elsewhere, the experience is
familiar that once one knows which institution will deal with an issue, one already will
know how it is disposed of.289
Hydraulic systems are increasingly subject to horizontal legal pluralism with
development of additional international environmental regimes and soft law statements from
international conventions and declarations.290 The 1997 UN Convention covers a broad scope of
watercourses defined as “a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of
their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.”291
The ILC recently adopted on second reading a set of draft articles on “The Law of
Transboundary Aquifers” the scope of which includes groundwaters that are within the scope of
the 1997 UN Convention. This is significant given the addition of Article 3, Sovereignty of
Aquifer States in the latter instrument. All waters within the scope of the 1997 UN Convention
are governed by the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization. Draft Article 3 of the Law
of Transboundary Aquifers provides that:
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“Each aquifer State has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer or
aquifer system located within its territory. It shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance
with international law and the present draft articles.”292
The interjection of principles of sovereignty in relation to transboundary waters creates
the potential for two regimes to produce two different results regarding utilization of the same
waters.293
More importantly for the impact on current water negotiations is vertical legal pluralism
which is a subject studied by social and anthropological legal theorists.

Sally Engle Merry

offers a general definition of legal pluralism as “a situation in which two or more legal systems
coexist in the same social field.”294 “Classic” legal pluralism295 studied the interaction between
European systems of law imposed within colonies and the indigenous law. A “new legal
pluralism”296 examines the intersection of laws of multiple origins within a society.297 The
broader definition of law as normative forces in society associated with legal pluralism is
criticized as re-defining “law” separate from the state or sovereign power.298 However, it is
apparent from the discussion in this paper that water is controlled, regulated, monitored and
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disputes are resolved at multiple levels which may or may not be within one state’s hierarchical
system of law.
Guillet applied the principles of legal pluralism to water rights in northwestern Spain,
Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya applied the principles to water rights in Africa and Asia following the
research in legal anthropology of H. L. Joep Spiertz in southeastern Asia. The legal
anthropologist examines the normative system governing use of water at the local level and then
steps back to examine what other normative systems are at work to allocate the same
watercourse.
In addition to the multiplicity of laws and norms for a single watercourse the same law
may be applied differently in different locations. Each acequia within northern New Mexico
developed its own social structure for water allocations and for sharing the costs and decision
making within the community. Spiertz documents that the subaks in Blahpane have the same
normative institutions but their administration is different depending on the locale. “In other
words, plurality of law should not only be seen in terms of different normative systems
pertaining to one domain of social life, but also in the way in which one legal rule or one
institution can manifest itself differently in different levels and contexts.”299
These layers of the legal system are not necessarily consistent. The domestic law of each
state determines the hierarchy however within a hierarchical system legal pluralism calls for a
closer examination of compliance and non-compliance and by whom.300 Local use may continue
despite a transboundary agreement requiring curtailment in favor of delivery across a border.
The local farmer may not know of the requirements in the transboundary agreement or may not
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consider it binding on her when she is using the water in the same manner under the same legal
right as always. Under these circumstances the question of compliance and non-compliance is
not clear-cut. The water use by the farmer is in compliance with local law but the state may be
in breach of its obligations under a transboundary agreement. The state must develop the
capacity to control and curtail local use to meet its obligations under a transboundary agreement.
How does this affect transboundary negotiations? Negotiations occur at a level most
likely to meet the needs of the parties negotiating.301 A farmer negotiates for water with her
neighbors or a local ditch authority; a large developer negotiates with the reservoir operators and
regional government; a utility may negotiate with the state for construction of a hydroelectric
power plant. But negotiations rarely jump a level whereby local farmers negotiate with other
states. The farmers are more likely to pressure their representatives who negotiate with other
states. Each state brings to negotiations its own individual box built by domestic laws and
interests that confine or limit the options available to that state in transboundary negotiations.302
The Rio Gallinas basin in northern New Mexico in the southwestern United States
includes acequias which have supplied water to local farms for centuries. When the supply of
water in the basin did not meet all the new demands the state of New Mexico instituted an
adjudication to determine the relative priorities of each user within the prior appropriation

301

Bryan Randolph Bruns & Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick, Negotiating Water Rights, in NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS,
Bryan Randolph Bruns & Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick eds. (2000).
302
Eyal Benvisiti discusses establishing local agreements for transboundary resources. SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY
RESOURCES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE (2002) and essay, (Eyal Benvinisti, Domestic
Politics and International Resources: What Role for International Law, 119, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, Michael Byer, ed.
(2000). He argues for negotiating resource agreements, including water, at a local level to avoid the difficulties of
heterogeneous influences that complicate or preclude state-to-state negotiations. His main example is a waste water
treatment plant serving both Israeli and Palestinian communities. This type of local agreement may be effective for
waste disposal or pollution prevention however this author maintains that it should not be used for apportionment of
an international watercourse. This type of local agreement may be perceived as creating rights that only frustrates
basin wide agreements that can foster optimal utilization. In fact, Benvenisti makes this very point that states “must
abstain from assigning inalienable rights in shares of ICPR’s ….” Heterogeneity as described by Benvinisti is not
unique to negotiations over resources and is not the same concept as legal pluralism.

≈84≈

system of state law in order to apply the first in time rule. Each irrigator and water user within
the acequia was served with notice to establish the date of first use and proof of continuous use
in order to establish a priority date and the non-abandonment of the water right. The acequia
management through the mayordomo established that within the acequia the law of prior
appropriation did not apply, that the water was shared equitably in times of shortage and the
first-in-time rule did not apply. The land owners within the acequia also argue that the laws
regarding abandonment of appropriative rights for non-use do not apply. The Rio Gallinas
forms part of the headwaters and is tributary to the Pecos River. The Pecos River is subject to an
interstate compact between New Mexico and Texas303 one purpose of which is “to provide for
the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the Pecos River.”304 The
Pecos River is tributary to the Rio Grande. The confluence is in the limitrophe section forming
the border between the United States and Mexico and subject to bilateral treaties.305 All sections
of these watercourses are fully appropriated.
The question becomes what law controls the use of water by the farmers in the Rio
Gallinas basin? Within the constitutional system of the United States a hierarchy of laws exist
and the resolution may be determined in court.
Through out the world use of water is governed from the bottom-up by local and
provincial laws. Yet the use of an international watercourse vis-à-vis other states is determined
at the top levels of government with the results implemented from the top down. Recognizing
legal pluralism in international negotiations may have positive and negative effects on the
negotiations. If the vertical pluralism of water law within a state is considered in international
303
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negotiations those negotiations may be slowed considerably as local uses and constituent
interests are assessed. Local laws may permit uses which will no longer be viable after an
international water sharing agreement is reached. On the other hand, as will be discussed in
Chapter 7, the assessment of local uses and the local laws that protect those uses are a valuable
determination of equitable and reasonable utilization of the watercourse. If local laws and local
uses are not considered, the political constituencies will be impacted upon implementation and at
worst the agreement loses the legitimacy necessary to make it effective. Local water uses, if
continued or expanded under local law will undermine the implementation of transboundary
agreements.
As an example, the La Plata River in the states of Colorado and New Mexico is allocated
by an interstate compact306 which authorizes the respective State Engineers to adjust deliveries in
times of shortage. When the Colorado state engineer cut off deliveries to farmers in Colorado
they sued him for violating their water rights which were perfected and adjudicated through a
state judicial proceeding. The constitution of the United States provides that the allocation
contained in the inter-state compact which is approved by Congress is superior to state law
which regulates local uses.307 If this had not been the case, or if these facts were presented in an
international setting involving states without clear hierarchies of law, the upstream farmers have
the potential to defeat the purposes of the inter-state agreement.

Asymmetrical	
  Power	
  on	
  a	
  Watercourse	
  	
  
This section briefly discusses aspects of asymmetrical power unique to transboundary
watercourses looking at some factors that contribute to hydro-hegemony.
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The land to which a state is entitled, its territory, is defined by political borders, many of
which were established by military power and alliances. International law now prohibits the
acquisition of territory by force308 and most territorial entitlements are secure.309 International
watercourses310 are not limited by political borders. Water flows, it moves from the snowmelt or
rain at the headwaters through multiple jurisdictions, through multiple uses, often returning to
the stream bed or aquifer many times before reaching an outlet. The amount of water within a
watercourse fluctuates with storm events, with seasonal changes and with climate changes. The
water quality changes as the water passes through different geological structures, as it is used,
and as waste and pollutants are added. Over time, even the location of the watercourse changes.
Power may be exerted in watercourse negotiations based on the relative location of one
riparian state to another. Upstream states may assert physical control over downstream flow.
Upstream dams, diversions and the discharge of pollutants determine the amount of water that is
available for use in a downstream state. Downstream states fear depletion and contamination of
the watercourse before it reaches their territory. However, downstream states are often the first
to develop using the flatter and more temperate lower reaches of a watercourse to create
economic superiority within the basin. The downstream state also may balance the upstream
power with legal authority. The customary international legal principle sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas,311 on which the principle of prevention of significant harm codified in Article 7 of
the 1997 UN Convention is based, allows the downstream state to limit use in an upstream state.
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The downstream state may also object to upstream uses as inequitable or unreasonable. The
Danube Case demonstrates that unilateral control by the upstream state of 80 - 90% of the flow
for a short period of violated the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization in relation to
the downstream state.312
The historic legal theories for the non-navigational utilization of an international
watercourse reflect assertions of upstream and downstream power on a watercourse. 313 The
theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, set forth in the opinion of United States Attorney
General Judson Harmon during negotiations with Mexico over the Rio Grande,314 provides that a
state may use all the water within its territory without obligation to deliver water to downstream
states. This legal theory was not followed by the United States. However, the power of an
upstream location is used by Turkey on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to develop the GAP
project without meaningful consultation or agreement with the downstream states. 315
The theory of absolute territorial integrity provides a position of “might” for a
downstream state. This theory provides that a state has a right to receive all of the water within a
watercourse undiminished in quantity or quality by upstream use.316 This is an exaggerated
extension of the principle of sic utere tuo.
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The United States Supreme Court characterizes arguments based on both absolute
territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity as “extreme positions.”317 Neither theory
is viable in international law based on state practice.318 The research by the ILC preparatory to
the 1997 UN Convention and the ICJ decision in the Danube Case make clear that the law
requires states to share the equitable and reasonable benefits of an international watercourse.
The factors for determining equitable and reasonable utilization give consideration to a
states relative location on a watercourse319 and to the different levels of development320 without
giving advantage to one factor to the disadvantage of another.321 For example, in a typical
watercourse downstream state B is more highly developed with a larger population, a larger
economy and a larger military. Upstream state A includes the headwaters for the watercourse, is
a more remote and mountainous region and is less developed. The interests of state B are in
preserving the existing development and providing food and water for a growing population and
economy. A theory of absolute territorial integrity provides the most water security. Absent this
extreme position state A may focus negotiations on the following factors from the 1997 UN
Convention:
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse….
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State
[upstream state A] on other watercourse States [downstream state B]
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse.322
The interests of upstream state A are in developing the potential of the watercourse for
hydropower, irrigated agriculture and domestic supply for a growing population. A theory of
absolute territorial sovereignty would permit state A to construct a multipurpose dam. However,
317

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
MCCAFFREY 2007 supra note __, 112.
319
1997 U.N. Convention supra note __, Art. 6 (1)(a).
320
Id. at Art. 6 (1) (b).
321
Id. at Art. 6 (3).
322
1997 U.N. Convention supra note __, Art. 6 (1).
318

≈89≈

under the principles of international law as set forth in the 1997 UN Convention upstream state B
may relay on Article 6(b) “[t]he social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned”
and gain support from the Helsinki Rules Article V(2)(b) which provides that the hydrology of
the basin, “including in particular the contribution of water by each basin State” is a relevant
factor to determine equitable and reasonable utilization.
The principles of equitable and reasonable utilization of an international watercourse and
the obligation to prevent significant harm to other watercourse states deter the assertion of
sovereign might over an international watercourse. However, remnants of each theory of
absolute sovereignty remain in political posturing and therefore each theory informs the
discussion of negotiations.

Conclusion	
  
This chapter discussed unique negotiating circumstances related to watercourses, the
variability of the natural conditions of the watercourse, the layers of existing laws governing its
utilization, and the power positions of the parties based on their relative location on the
watercourse. Within a state, the recognition of subsidiary laws governing utilization of the
watercourse informs the negotiating positions as well as lays the foundation for implementation
of a watercourse agreement. The physical characteristics of the watercourse may cause a shift in
the relative political power positions of the parties to the negotiations depending on the location
as an upstream or downstream state.
Transboundary watercourse agreements are political instruments. International
agreements are negotiated by government officials and once concluded must be approved by
legislative or parliamentary bodies to enter into force. The negotiators balance the interests and
benefits with the other parties during negotiations while maintaining the domestic political and
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development agenda sufficiently intact to obtain ratification. This complexity of interests is one
reason current scholars are proposing “benefit sharing”323 By enlarging the basket of items open
for negotiation the parties are more likely to be able to create a win-win situation for all
constituents.324
Benefit sharing and broadening the negotiations do little to limit the power that can be
exercised by a hydro-hegemon. The next chapter discusses the role international law may play to
support a process to better equalize the power positions in watercourse negotiations and provide
legitimacy for local constituencies.
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Chapter	
  Six:	
  The	
  Role	
  of	
  Law	
  
A person trained in another discipline, an engineer, has postulated that, in fact,
water laws have a relatively unimportant effect on development, that entrepreneurs
initiate projects and engineers build them without much regard for the fears here
discussed the need to reform of water laws].
Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between. If poorly-designed laws do not
impede all developments, how much do they impede? If development proceeds outside
the law, to what extent is present law a trap waiting to be sprung on those who have
invested in projects? How many projects are not built? The biggest builder and
financier of water use projects, the federal government, has refused to act in the face of
uncertain water titles….325
Frank J. Trelease, the leading water law scholar of the 20th century poses these questions
about the role of water law following his analysis of the prior appropriation and riparian systems
in the United States in a time of maximum development.326 While the policy promoting
maximum development has changed since 1957 to that of “optimal and sustainable
utilization,”327 the questions posed by Prof. Trelease remain relevant.
As discussed in Part I, international water law does not in and of itself, apportion or
allocate the waters of international watercourses, it does not determine which side to favor in a
conflict.
“Pacta sunt servanda, the cardinal rule of international law, prohibits the breaking of
agreements. But what role should international law play in the making of agreements?”328 A
leading non-lawyer in transboundary water policy described international law as “poorly
developed, contradictory, and unenforceable.”329 If we assume this to be an accurate statement,
325

Frank J. Trelease, A Model State Water code for River Basin Development, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301,
321 (1957).
326
Id. at 307.
327
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN Doc.
A/Res/51/869, May 21, 1997 [hereinafter 1997 UN Convention] Article 5(1).
328
Dajani supra note __at 62.
329
Aaron T. Wolf, “Water Wars and Other Tales of Hydromythology,” 112 in WHOSE WATER IS IT?: THE
UNQUENCHABLE THIRST OF A WATER HUNGRY WORLD, Douglas Jehl & Bernadette McDonald, eds (2003).. See
also Aaron T. Wolf, Criteria for equitable allocations: The heart of international water conflict, Natural Resources

≈92≈

the law of international watercourses still plays a significant role in the negotiation of
watercourse agreements.
Law seldom provides the solution to interstate or international water disputes. Within the
federal system of the United States the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
decide disputes between states.330 Over the past 100 years the Court has decided numerous
equitable apportionment cases. “In only three equitable apportionment cases has the Court
actually decreed a division of the waters of a river on an interstate basis.”331 In most other cases
the Court admonishes the parties to negotiate an agreement to resolve their differences.332
In one of the few international case regarding the non-navigational use of an international
watercourse the International Court of Justice reached a similar conclusion for the equitable
utilization of the Danube by Slovakia and Hungary.333
[T]he Parties (Slovakia and Hungary) … must find a satisfactory solution for the volume
of water to be released into the old bed of the Danube and into the side-arms on both
sides of the river. It is not for the Court to determine what shall be the final result of
these negotiations to be conducted by the Parties. It is for the Parties themselves to find
an agreed solution that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty, which must be
pursued in a joint and integrated way, as well as the norms of international environmental
law and the principles of the law of international watercourses.334
The restraint exercised by the United States Supreme Court and the International Court of
Justice reflects the complexity of apportioning a transboundary watercourse among riparian
sovereigns. Judicial remedies for apportionment are not likely to be available. The states must
negotiate this for themselves in a manner that permits compliance by all parties. Law maintains
a significant role by establishing norms and standards for the negotiations.
Forum Vol 23, #1, Feb. 1999, pp. 3-30 “international water law is ambiguous and often contradictory, and no
mechanism exists to enforce principles which are agreed-upon.” (before note 2).
330
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Henkin offers the following observations on international law:
International norms will … determine choice among alternatives. With more than one
way of achieving a desired policy, nations will not readily choose the one that violates, or
more clearly or deeply violates, an international norm or obligation. They will tend to
choose the lesser violation, sometimes at substantial sacrifice.335
What matters is not whether the international system has legislative, judicial, or executive
branches, corresponding to those we have become accustomed to seek in a domestic
society; what matters is whether international law is reflected in the policies of nations
and in relations between nations. The question is not whether there is an effective
legislature; it is whether there is law that responds and corresponds to the changing needs
of a changing society. The question is not whether there is an effective judiciary, but
whether disputes are resolved in an orderly fashion in accordance with international law.
Most importantly, the question is not whether law is enforceable or even effectively
enforced; rather, whether law is observed, whether it governs or influences behavior,
whether international behavior reflects stability and order.336
The law governing the non-navigational uses of international watercourses is still
developing. Brunee and Toope in their articles on environmental security337 maintain that law
and binding legal obligations are only one aspect of utilization of freshwater resources. Building
on the concept of security articulated by Robert Ullman that threats are based on events that
“degrade the quality of life” or limit policy choices338 they state that security of the resource
must be security at the local and community level not just in state to state relations. Internal
conflict over a resource is as damaging to stability as state-to-state conflict over resources. To
provide better environmental security, they argue for an “ecosystem regime” guided by general
principles which may or may not result in a binding agreement among those involved.
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Brunee and Toope state that environmental and freshwater security must be understood as
having two dimensions. The first is an expansive view of security in terms of the environment
and maintaining ecological balance; is the resource secure? The second is the more traditional
concept of “prevention or management of conflict over scarce or degraded resources.”339 It is
this approach based on ecosystem regimes that provides security both in state-to-state relations
and internally. Increased water security may be the goal of watercourse negotiations; both
security for the resource and the ecosystem and for the population relying on the resource.

Law	
  Defines	
  a	
  Bargaining	
  Zone340 	
  	
  
Using the analysis of Omar Dajani in his seminal article Shadow or Shade? The Roles of
International Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks341 this section examines the role of the law
of international watercourses in negotiating agreements. According to Dajani, “[L]aw’s
influence is not simply a function of the legal sanction that will follow if no deal is
reached….[its] influence is also a consequence of the shade it offers….the attributes of legal
rules that pull parties to reach an agreement in conformity with them even when enforcement is
unlikely.”342
Watercourse negotiations, like negotiations for any type of agreement, are influenced by
many factors, including “the economic costs and benefits of reaching agreement and of
continuing to negotiate; interests in maintaining an ongoing relationship with the other party;
social norms; cultural difference; power disparities; even spite or distrust.”343
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International water law is a relatively new discipline with limited development in
international tribunals. The International Law Commission conducted extensive examination of
state practice and existing agreements to discern three principles that have crystallized into
customary international law. McCaffrey sets forth these laws as follows:
Equitable and reasonable utilization: Shared water must be used in a manner that is
equitable and reasonable vis-à-vis co-riparian state;….
Prevention of significant harm: Countries must do their best to prevent uses within their
territories from causing significant harm to other states;…[and]
Prior notification: …[A]state must notify other states of planned activities that may
adversely affect those other states. Potentially affected states must be permitted to
comment on and consult with the notifying state concerning the plans.344
Only the third principles, prior notification, may be implemented unilaterally. The
second principle, prevention of significant harm, requires knowledge of conditions in other
riparian states. The first principle, equitable and reasonable utilization, requires tat all riparian
states reach agreement. This point is emphasized by the decision in the Danube Case. The ICJ
held that diversions by Slovakia, even though similar to what was contemplated by a treaty
between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, violated Hungary’s “basic right to an equitable and
reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse.”345 The ICJ went on to
solidify the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization as international law by referencing
the 1997 UN Convention and quoting the second paragraph of Article 5, “watercourse States
shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an
equitable and reasonable manner.”346 McCaffrey states that the Court quoted the second
paragraph of Article 5 regarding participation instead of the first paragraph regarding use
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because the second paragraph more closely reflects the outcome of the case—a recitation of
treaty breaches and inequitable uses and a strong recommendation for the parties to negotiate a
solution “that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty (Hungary/Slovakia), which must be
pursued in a joint and integrated way, as well as the norms of international environmental law
and the principles of the law of international watercourses.” 347 The Court did not articulate what
the negotiated solution should be.
The United States Supreme Court in deciding an equitable apportionment case between
the states of Kansas and Colorado strongly recommended to the parties that they negotiate an
apportionment of the Arkansas River. The Court declined to take on this task stating:
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of states in such cases is
that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they involve the interests of quasisovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of
future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration rather than judicial
imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may appropriately be composed by
negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal constitution.
We say of this case, as the court has said of interstate differences of like nature, that such
mutual accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement,
instead of invocation of our adjudicatory power.348
The Court went on to examine the controversy within the legal parameters of equitable
apportionment indicating that judicial intervention would occur only when one state breached its
obligation to the other.
“The lower state is not entitled to have the stream flow as it would in nature regardless of
need or use. If, then, the upper state is devoting the water to a beneficial use, the question
to be decided, in the light of existing conditions in both states, is whether, and to what
extent, her action injures the lower state and her citizens by depriving them of a like, or
an equally valuable, beneficial use.”349
The states of Kansas and Colorado negotiated a Compact with the assistance of federal
authorities, the purpose of which is to equitably apportion the waters and administer the
347
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operation of a new reservoir. The parties and the federal government changed the watercourse
facts by increasing the supply with new storage facilities and used the law of equitable
apportionment to set the bounds of the negotiations.350
These two examples, the Danube Case and Colorado v. Kansas, indicate the need for
negotiated agreements to establish entitlements to international and interstate watercourses.
Within each state there are strong constituencies with rights to water based on local law who
urge maximum allocation without concern for equitable apportionment with other riparian states.
The court decisions confirm the legal obligations of each state and provide the political cover,
the shade, needed to pull the parties to negotiate reasonable allocations.

Soft	
  Law	
  Influences	
  Positions	
  
There is a large and increasing body of “soft law” regarding the utilization of
international watercourses. Soft law furthers negotiations by serving as the default rules, the
standards, concepts and principles around which a deal may be structured.

When a state-to-

state negotiation arises to which that non-binding concept applies a state that previously voiced
support of the concept in the abstract may not be able to ignore it.
This section discusses three “soft law” concepts impacting watercourse negotiations. The
first two, water for vital human needs and sustainable development guide choices and help “to
anticipate the contours of a legal remedy” to the situation under negotiation.351 The third soft
law is sovereignty over natural resources. It is discussed for its potentially negative influence on
watercourse negotiations. Though sovereignty over natural resources is a principle of
international law, the assertion of sovereignty over an international watercourse is antithetical to
sharing the resource through equitable apportionment. World Bank policies also have a
350
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significant impact on watercourse negotiations and are discussed below for the direct influence
the World Bank exerts over watercourse projects and for the secondary influence on the
development of international law.

Water	
  for	
  vital	
  human	
  needs	
  
Foremost among the soft laws regarding utilization of international watercourses is water
for basic human needs. A human right to water is set forth in General Comment 15—The Right
to Water prepared by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Water for vital
human needs is the only use given a priority in the 1997 UN Convention352 for utilization of an
international watercourse. The relationship between these two documents is discussed below.
Peter Gleick discusses basic water requirements for human needs in terms of drinking
water, sanitation, bathing, and food preparation.353 He is careful to point out the variability in
basic requirements based on environmental factors including the local climate and distance to
water sources. Given these variables he estimates the basic water requirements for human life to
be a minimum of 25 liters per person per day.354 “Adding water for bathing and cooking raises
the total range to between 27 and 200 liters per capita per day, bracketing the level of 100 liters
per capita per day … as typical household demand in water-scarce regions.” Using this as the
minimum for basic human needs Gleick indicates that based on the best available data “in 1990
fifty-five countries with a population of nearly a billion people fell below the level
recommended.”355 Based on UN and WHO data Gleick estimated that in 2000 more than 1
billion people lacked access to safe drinking water.356 The World Health Organization estimates
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that in 2002 1.1 billion people are without access to an improved water supply.357 WHO also
estimates that 1.5 million people die each year from diseases related to unsafe water supplies and
inadequate sanitation and hygiene.358
McCaffrey was the first to address the legal issue of a human right to water in his seminal
article in1992.359 He explores both the concept of using the basic human rights documents, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,360 the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights361 and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights362 as a basis for such a right and the
potential obligations of watercourse states to each other to maintain adequate water to meet vital
human needs based on Article 10 of the 1997 UN Convention. He concludes that water is so
vital to life that the basic human rights documents should be interpreted to require states to at
least exercise due diligence in their efforts to provide water to their citizens.363
In 2002 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued General
Comment 15, “The Right to Water” based on Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.364 This committee does not address the mandatory
obligations contained in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which moves the right to
water away from the right to life under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and away from
a mandatory obligation as McCaffrey had advocated.
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Salman indicates that General Comment 15 can be “characterized as a need or an
entitlement embodied as a right.”365 The language of Paragraph 10 of the General Comment
continues this less-than-clear characterization.
The right to water contains both freedoms and entitlements. The freedoms include the
right to maintain access to existing water supplies necessary for the right to water, and the
right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from arbitrary
disconnections or contamination of water supplies. By contrast, the entitlements include
the right to a system of water supply and management that provides equality of
opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water.366
General Comment 15 strengthens the importance of water to meet human needs but is not
clear that co-riparians have obligations to each other in regard to availability of water. The core
obligations are for infrastructure, financing for infrastructure, and for water supply. While
couched in terms of “human rights” General Comment 15 addresses issues related to financing
and the “core obligations” are somewhat removed from the objective of providing, delivering or
obtaining water for people in need.367 General Comment 14, the right to the highest attainable
standard of health, contains a clear statement of a core obligation for all states “to ensure access
to…an adequate supply of safe and potable water.”368 General Comment 14 contains a more
direct obligation for a state to provide water to maintain human rights than General Comment 15
which directly addresses the Human Right to Water. The state obligations to meet a human right
to water cannot be answered at this time or in this paper.
The more fundamental question to the discussion of equitable utilization of an
international watercourse is whether watercourse states have a legal obligation to consider or
address the human needs that exist in other states utilizing the same watercourse. Human rights
365
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law protects individuals from actions by their own government but do international watercourses
create a situation that requires an interstate obligation. Is it necessary for State A to utilize an
international watercourse in a way that protects or at least does not interfere with the basic
human needs for water in State B? The following examination of the 1997 UN Convention, Part
II, General Principles addresses that question.
Article 5, Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation, and Article 7, Obligation
not to cause significant harm, are the key substantive provisions of Part II containing the general
principles of the 1997 UN Convention. As discussed in Part I of this paper, each of these
standards for use of an international watercourse requires comparison to other uses, more
particularly comparison to uses in other states and an examination of the impacts in other states.
The utilization of a watercourse in one state is never considered in isolation. Therefore State A
has a general obligation to consider the consequences of water utilization within its territory on
all other watercourse states.369
Article 6 lists the factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization which include
“the social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned” and “the population
dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State.” Using these factors alone, an
argument may be made that a use in State A that depletes or pollutes water needed in State B for
basic human needs is inequitable and unreasonable.
The 1997 UN Convention, Article 10 of Part II titled Relationship between Different
Kinds of Uses, provides additional support for this line of reasoning. Article 10 references both
Article 5, Equitable and Reasonable Utiltization and Article 7, Prevention of Significant Harm:
Article 10
Relationship between different kinds of uses
369
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1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an international
watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it shall be
resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to the
requirements of vital human needs.
Can this provision be used to protect “vital human needs” 370 in one state from
interference by another state? This author asserts the answer is yes. What is equitable and
reasonable utilization and participation required by Article 5 includes the factors of Article 6
which take into account providing for the population in need of water. Relying on the draft
articles that would become the 1997 UN Convention, McCaffrey draws a similar conclusion.371
“In our hypothetical fact situation, a conflict has arisen between the hydroelectric and
agricultural uses of state A, on the one hand, and the domestic (specifically, drinking
water) uses of states B and C, on the other. Article 10 would require that in allocating
their shared water resources, the co-riparian states pay "special attention" to the drinking
water needs of the populations of B and C. This, in effect, gives priority to the use of
water for drinking over its use for power generation or agriculture, in the event that they
come into conflict, as in our hypothetical case. The rationale for such a result would
presumably be that human life (here, in states B and C) takes priority over economic
development (here, in state A). While this proposition may not be particularly
controversial in the abstract, it could well be politically difficult for the government of
state A to "sell" to its population.”372
As has been discussed herein, there is acceptance of the concept of equitable and
reasonable utilization as a principle of customary international law binding on all states. This
principle has two aspects; one, utilization within State A must be equitable and reasonable and
two, that utilization cannot interfere with the equitable and reasonable utilization in State B. In
the event of a conflict between State A and State B each is entitled to an equitable and reasonable
share provided that each has sufficient water to provide for vital human needs. Therefore any
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utilization in State A, other than for vital human needs, that deprives State B of sufficient water
to provide for the vital human needs of its population is not equitable and is a violation of
customary international law.373 Using this reasoning, states must consider the human needs in
other watercourse states to determine if their own use is equitable and reasonable.
The other substantive provision of Part II, Article 7, The Obligation Not to Cause
Significant Harm, also requires consideration of impacts in other watercourse states by requiring
that a state take “all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other
watercourse States.” The bridge for cross-boundary liability is built in paragraph 2 of Article 7;
“where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States whose
use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate
measures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the
affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question
of compensation.”
The commentary to Article 7 indicates that the standard imposed on a state through
Article 7 is one of due diligence. McCaffrey examines the threshold of harm for legal injury that
would result in a violation of this codified provision of international law.374 “To be sure, the
causing of some forms of harm may be considered per se unreasonable, as for example, where
the harm endangers human health.”375
McCaffrey goes on to point out that in order “for the ‘no-harm’ obligation to be breached,
three conditions must be satisfied: significant harm must result in one state from activities in
another state; the latter must not only have failed to prevent the harm by its conduct but must
also have been capable of preventing it by different conduct; and the conduct or use resulting in
373
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the harm must be unreasonable (inequitable) in the circumstances.”376 A project or use in State
A that limits or contaminates the water in State B such that water is not available for vital human
needs, for drinking water and for food production, meets these requirements for significant harm.
It also may be characterized as inequitable and unreasonable—in both characterizations there is a
violation of international law.
The Article 10 reference to Articles 5 to 7 of the 1997 Convention may appear to be a
circuitous track; however, it ties water for “vital human needs” to principles of international law
binding on all states and thereby creates a duty for all states in relation to all other states, and
arguably all other humans, not to interfere with the human needs along a given watercourse. This
does not mean that individuals within State B have a remedy against State A. International law
has not reached the point of providing such rights, however, in the relations between states, in
the negotiations of a watercourse agreement, the state without adequate water to meet vital
human needs should prevail against activities within any other watercourse state which interfere
with the availability of sufficient water.377

Sustainable	
  development	
  
The concept of sustainable development is a policy for the interaction between resources
and people for global development. The need for this policy is articulated by the World
Commission on Environment and Development, an independent commission called by the
United Nations General Assembly. The Commission defined sustainable development as
development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.”378 Since the publication of the commission report, Our
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Common Future,379 in 1987 the concept of sustainable development has permeated the
international declarations related to resource development including those governing
international watercourses.380
The ILC draft of the 1997 UN Convention as referred to the General Assembly includes
the concept of sustainable development in Article 24, Management, which suggests joint
mechanisms for “planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse.”381 The
ILC did not include sustainable development as a component of the general principles contained
in Article 5.382 Article 5 did, however, include concepts that support sustainable development
such as reasonable utilization,383 protection of the watercourse,384 consideration of the effects of
planned development,385 and pollution prevention.386 It was not until the General Assembly
added “sustainable” which reads as follows in the 1997 UN Convention:
[A]n international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a
view of attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom,
taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with
adequate protection of the watercourse.387
In the Danube Case Vice President Weeramantry writing separately specifically
addresses the “Concept of Sustainable Development.” Justice Weeramantry explained the
importance of this concept as follows: “The Court must hold the balance even between the
environmental considerations (Hungary) and the development considerations (Slovakia) raised
by the respective Parties. The principle that enables the Court to do so is the principle of
379
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sustainable development.”388 The Court in the majority opinion refers to sustainable
development as a concept and Judge Weeramantry so titles his discussion, but the thrust of his
argument is that it is a principle of international law with normative value essential to the
resolution of the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia.389 He maintains that development and
the right of each sovereign state to develop is a principle of international law and that protection
of the environment is equally founded in international law. “While … all peoples have the right
to initiate development projects and enjoy their benefits, there is likewise a duty to ensure that
those projects do not significantly damage the environment.” 390 The way this is accomplished is
through the requirements of sustainable development.
The concept (of sustainable development) has a significant role to play in the resolution
of environmentally related disputes. The components of the principle come from wellestablished areas of international law – human rights, State responsibility, environmental
law, economic and industrial law, equity, territorial sovereignty, abuse of rights, good
neighbourliness – to mention a few. It has also been expressly incorporated into a
number of binding and far-reaching international agreements, thus giving it binding force
in the context of those agreements. It offers an important principle for the resolution of
tensions between two established rights. It reaffirms in the arena of international law that
there must be both development and environmental protection, and that neither of these
rights can be neglected.391
According to Judge Weeramantry, watercourse agreements that contemplate development
must be consistent with sustainable development which he characterizes as a principle of
customary international law. The majority of the ICJ characterize sustainable development as a
concept, but its acceptance in international agreements and declarations392 is sufficiently
pervasive that parties negotiating watercourse agreements should give due consideration that a
watercourse is developed in a sustainable manner.

388

Danube Case supra note --, separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry, A—page 1
Id.
390
Id. at 4.
391
Id. at 6.
392
See Id. at 4-5 for a list of documents.
389

≈107≈

Sovereignty	
  	
  
“Sovereignty” is a word with great power. It is a political principle. It includes concepts
of rights, territory and inviolability. In connection with watercourses it is used in two distinctly
different ways. First is the sovereign equality of states to share in the benefits of an international
watercourse. Second is the assertion of sovereignty over a watercourse. The former is discussed
in Part I as a foundational principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. The latter is
discussed below.393
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration affirms that “[s]tates have, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies….”394 The same
formulation has been reproduced in other binding and non-binding international instruments.
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration builds on this concept:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 395
The right to development is set forth in a Declaration of the General Assembly which
provides as follows in paragraph 2 of the first article:
The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to
self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both
International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full
sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.396
393
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The General Assembly in resolution 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources, declares that:
“The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the wellbeing of the people of the State concerned.”397
The concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources gained recognition in the
period of decolonization in the early 1960’s.
The principle of ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’ as the right of peoples
and nations to use and dispose of the natural resources in their territories in the interest of
their national development and well-being was established by the General Assembly in
its resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 1962….While the legal nature of the core
principle of ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’, as a corollary to the principle
of territorial sovereignty or the right of self-determination, is indisputably part of
customary international law, its exact legal scope and implications are still debatable.398
Sovereignty over resources is a principle of customary international law,399 a “hard law,”
and there is little dispute that states have permanent sovereignty over a resource such as a coal
deposit. However, the question remains as to its applicability to an international watercourse.
Because the answer to that question is not certain, this principle is discussed as “soft law.”
The legal theories related to transboundary watercourses of absolute territorial
sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity are comparable to the policy of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources. It is well documented that these two theories of sovereignty
over a transboundary watercourse are discredited theories of international water law.400 The
assertion of permanent sovereignty over an international watercourse may be considered as
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political posturing with a discredited legal theory or as an assertion of power during negotiations
over an international watercourse.
However, sovereignty over transboundary water resources is a current topic of discussion
by the UN Commission on Human Rights in relation to indigenous peoples and by the ILC in
relation to transboundary aquifers. These are discussed below for their potential pull on
watercourse negotiations.401
Indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources402
In 2001 the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights resolved
to study indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources through a request to
the Commission on Human Rights to appoint Erica-Irene Daes as special Rapporteur to prepare a
report to the sub-commission.403 This topic was suggested by the debates about indigenous
peoples rights to self-determination and the detrimental impact to indigenous peoples from
exploitation of natural resources.404 In response to questions regarding the nature of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources to be exercised by groups not recognized as sovereign states
in most regions of the world, the Special Rapporteur defined the scope of her work as “legal,
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≈110≈

governmental control and management authority over natural resources, particularly as an aspect
of the exercise of the right of self-determination….In this context, it is apparent that the term
‘sovereignty’ refers not to the abstract and absolute sense of the term, but rather to governmental
control and authority over the resources in the exercise of self-determination. Thus it does not
mean the supreme authority of an independent State.” 405
Daes discusses Indian law from the United States as a concept of sovereignty held by
indigenous peoples that is subordinate to the sovereignty of states. Given this clarification of the
difference between permanent sovereignty over the natural resources of states and that of
indigenous peoples, it is more akin to local water laws. Unlike state sovereignty which creates a
tension over sharing a resource, the sovereignty of indigenous peoples over water resources is
incorporated in the domestic legal system.
Sovereignty and Shared Natural Resources
In 2000 the ILC took up the topic of shared natural resources starting transboundary
aquifers. Groundwater and surface water are defined as parts of a unitary system in the 1997 UN
Convention.406 The ILC at the conclusion of its work on the law of the non-navigational uses of
international watercourses adopted a resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater
commending states to follow the principles in the 1997 UN Convention for those waters not
included in the definition of watercourse.407 The ILC work on transboundary aquifers uses the
resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater as a starting point.
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The draft articles adopted on second reading in 2008 contain a separate article titled
“Sovereignty of Aquifer States”408 which is a different and new legal concept in relation to
transboundary waters than any contained in the 1997 UN Convention.
This current work of the ILC on shared natural resources demonstrates the tension
between the political principles of sovereignty and the development of transboundary resources.
The United States Supreme Court determined that the states of the United States, as quasisovereigns, have sovereign control over the water resources within the state; however that
control only extends to each state’s equitable share of the resource.409 The ILC Draft Article
Three emphasizes that the exercise of sovereignty over a transboundary aquifer shall be “in
accordance with the present draft articles.” The commentary, however, indicates that this
sovereignty article is based on concepts of territorial boundaries, not equitable allocation.410
The ILC Special Rapporteur purported to base the draft articles for transboundary
groundwaters on the 1997 UN Convention. There is reported discussion that the 1997 UN
Convention covered the topic of transboundary aquifers, however, the ILC proceeded to identify
the differences between watercourses as defined in the Convention and aquifers within the scope
of the draft articles. In essence, the draft articles contain exceptions to the legal principles of
equitable and reasonable utilization contained in the 1997 UN Convention. Scientists are
developing a better understanding of the interconnectedness of water throughout the hydrologic
cycle411 and an understanding of the nature and extent of what the ILC called confined aquifers.
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However, the legal separation of “watercourses”412 from “aquifers”413 creates the potential for
conflicting legal standards for water use. Separation of the law for groundwater withdrawal from
the law for surface water may lead to situations where neither is sustainable.414
Special Rapporteur Chusei Yamada indicates in his reports that members of the
Commission requested a specific reference to General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14
December 1962, entitled “Permanent sovereignty over natural resources.” He recommended that
such a reference be in the Preambular language which would not be drafted until the articles
were final. The Drafting Committee returned draft articles including the above quoted Article 3
on Sovereignty.415 The Commentary for Draft Article 3 in the Report of the International Law
Commission reflects the lack of consensus on the topic.
The need to have an explicit reference in the form of draft article on the sovereignty of
States over the natural resources within their territories was advocated by many States,
particularly by those aquifer States that are of the opinion that water resources belong to
the States in which they are located and are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of those
States. They also pointed out that groundwaters must be regarded as belonging to the
States where they are located, along the lines of oil and gas. Reference was made, in that
regard, to General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, entitled
‘Permanent sovereignty over natural resources’. Some thought that it would be enough to
have a reference to it in the preamble while others considered that such reference would
be undesirable for the proper management of aquifers.416
This focus on sovereignty over the resources is not part of the 1997 UN Convention and
the legal theories based on sovereignty over international watercourses were discredited by the
work of the ILC in the preparation of the draft articles on which the 1997 UN Convention is
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based. The topic of shared natural resources and the manner in which the ILC chose to approach
the topic invite the application of the concept of sovereignty to transboundary water resources.
In 2000 the ILC listed the topic of “shared natural resources of States” as an appropriate
topic for its long-term program of work. The Special Rapporteur proposed first to take up the
topic of confined groundwaters and then oil and natural gas. This sandwiched transboundary
groundwaters between the law of international watercourses codified in the 1997 UN Convention
and the law of mineral development including oil and gas which is reflected in General
Assembly resolution 1803. The Special Rapporteur proposed draft articles for discussion based
on the 1997 UN Convention noting the physical differences between confined groundwaters and
renewable surface supplies. He noted that the first discussions within the Commission and the
Sixth Committee included concern with the term “shared”417 and with use of equitable and
reasonable utilization as the legal standard.418 This concern resulted in sovereignty being the
lead principle in the Draft Articles.
Development of different legal principles for “transboundary aquifers” makes the
negotiated definition of the waters covered by an agreement key to the optimal and sustainable
development of the resource. The introduction of sovereignty over water based on the territorial
limits of a state may pull negotiations in a different direction from the law of equitable and
reasonable utilization. It would be unfortunate if the work of the ILC on shared natural resources
legitimizes sovereign as opposed to equitable claims to international watercourses. The relative
importance of these concepts must be resolved through negotiations.
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World	
  Bank	
  Policies	
  
World Bank policies for the development of international watercourses are not in the
same classification as the “soft law” discussed above. Yet, they have a significant influence over
watercourse agreements and over the implementation of both “soft” and “hard” law.
[T]he policies, procedures, codes of conduct, and guidelines of multilateral financial
institutions, such as the World Bank Group and of other United Nations specialized
agencies…are not binding in the traditional sense, (but) they have considerable practical
impact, especially throughout the developing world. In part, this impact occurs because
the financial leverage of institutions such as the World Bank enables them to impose
environment-related instruments such as “green’ loan conditions and environment-related
policies as part of their financing activities. Further, the application of these instruments
by multilateral financial institutions helps support traditional treaty law because many of
these instruments explicitly or implicitly further the aims of international environmental
agreements. Thus, in a world where the efficacy of a legal instrument is based upon its
capacity to generate compliance, the policies of the World Bank and similar institutions
may be highly effective in promoting international environmental treaties, in some cases
more effective than many of the traditional sources of international environmental law.419
McCaffrey argues that the operational policies of the World Bank, which, for the most
part, are set by developed countries and accepted as conditions of funding by developing
countries, contribute to the development of customary international water law.420
The World Bank is instrumental in instigating watercourse negotiations. It is Bank policy
to require notification and receive a “non-objection” from all watercourse states before funding a
watercourse project.421 These policies have been in place since 1956 with the objective of
ensuring “that riparians did not undertake projects with Bank financing to the detriment of other
riparians, especially in the absence of adequate notice and opportunity for consultation. Thus,
419
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Bank policy was largely consistent with current international treaties many years before their
development.”422
The current Operational Manuals require more than notification. The Bank makes a
determination that a project does not cause appreciable harm viewed from both downstream and
upstream perspectives.423 Though McCaffrey asserts that the Bank “is in a position analogous to
that of a third-party dispute-resolution mechanism, in that it interprets and applies international
standards in concrete cases”424 the Bank attempts to limit this role by basing its evaluation on a
determination of “appreciable harm” not by determining an equitable and reasonable utilization.
By using the ‘appreciable harm’ and ‘adverse effect’ formulation, the Bank is not
rejecting the ‘equitable utilization’ formulation. In fact, it has been noted that the
‘equitable use’ formulation is considered the ‘cornerstone’ of the law in this field. In the
Bank’s view, however, the equitable use analysis could require the Bank to act more in
the nature of a tribunal, adjudicating issues of equity and distribution between the parties;
whereas the ‘appreciable harm’ or ‘adverse effect’ formulation is more of a purely
scientific determination, akin to the environmental assessment/economic analysis
required of Bank investments.425
The leverage of World Bank financing strongly influences a state to comply with the
notification provisions of Part III of the 1997 UN Convention for planned measures. In many
instances it is through the influence of World Bank policies and the state compliance with
lending agreements that customary international law, treaty obligations and “soft law” principles
are implemented.426

Conclusion	
  	
  
“As a growing body of international law and international relations literature suggests,
the influence of legal rules does not turn solely on the possibility of third party
422
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enforcement; international law’s influence also derives from the normative force of the
ideas it embodies and its capacity to legitimize negotiated outcomes in the eyes of other
international actors and domestic constituencies.”427
Legitimacy is key to watercourse agreements. Negotiating within the box of widely
accepted legal principles adds legitimacy. International law influences negotiations because “the
attributes of legal rules… pull parties to align a negotiated outcome with them, even when their
ultimate enforcement is unlikely.”428
The division of a finite supply of water among increasing demands is a difficult task.
Conflicts among states over water are politically charged in part because of the multiple
domestic constituencies with a stake in the outcome which may require economic, political and
individual life changes. Sovereign states may divide the water and the benefits of an international
watercourse as they agree among themselves. The role of the law is to facilitate the negotiation
of an equitable and reasonable solution that is obtainable and sustainable. It is the role of law to
lessen the influence of power in negotiations through application of normative principles applied
equally to all states.
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Chapter	
  Seven:	
  Using	
  a	
  Winters	
  Methodology	
  
The comparison of uses among all states along a watercourse to determine equitable and
reasonable utilization is not an easy task. This paper has established that watercourse
agreements help to protect economic development and investment in water infrastructure.
Flexibility for the variability of the watercourse and the needs of the watercourse states should be
built into the agreement because hanges in circumstances and natural conditions are not likely to
alter the obligations in the agreement.429
Watercourse negotiations are part law, part hydrology, part engineering and part political
strategy. Negotiations require a common data base of watercourse information that is as accurate
and complete as the parties are able to acquire. Watercourse negotiations are unique in that the
parties may change the facts of the watercourse any number of imaginative ways from adding
dams and storage reservoirs to conservation requirements to inter-basin transfers of water, to
virtual water trade agreements.
This section describes the methodology used in the United States to establish entitlements
to water for indigenous Indian tribes who have not developed in the same way or to the same
degree as the non-Indian surrounding communities. This methodology is primarily one of water
use planning. This is supported by Article 24 of the 1997 UN Convention which calls for
“planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse and providing for the
implementation of any plans adopted; and otherwise promoting the rational and optimal
utilization, protection and control of the watercourse.”430 The Winters methodology described
herein may be used for water use planning and as the basis for negotiations. It develops the
429
430
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factual basis for presentation of tribal water rights’ claims and may be used as the factual
foundation for negotiations over international watercourses.

History	
  
In general, the states within the western United States allocate water among individual
users based on a system of prior appropriation and beneficial use of water. The first to do so on a
river system obtains a superior right over all those who appropriate at a later date. This system
of prior appropriation is summarized by the statement that the first in time is the first in right.431
During the 19th century indigenous tribes within the western United States were forced
from all or large portions of their aboriginal lands by non-Indian settlement. The surviving tribes
relocated to or remained on smaller enclaves that were reserved for them by treaty or executive
order. This territory, the tribe’s reservation, is governed by the tribe and subject to federal
jurisdiction but is outside the jurisdiction of the state(s) in which it is located. The state law of
prior appropriation does not apply within tribal territory and tribes are not bound by the rules of
state water law.432
In 1908 the United States Supreme Court decided Winters v. United States433 establishing
the legal basis for an entitlement to water for an Indian tribe. The Court held that the tribe was
entitled to an amount of water necessary to fulfill the purposes for which the reservation was
established. Since 1908 a methodology for determining the quantity of water necessary to fulfill
the purposes of the reservation has developed through extensive litigation.
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This chapter discusses the legal principles of the Winters doctrine of reserved rights with
an emphasis on water rights claims based on this theory. This is followed by a section discussing
the similarities between equitable theories of water use and a Winters claim comparing the
Winters factors to Article 6 of the 1997 UN Convention. This chapter concludes with a general
discussion of ways in which the Winters methodology may inform international negotiations.
The prior appropriation doctrine facilitated the rapid development of the arid western
states of the western United States. Prior appropriation rights are quantified at the time of first
use and continue until abandoned at which time they revert to the watercourse for the benefit of
junior appropriators. The doctrine also encouraged a “race to the river,” and over-appropriation
of the watercourse using inefficient diversion works. It furthered the philosophy that a drop of
water reaching the ocean was a drop of water wasted giving little consideration to the ecology or
“natural” resources associated with the watercourse.
It is into this system of “first in time, first in right” that the courts were challenged to
incorporate water rights for Indian tribes.434 The tribes were the first to occupy the lands riparian
to the watercourses yet few tribes developed the large river works for irrigated agriculture. The
United States government spent billions on major reclamation projects to irrigate non-Indian
lands giving non-Indian settlers a priority to water often in violation of treaties or trust
obligations to tribes.
It is in this context at the end of the 19th century that the Supreme Court decided the case
of Winters v. United States.435
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Winters	
  Doctrine	
  of	
  Reserved	
  Rights	
  
The Gros Ventre and the Assiniboine Indians reside on the Fort Belknap Reservation in
the state of Montana. The northern border of the reservation is the Milk River. In the early
1900’s there was not sufficient water in the Milk River to irrigate the lands on the reservation
because of upstream non-Indian diversions. This led to litigation by the United States on behalf
of the tribes against the non-Indian irrigators in the case of Winters v. United States.436
Montana follows the law of prior appropriation and though the tribe and the United States
used water for irrigation prior to any use by non-Indians off the reservation they did not perfect
the water use on the reservation under state law by filing the necessary documents.437 When the
conflict in uses arose the parties argued different theories of law. The non-Indians argued for
upholding state law requirements for perfecting prior appropriation rights. The United States
argued that water for Indian tribes should have the same legal status as their land. When the
tribes ceded vast tracts of land to the United States by treaty, they reserved unto themselves a
smaller territory, their reservation. The United States argued that the reservation of land
included a reservation of water sufficient to make the land habitable. In essence, the tribe did not
relinquish the land that supported their nomadic life and also relinquish the water necessary to
support farming on the smaller reserved lands.
The facts of Winters were particularly suited to this theory of law. The reservation
boundary was set by the Treaty of 1888 between the United States and the tribes as the “middle
of the main channel of the Milk River.”438 The Treaty provides that the United States will
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provide assistance for irrigation of the reservation and that the United States promises to promote
the arts of civilization for the tribe. In addition, the reservation was irrigated prior to the time
when the diversions by the non-Indian irrigators depleted the flow of the Milk River.
The Court determined that the dispute between the United States on behalf of the tribes
and the non-Indian upstream irrigators would be resolved according to the terms of the Treaty of
1888. The Court held that the Treaty of 1888 reserved for the tribe sufficient water to fulfill the
purposes for which the reservation was established. To hold otherwise and deprive the tribe of
water would make the Treaty meaningless and illusory.439
The courts of the United States elaborated on the reserved water rights doctrine of
Winters throughout the decades in numerous water rights cases. This history is well documented
by legal scholars440 and is not discussed here. This discussion leapfrogs to two cases which
applied the Winters doctrine and developed standards to quantify tribal reserved water rights.
The first is a 1963 United States Supreme Court case, Arizona v. California,441 which quantified
the tribal reserved water rights along the Colorado River developing the standard of “practicably
irrigable acreage.” The second is the 2001 decision by the Supreme Court of Arizona, In re the
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source (Gila V)442
in which the state court takes a realistic view of water use and water needs on reservations in
Arizona.
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Arizona	
  v.	
  California443	
  
In the late 1950’s the state of Arizona sued the state of California444 challenging the
Congressional apportionment of the Colorado River in the Boulder Canyon Project Act.445 The
other states in the Lower Basin and the United States joined the action which adjudicated the
rights to water within this section and the United States presented claims on behalf of riparian
tribes. This case was one of original jurisdiction before the United States Supreme Court446 who
appointed a Special Master to hear evidence and submit findings. The Special Master
established a standard of practicably irrigable acreage to measure the amount of water needed to
satisfy the purposes of the Indian reservations. In doing so he rejected a standard for tribal
reserved rights based on future needs as being too speculative. He rejected a standard based on
population as not sufficient to meet the future needs of the reservation and as too speculative. He
also rejected an equitable apportionment of the water between the tribes and the states because
the tribes are not states for purposes of this doctrine. He determined that the quantity of water
reserved was commensurate with the land reserved for the tribe.
What the United States did, in withdrawing public lands for these Indian Reservations,
was to establish areas that could be used in the indefinite future to satisfy the needs of
Indian tribes in the United States as those needs might develop. It follows from this that
the United States intended to reserve enough water to make the lands productive, in other
words, enough to irrigate all of the practicably irrigable acreage.447
The Special Master proceeded to hear evidence to determine the amount of irrigable
acreage, the practicability of producing crops on this acreage and the appropriate amount of
water for each crop, the water duty. He recommended an amount of water for each tribe to be
entered into a decree. For example, the Special Master’s report indicates that the Chemehuevi
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reservation contains 1900 acres of irrigable land within the state of California with a maximum
annual diversion requirement of 11,340 acre-feet or up to the quantity necessary to “supply the
consumptive use required for irrigation of 1,900 acres and for the satisfaction of related uses,
whichever is less, with a priority of February 2, 1907.”448 The priority date is the date the
reservation was established. This amount of water for the Chemehuevi reservation is confirmed
by the Supreme Court in the water decree.449
Water rights were decreed for six reservations along the lower reaches of the Colorado
River. All of the reservations are comprised of arid lands riparian to the mainstream with tribal
histories of irrigation and reservation histories indicating that the lands were reserved for
irrigation purposes.
The cases following Arizona v. California dealt with more complex reservation purposes,
more complex land use issues and often adamant opposition from water users and state
governments to the establishment of tribal water rights. Numerous courts used the standard of
sufficient water to irrigate the practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) within a reservation.450 The
Montana Supreme Court in the Big Horn River adjudication clarified the PIA standard as “those
acres susceptible to sustained irrigation at reasonable costs.”451
By the year 2000 irrigated agriculture was not the same economic base for the rural and
arid western United States that it was in 1963 when the Supreme Court established the
quantification standard of practicably irrigable acreage. The Supreme Court of Arizona faced
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with the question of quantification for tribes in Arizona established a more expansive standard to
measure the water necessary to fulfill the purposes of Indian reservations.

Gila	
  V	
  
The Gila River is tributary to the Colorado River arising in the mountains of far western
New Mexico and eastern Arizona. Except for a small section of the headwaters, the Gila River
flows within the state of Arizona crossing the state from east to southwest having its confluence
with the Colorado River near the border with Mexico at Yuma, Arizona. The tributaries draining
the high country of central Arizona include the Salt River, the Verde River and the Agua Fria
River. The mountains in the southern part of Arizona within the Gila River basin are drained by
the San Pedro. The parties to the adjudication include most of the population with the state of
Arizona, the major irrigation interests, the State of Arizona, Indian tribes, and the federal
government.
The Gila River adjudication to determine the relative rights of water users within the Gila
River System is a massive litigation that began in 1974. Approximately 849,000 people or
entities were served, 24,000 became parties filing 78,000 claims to water in the Gila River
system.452 Because of the enormity of this litigation and the complexity of the interrelationship
of the claims based on state law, federal law and reserved rights, the Arizona Supreme Court
adopted special rules for interlocutory appeal of questions of law that affect the course of the
adjudication.453 Gila V is an opinion from one such appeal addressing the single issue: 454 “What
is the appropriate standard to be applied in determining the amount of water reserved for federal
lands?”
452
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This unique procedural posture permits the court to discuss the Winters doctrine in
general terms not bound to a particular reservation or a particular set of facts. Gila V is in the
nature of an “advisory opinion” so that the parties, the Arizona Department of Water Resources
who serve as the technical advisors to the trial court, and the Special Master may proceed to take
evidence using established law for the case.
The Court reviewed the history of reserved rights cases since Winters455 including the
case of Arizona v California,456 and held that the United States established reservations for the
tribes in Arizona in order “to provide Native American people with a ‘permanent home and
abiding place’ that is a ‘livable’ environment.”457 The court did not accept arguments to examine
the official documentary history of each of the reservations stating that the official record often
did not reflect the reality of the reservation establishment. Giving a realpolitik explanation the
Court stated that “[d]espite what may be set forth in official documents, the fact is that Indians
were forced onto reservations so that white settlement of the West could occur unimpeded.”
Once the reservations were established and the Native Americans isolated thereon the United
States government was “less than diligent in its efforts to secure sufficient water supplies for the
[Indian] community to develop its arable lands and achieve meaningful economic selfsufficiency and self-determination.”458
The Court held that the PIA standard articulated in Arizona v. California and developed
in the Big Horn Adjudication is not the exclusive measure459 of a reserved right to water.
Irrigation may be considered, but “must be both practically and economically feasible.”460 The
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Court went on to negatively comment on water rights for irrigation indicating that in Arizona, “It
has been observed that ‘irrigation is one of the most inefficient and ecologically damaging ways
to use water…’”461
The Court held that a homeland is many things and determining the water requirements
for a permanent homeland requires a multi-faceted approach. Each tribe is to identify its own
needs that may be based on master land use plans462 and which may include claims to water
based on the following:
•

The tribal history including traditional practices and rituals that have used water or are
related to water;463

•

The tribal culture464 and religion;

•

The geography, topography and natural resources, including groundwater availability on
tribal lands;465

•

The present and projected future population; 466 and

•

The tribe’s economic base including development plans.

Each of these are examined by the adverse parties and the court “to determine that they are, in
fact, appropriate to a particular homeland.”467
These factors are used by tribes to develop water rights claims and are the standard for
quantification in Arizona. They are similar to the factors set forth in Article 6 of the 1997 UN
Convention used to determine equitable and reasonable utilization.468
461
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Winters	
  Methodology	
  and	
  International	
  Watercourses	
  
This section explores the ways the process for developing a tribal reserved right claim
may be used in negotiations over international watercourses. It begins with a discussion of the
differences between these principles of domestic law of the United States and international water
law.
The first and most obvious difference between reserved rights and utilization based on
international law is the protection afforded a prior appropriator. The “first-in-time” to use water
is protected in times of shortage and inadequate supply. This principle usually protects a tribal
reserved right since reserved rights are inserted into a priority system with the date the
reservation was created, not the first date of beneficial use. Most reservations in the western
United States were established in the late 19th century within lands that were occupied by a tribe
from “time immemorial.” This priority date is prior to construction of major works for the
benefit of non-Indian development Therefore, within a priority ranking tribes are usually first in
time.
International law does not emphasize priority of use. "[T]he lodestar [of equitable and
reasonable utilization] is not simply who got to the river first, or who is upstream and who
downstream, but what is equitable and reasonable in the circumstances. No state has an
inherently superior claim. The doctrine is 'flexible' in this sense and also in a temporal sense:
what is an 'equitable apportionment' may change over time." 469 Water rights based on prior
appropriation, including those based on the Winters doctrine, are not apportioned and do not
change over time. In the event of a shortage of water necessary to supply all rights those “who

469
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got to the river first” receive water to satisfy their full rights while others with later priority dates
may receive none.470 Prior appropriation rights are fixed in time and quantity.
Another significant difference is the legal concept of “reserving” water for future use.
International law does not recognize this concept. It is contrary to an equitable apportionment
among watercourse states. The Helsinki Rules specifically provide that “A basin State may not
be denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an international drainage basin to reserve
for a co-basin State a future use of such waters.”471 Each state has an equal right to share the
resource provided that a given use does not cause significant harm to another state. This is a
dynamic process the balance of which changes as each new use of the watercourse is added and
as the natural conditions change.
The rigidity of the law of prior appropriation when presented with the facts of Winters472
created circumstances whereby a legal right to water is “reserved” for future use. The
reservation of a legal claim that may ripen into a water right does not prevent others from
utilizing the watercourse in the meantime. Those rights with later priority dates are at risk of not
having water available when a reserved right is converted to “wet water” by a tribe.
Given these basic differences in legal doctrine, the process used to develop tribal reserved
rights offers a useful methodology for multilateral negotiations. Tribes are sovereign
governments subject to federal authority but not subject to the jurisdiction of the surrounding
states. The level of economic development between the on and off reservation territory is often
disparate with many tribal reservations remaining under-developed with high levels of poverty
470
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and a lack of basic water infrastructure. The adjudication of tribal claims and the negotiation of
tribal rights involve multiple states each with its own water laws.
Acknowledging the differences and the similarities of these systems the next section
discusses the use of the “Winters methodology” for national water planning, responding to
notification of planned measures, and negotiating an international watercourse agreement.

National	
  water	
  planning	
  
The increasing global demand for freshwater makes it critical for the utilization of an
international watercourse to be planned and measured. The International Law Commission
discussed the importance of national water planning citing the Mar del Plata Action Plan adopted
by the United Nations Water Conference in 1977.473 This Action Plan calls for the development
of national and basin-wide water planning for integrated management of land and water
resources.474
The Arizona Supreme Court in Gila V commended tribes for developing master land use
plans which incorporate the water requirements for each land use. These plans form the basis of
tribal claims and increase the credibility of claims to reserved water for future use.
The first step in development of a water rights claim or water planning is to identify
existing uses. For water planning this includes quantifying those uses. Municipal, industrial and
agricultural uses are measurable, but cultural and religious uses may defy simple quantification
techniques. What is the amount of water necessary to protect a sacred spring or to permit a
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baptism? Tribes have based these uses on minimum spring flows and minimum requirements for
habitat preservation.475
Reserved rights for agriculture based on the legal standard of practicably irrigable
acreage have been developed and quantified for more than 50 years. The process includes
analysis of soils, water availability, climate, agriculture markets, transportation, and all other
aspects of crop production. The sampling criteria are well established. With this analysis the
tribe has a credible water claim and knows the realistic potential for food or other crop
production and may evaluate the best uses for its lands.
Population projections are an important component of water claims for tribal lands. In
Gila V the Arizona Supreme Court stated that “to act (to quantify a right) without regard to
population would ignore the fact that water will always be used, most importantly, for human
needs. Therefore, the number of humans is a necessary element in quantifying water
rights….Population forecasts are common in today’s society and are recognized and relied upon
by the legal system.”476 Tribes use actuarial information including migration patterns to estimate
future population and the potential future demand. The distribution of the projected population
within different water basins is determined using tribal land use planning.477 Other economic
development plans and the water requirements for each are included in the calculations.
This level of detailed information for water planning is invaluable for the economic
development of a state and, as will be discussed in the next part, provides a basis to evaluate the
impact of upstream or downstream development on the equities among the watercourse states.
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Responding	
  to	
  notification	
  of	
  planned	
  measures	
  
Notification to all states on a watercourse, upstream and downstream, of planned
measures is recognized as a requirement of customary international law. 478 It is required by the
Helsinki Rules as a means to avoid disputes.
A State, regardless of its location in a drainage basin, should in particular furnish to any
other basin State, the interests of which may be substantially affected, notice of any
proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime of the basin in a way
which might give rise to a dispute as defined in article XXVI. The notice should include
such essential facts as will permit the recipient to make an assessment of the probable
effect of the proposed alteration.479
Notification of planned measures and the opportunity to respond build on a foundation of
cooperation among watercourse states. Article 12 of the 1997 UN Convention contains specific
requirements for notification.
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of planned
measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States, it
shall provide those States with timely notification thereof. Such notification shall be
accompanied by available technical data and information, including the results of any
environmental impact assessment, in order to enable the notified States to evaluate the
possible effects of the planned measures.480
The 1997 UN Convention formalizes the process for notification and the time periods for
reply.481 However, developing a meaningful reply regarding the significant impacts of planned
measures may be difficult if a state is less developed than its co-riparians. A downstream state
may be able to evaluate the impact on the flow of water reaching its borders after installation of a
planned measure upstream but an upstream state may find it difficult to evaluate the impact of
planned measures downstream. Both situations require not only an evaluation of the physical
impacts to water supply but an evaluation of the change in equitable apportionment of the
benefits from the watercourse that may occur as a result of implementing the planned measure.
478
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A state that has prepared a water plan using the “Winters methodology” is better able to
evaluate the impacts of planned measures. The internal water plan for a state will include the
amount of water required for specific uses which may then be used to evaluate the
reasonableness of the planned measure in response to plans in another state. A state may ask the
question: Given the physical characteristics of the land and the watercourse is the planned
measure equitable in terms of its impact on our existing and planned future uses and is the
amount of water to be used from the watercourse reasonable when compared to our own water
plan? The state may then formulate objections to the planned measure in terms of significant
impacts and communicate these objections to other states within the relatively short time period
of six months that is provided in Article 13 of the 1997 UN Convention.

Negotiating	
  a	
  watercourse	
  agreement	
  
A more developed state on a watercourse has the advantage of knowing what it has
because its water use is established and measurable. Existing uses are quantifiable and the
equities of continuing those uses are observable. The equities and reasonableness of any new
development is measured against the pre-existing uses. This process finds the developing state at
a disadvantage.
For most tribes in the western United States, the presentation of water claims legally
based on the Winters doctrine and factually supported with credible water use planning result in
negotiated water rights settlements.482 These negotiated agreements establish a fixed quantity of
water for the tribe which is approved by the non-Indian water users, the courts and by the United
States Congress.
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The factors to establish a Winters claim to water are universal factors used when there are
multiple sovereign jurisdictions along a transboundary watercourse which must be shared.

	
  

Conclusion	
  	
  
Agreements are negotiated based on the information available at the time, both a common

knowledge of the watercourse and the specific knowledge of the needs for one’s own future.
The “Winters methodology” demonstrates that a legal principle may be given concrete meaning
when applied to planning and development. In 1908 the United States Supreme Court
established the legal principle that the establishment of a tribal reservation includes sufficient
water to fulfill the purposes for which the reservation is established. In the 1960’s this principle
was further defined for farming tribes and measured by sufficient water to irrigate the practicably
irrigable acreage of the reservation. The Arizona Supreme Court addressed the issue of
quantifying reserved rights to water in 2001 when the suitability and sustainability of water for
irrigation in the arid lands of the state of Arizona was viewed as less practicable. The Court
adopted a broader measure of water for homeland purposes. This standard provides the
parameters to quantify a tribal water claim using scientific studies. The claim is then settled
through negotiation or litigation.
The international legal standard is more fully articulated. It is worded in comparative
terms but may be used by a watercourse state to guide the preparation of a national water plan for
the “optimal and sustainable utilization”483 of the watercourse “consistent with adequate
protection of the watercourse.”484 As this chapter demonstrates, the factors to be examined to
determine equitable and reasonable utilization and the factors to determine water utilization for a
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tribal homeland are sufficiently similar to demonstrate that the principles of international law
may be developed into a water plan.
A watercourse state within an international basin that is less developed may be stymied in
the international basin development processes unable to consent to uses by other states without
knowing or understanding the potential impact on its own future development.

A

comprehensive water plan developed using the “Winters methodology” permits the incorporation
of local water uses, multi-sector utilization and provides a measure for response to potential
impacts. It is one way to level the playing field among the states within a basin.

Conclusion	
  to	
  Part	
  II	
  
The Beginning point in any negotiation is the knowledge of what you have and what your
opponent has. Without that knowledge, any negotiation is a charade.485
Agreements are key to the equitable and reasonable utilization of an international
watercourse. Negotiating these agreements is a complex process requiring integration of the
human and environmental use of a natural system into a legal document. Water is being used by
everyone within the watercourse basin prior to the negotiation of an agreement and those uses
must be considered and where appropriate protected. This includes the recognition of the
plurality of water law and the effect of a watercourse agreement on other water laws.
Each state has an equal right to equitably utilize a watercourse.486 This principle alone
calls for cooperation and negotiation of water agreements. Each use of water impacts other uses
whether they are existing or a possibility for the future. The equitable, reasonable, sustainable
and optimal utilization of a watercourse requires the political will to share information, develop
485

McCool supra note ,34 quoting Person Zah, former chairman of the Navajo Nation in Water: Key to Tribal
Economic Development, in INDIAN WATER 1985: COLLECTED ESSAYS, ED. CHRISTINE MIDLAS & STEVEN SHUPE
(Oakland: AILTP/American Indian Resources Institute) 1986 at 77-78.
486
UN Charter Art. 2(1), 1997 UN Convention Art. 8(1).

≈135≈

common principles and implement them through cooperative institutions. Legitimacy of a basin
agreement is gained from recognition of all aspects of negotiations discussed above:
understanding the natural conditions, agreeing to alter the natural conditions for the benefit of all,
recognizing the legally pluralistic nature of water law, tempering the relative power of a hydrohegemon, and establishing the role of law in the negotiations. International water law provides a
common terminology, factors for consideration and the boundaries for negotiations.
The next and final Part examines agreements from two watercourses, the Colorado River
in the United States and the Senegal in western Africa along with the Utton Transboundary
Model Agreement for the methods used to apportion water and the institutional and other
management regimes. Part III also looks at three basins without basin-wide agreements for what
might be their next steps.
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Part III
Transboundary Agreements
Watercourse agreements set forth the principles for utilization of the resource. The
agreements substantiate the legal principles and the uses agreed upon during the negotiations.
Agreements provide a level of water security to the parties. Agreements are most commonly
administered by multi-party institutions established in the agreement.487
This Part examines three watercourse agreements looking at how water is allocated or
apportioned among the states and the institutions created to manage the watercourse. Two
watercourses with established allocations and basin institutions are discussed: the Colorado
River in the Western United States and Mexico, the Senegal River in West Africa. The legal
regime for the Colorado River may be the most complex in the world and it is the author’s home
basin, therefore it receives more extensive discussion. The Senegal Basin has had numerous
agreements since 1963, each modifying or rescinding the previous agreement, establishing
principles for utilization of the watercourse and changing the basin institutions. The discussion
of the Senegal Basin traces the basin agreements in chronological order.
A Model Interstate Water Compact was drafted by a group of experts under the auspices of
the Utton Transboundary Resource Center at the University of New Mexico. The Model was
prepared for use by states of the eastern United States however, the principles are applicable to
all transboundary negotiations.
This Part also includes a discussion of three basins without basin wide watercourse
agreements, the Nile, Amu Darya/Syr Darya and the Euphrates/Tigris basins. These three basins
are examined using four criteria considered preparatory to entering an agreement: basin wide
487
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communication, gathering and exchange of data, common goals and principles, and common
institutions.
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Chapter Eight: Colorado River, United States and Mexico	
  
The Colorado River rises in the snow pack of the Rocky Mountains of the western United
States. It flows in a southerly direction through the states of Colorado, Wyoming and Utah to the
Grand Canyon region where the upper basin is demarcated from the lower basin at a point known
as Lee Ferry.488 The Colorado then flows west through Grand Canyon National Park after which
it turns south at the southern tip of the state of Nevada forming the border between Nevada,
Arizona and California. Farther south it forms the border between the United States and Mexico
before entering Mexico between the Mexican states of Sonora and Baja California. It empties
what may be left of its flow into the Gulf of California. 489 The Colorado River is approximately
1450 miles long emptying a basin of approximately 240,000 square miles490 including the most
arid regions of the United States.491 It provides drinking water for an estimated 27 million
people in the United States and irrigation for over 3.5 million acres of farmland.492
The flow of the Colorado fluctuates considerably from year to year. The massive works
on the main stream store approximately four times the average annual flow or 60 million acre
feet.493 The legal allocation scheme for the basin is based on an average annual flow of 16.5
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million acre feet.494 Allocations are made according to a complex system of laws which include
a treaty between the United States and Mexico, interstate compacts, federal statutes and United
States Supreme Court decisions, together referred to as “The Law of the River.”495
This discussion focuses on the allocation schemes between the United States and Mexico
and among the basin states within the United States. The transboundary allocations build upon
the first interstate agreement, the 1922 Colorado River Compact496 which divided the basin into
the upper basin and lower basin at the point between Marble Canyon and the Grand Canyon
known as Lee Ferry.497
The second part of this chapter discusses three major water management institutions
within the basin, the International Boundary and Water Commission, the Bureau of Reclamation
and the Upper Basin Commission.

Allocations	
  
John Wesley Powell, the first representative of the United States government to explore,
study and write about the Colorado Basin recommended to the Congress of the United States that
the political lines delineating state boundaries within the western territory be drawn along the
basin boundaries. He recognized the importance of the major river systems to development of
this arid region, the interconnectedness of different ecological systems and the necessity of
maintaining the ecology within different climatic zones to preserve the availability of water in
the rivers. He was concerned that separating the mountainous regions from the farm lands by
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political boundaries would separate development from the natural systems that supported it.
Powell wrote in 1878498 that the waters of western rivers must be divided among the states and
nations within the basin because when users began to squabble over water, so too would states
and nations.499
At the turn of the 20th Century, irrigated agriculture expanded in the downstream state of
California with the construction of diversion works to central valleys. Negotiations for an
interstate agreement began out of fear that California would obtain rights superior to the used in
other states based on a theory of interstate prior appropriation,500 If so, this would curtail
development in the other basin states.
This section discusses allocations within the basin beginning with the 1922 Colorado
River Compact. This section also discusses the allocations among the lower basin states
contained in the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act, the allocations among the upper basin states
contained in the 1948 Upper Basin Compact and the sub-compacts contained therein, concluding
with a discussion of the allocation between the United States and Mexico contained in the 1944
Treaty.
1922 Colorado River Compact	
  
The 1922 Colorado River Compact is a political compromise among the 7 basin states
brokered by representatives of the United States. The upper basin states contribute most of the
flow to the river from snow melt. The upstream state of Colorado was known at this time for its
position of absolute territorial sovereignty501 maintaining that it had an exclusive right to use all
the water within the state. The downstream state of California contributes negligible water to the
498
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river but at the time of the negotiations was the fastest developing state in the basin. It diverted
water long distances to supply irrigation to the out-of-basin area known as Imperial Valley and
had plans for large diversions to supply the out-of-basin growing population of the coastal city of
Los Angeles. California would benefit from application of a theory of interstate priorities so that
the first to develop would acquire rights to the most water. Arizona was the least developed but
most “riparian” state with the mainstream flowing through the northern canyons of the state and
forming the border with California. Arizona also contributes water from numerous tributaries
including the Little Colorado and Gila Rivers. Arizona wanted rights to water preserved for
future development. The three states of Colorado, California, and Arizona advocated different
allocation schemes for waters of the Colorado.502
At the time of these negotiations the law of equitable apportionment of interstate
watercourses was developing in Supreme Court jurisprudence.503 In a dispute over use of the
Laramie River the upstream state of Colorado argued a theory of absolute territorial sovereignty
while the more developed downstream state of Wyoming argued for an apportionment based on
the law of prior appropriation.504 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Wyoming reasoning that
it was equitable to apportion the Laramie River between these two states based on interstate prior
appropriation, because of their similar state water laws and their similar development histories.505
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Using an interstate system of priorities the Court permitted the first in time to be the first in right
within the basin without regard to the state in which the water is used.
The states in the negotiations over the Colorado River feared that if this reasoning were
applied to the Colorado River, California would acquire rights to a large portion of the river.506
The negotiations stalled in attempts to allocate the waters among all the basin states and a
compromise was brokered which split the basin into two parts, an upper basin including
Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico and a lower basin of Arizona, Nevada and
California.
The upper basin states agreed to deliver to the lower basin at the point known as Lee
Ferry 75 million acre feet of water on average every 10 years, or approximately 7.5 million acre
feet per year. This allocation is based on the assumption that the basin generated on average in
excess of 15 maf/year providing approximately7.5 maf/year for use in each of the lower and
upper basins. With this division, the upper basin states are protected from the voracious
development in California leaving Nevada and Arizona to negotiate a division of the lower basin
share.507
The legislature of the state of Arizona refused to ratify the 1922 Colorado River Compact
preventing the unanimous agreement required for it to enter into force.508 However, this did not
stop the powerful interests in California from continuing to pursue federal assistance for major
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works on the river for flood control and irrigation.509 In 1928 the United States Congress passed
the Boulder Canyon Project Act510 appropriating funds for a major dam at Boulder Canyon (later
named Hoover Dam) where the river forms the border between California and Arizona.
Considering the holdout of Arizona, Congress further provided that the 1922 Compact would
enter into force upon ratification by six of the seven basin states including California, if
California agreed to limit its share of the 7.5 maf/year to 4.4maf/year.511 With the enactment of
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Congress of the United States allocated the waters of the
Lower Basin.
Lower Basin Allocations	
  
In addition to limiting California to 4.4 maf, the Boulder Canyon Project Act further
allocated the remaining lower basin share of 7.5 maf, 2.8 maf to Arizona and 300,000 af to the
state of Nevada. All allocations include existing uses and all uses of mainstream water within a
state are counted against that state’s total allocation. California maintained the right to use any
unused allocations and only in the 21st century started reductions to limit uses to 4.4 maf.512
The Boulder Canyon Project Act established the federal government as the management
entity for the river. The United States Secretary of the Interior was authorized “to construct,
operate, and maintain a dam and incidental works in the main stream of the Colorado River” and
such diversion dams and canals as necessary to supply the major irrigation projects within
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California.513 The Secretary of Interior carries out management responsibilities through the
Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau).
The legislature of Arizona ratified the 1922 Compact in 1944514 and proceeded to
challenge the allocations contained in the Boulder Canyon Project Act in court. The United
States Supreme Court confirmed the lower basin allocations in 1963 in the case of Arizona v.
California.515 Arizona then pursued federal funding for construction of works to deliver water to
the major cities of Phoenix and Tucson, and in 1968 Congress passed the Colorado River Basin
Project Act516 authorizing the Central Arizona Project and appropriating funds for its
construction. This 1968 legislation also authorized construction of major works in the upper
basin the allocation scheme for which is discussed next.
Upper Basin Allocations	
  
The states of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona entered a compact in
1948 apportioning the upper basin allocation from the 1922 Compact. 517
Twenty six years after the division of the Colorado River into the upper and lower basins,
the Upper Basin states needed to build major river works for in-state storage and carry-over
storage to meet the 1922 Compact obligations to the Lower Basin. In order to access federal
money for the large reclamation projects the political realities required the states to agree on
apportionment. Meyers, in his 1966 seminal article on the Law of the River, described the
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political situation this way: “All [states of the Upper Basin] were under-developed, none had the
resources to go it alone. It was a classic case of hanging together – or hanging separately.”518
The state of Arizona is allocated 50,000 af/year for use in that portion of the state in the
watershed above Lee Ferry.519 All other allocations are measured as a percentage of annual
available supply. Colorado has the beneficial use 51.75%; New Mexico, 11.25%; Utah, 23%; and
Wyoming, 14%. The Upper Basin Compact was negotiated at a time of limited development in
relation to supply such that each state’s percentage allocation is sufficient to includ all existing
uses.
In addition to the allocations to each state, the Upper Basin Compact includes four “subcompacts” apportioning the use of tributaries. The sub-compacts were negotiated separately
between the affected states, but within the framework and restrictions of the Upper Basin
Compact which is within the limitations of the 1922 Compact. The sub-compacts designate
tributary sources of supply from which states may take their percentage shares. Incorporation of
sub-compacts within the “master” compact provides basin (granted only the upper basin) and
sub-basin management under one umbrella agreement.
Article XI of the 1948 Upper Basin Compact is the sub-compact for the Little Snake
River and its tributaries apportioning its waters between the states of Colorado and Wyoming.
The states agree to administer this tributary using a system of interstate priorities without regard
to the state of use, except in times of curtailment which results from a shortage of supply within
the basin. In the event of shortage such that upper basin curtailment is required it is agreed that,
to the extent possible, water use from the Little Snake River will be curtailed on an equal basis
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between the states. The parties agree that the Little Snake River is administered by each state
according to its water laws.
Article XII of the Upper Basin Compact is a sub-compact between the states of Utah and
Wyoming apportioning the use of waters from the Green River and its tributaries. Existing uses
at the time of the Compact are apportioned by priority date without regard to state boundaries.
Uses initiated after the effective date of the Compact are apportioned 50% to each state. This
sub-compact is administered by a Special Water Commissioner who is jointly appointed by the
State Engineers of each state.
Article XIII of the Upper Basin Compact is a sub-compact between the states of Colorado
and Utah for apportionment of the Yampa River, a tributary to the Green River. The upstream
state of Colorado agrees not to deplete the flow of the Yampa River below “an aggregate of
5,000,000 acre-feet for any period of ten consecutive years” as measured at a designated gaging
station. No additional administrative institution is created.
The San Juan River is apportioned between the states of Colorado and New Mexico in
Article XIV of the Upper Basin Compact. The state of New Mexico is not riparian to the
mainstream of the Colorado River but does supply water to the San Juan River tributary which
runs through the northwest portion of the state. This sub-compact provides that the upstream
state of Colorado “agrees to deliver to the State of New Mexico from the San Juan River and its
tributaries which rise in the State of Colorado a quantity of water which shall be sufficient,
together with water originating in the San Jan Basin in the State of New Mexico, to enable the
State of New Mexico to make full use of the water apportioned to the State of New Mexico by
Article III of the [Upper Basin] Compact,”520 its 11.25% share. All uses as of the effective date
of the Compact are recognized with a prior right as are “uses of water contemplated by projects
520
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authorized.” The technical determinations required to make this allocation are made by the
Upper Basin Commission. It is reported that New Mexico would not approve the Upper Basin
Compact without protection for use of its full 11.25% share from the San Juan River.521
Article X confirms and incorporates the 1922 La Plata River Compact522 between the
states of Colorado and New Mexico apportioning this tributary. In the 1922 La Plata River
Compact, the State of Colorado agrees to establish and maintain two gaging stations on the La
Plata River, one upstream near the community of Hesparus and one downstream near the border
with New Mexico. The Compact allocates to New Mexico one half the mean flow as measured
at the Hesparus gaging station. However, when the “flow of the river is so low that… the
greatest beneficial use of its waters may be secured by distributing all of its waters successively
to the lands in each state in alternating periods…the use of the waters may be so rotated between
the two states….”523 This scheme attempts to preserve uses within the downstream state when
half the flow is not sufficient to convey the water and provide for its beneficial use. This
Compact is administered by the Colorado and New Mexico State Engineers.
The sub-compact format permits negotiation of an agreement closer to the user level and
by only those states affected while keeping the negotiations within the framework of the
equitable apportionment among the states contained in the Upper Basin Compact and the 1922
Compact. The sub-compact negotiations also took place bilaterally yet under the scrutiny of the
other states who share in the 1922 Compact obligations. The sub-compacts apportion the
tributaries to meet local conditions, provide protection for existing local uses and permit the
states to take water from local resources. Including the sub-compacts within the 1948 Upper
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Basin Compact assures all parties that use of the tributaries will not deplete mainstream supply
and thereby defeat the upper basin commitment to deliver 7.5maf to the lower basin.
The sub-compacts may be viewed as examples of the principle of subsidiarity “which is a
general organizing principle of governance, express[ing] a libertarian value in favor of making
decisions and implementing them at the lowest effective level of government....”524 For natural
systems such as watercourses, the tributary sub-basin may be the lowest effective level of
governance. Local conditions within the tributary sub-basins impact, if not determine, the
allocation schemes at the interstate and international level. This is illustrated by examining the
sub-compact allocations negotiated by the upstream state of Colorado.
Colorado is a party to the 1922 Compact, the 1922 La Plata River Compact, the 1948
Upper Basin Compact, and the Little Snake, the Yampa and the San Juan sub-compacts. The
1948 Upper Basin Compacts apportions 51.75% of the available beneficial use of the upper basin
supply to Colorado. The Yampa and San Juan sub-compacts require Colorado to deliver
designated quantities of water at fixed measuring points for use in the downstream states of Utah
and New Mexico respectively. This is a “negative allocation” whereby Colorado bears the risk
of lower than “average” flows but benefits from above “average” flows by using all water in
excess of the quantity required to be delivered downstream.
The state of Colorado agreed in the Little Snake sub-compact to disregard the state
boundary with Wyoming and to allocate the tributary based on the law of prior appropriation.
The Upper Basin Commission, with representatives from the four upper division states prepared
a schedule of priorities as of the date of signing the sub-compact. Uses initiated in either state
after the effective date “shall permit the full use within the Basin in the most feasible manner …
without regard to the state line; and, so far as is practicable, shall result in an equal division
524
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between the States of the use of water not used under rights existing prior to the signing of this
[Upper Basin] Compact.”525 All uses are charged to the respective state’s allocation and are
administered and managed by each state within its jurisdiction.
The1922 La Plata River Compact apportions the annual supply equally between the two
states riparian to the tributary. Flow is measured at designated gaging stations and allocated to
diversion structures in each state.
The mountains in the state of Colorado form the head waters for the Colorado River. In
spite of the states early assertions of sovereignty over waters within its borders,526 by 1948 the
state agreed to multiple and varied allocations to satisfy its negotiated share.
Moving from the interstate allocations of the Colorado River to international allocations,
the final agreement examined in this section is the 1944 Treaty between the United States and
Mexico.
1944 Treaty with Mexico	
  
In 1944 the United States and Mexico entered a treaty for the utilization of waters of the
Tijuana River, the Rio Grande below Fort Quitman, Texas and the Colorado River.527 At the
time, the Colorado basin within the United States was divided into the Upper and Lower Basins
with volumetric allocations based on an assumed annual flow of 15maf and the lower basin was
further allocated with specific volumetric measures. Mexico is the farthest downstream with less
than 1% of the basin land area.
At this time, the agricultural lands in Mexico were underdeveloped compared to the
United States which was delivering water to farmers from massive federal reclamation projects.
525
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Mexico attempted to negotiate an equitable apportionment of the benefits from the river that
would adjust as development of irrigated agriculture increased within Mexico. The United
States, having approved the specific allocations to the states in the 1922 Compact and the 1928
Boulder Canyon Project Act, did not have the domestic political support to upset the volumetric
allocation scheme among the states even though Article III(C) of the 1922 Compact anticipates a
future agreement with Mexico.
The apportionment of the Colorado River between Mexico and the United States is a
volumetric allocation. The United States is obligated to deliver no less than 1.5maf/year to
Mexico at designated points on the river, reminiscent of the volumetric allocations contained in
the 1922 Compact and the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act. Mexico may receive more water
in any given year but cannot acquire rights to additional water. The parties further agree to
install works on the river for carry-over storage to meet this obligation.
The 1944 Treaty, like the interstate compacts, does not allocate water for ecological
preservation, does not contain provisions for conservation, pollution prevention or other factors
for an equitable and reasonable utilization of an international watercourse.528 Nor does it address
an obligation not to cause significant harm or provide remedies in the event of such harm.529
However, as is discussed in the next section, the institution created by the 1944 Treaty, the
International Boundary and Water Commission, does have limited authority to address these
issues.
Institutions	
  	
  
Given that the allocations of the Colorado River are determined by a development
strategy from the 19th century whereby a drop of water reaching the ocean is a drop of water
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wasted, the fixed allocation schemes within the lower basin and with Mexico are rigid and
archaic. However, the three different management institutions within the basin are worthy of
emulation. This section briefly discusses the International Boundary Commission established by
the 1889 Treaty with Mexico whose duties were expanded by the 1944 Treaty to include
international waters, the Bureau of Reclamation, which is the federal agency that manages the
Lower Basin, and the Upper Basin Commission established by the 1948 Upper Basin Compact.
International Boundary and Water Commission	
  
The 1889 Convention between the United States of America and the United States of
Mexico established the International Boundary Commission “to facilitate the carrying out of the
principles contained in the treaty of November 12, 1884, and to avoid the difficulties occasioned
by reason of the changes which take place in the beds of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers in
those parts which serve as a boundary between the two Republics.”530 The Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any such disputes.531 In this regard the IBC is charged with
delimiting the boundary between the United States and Mexico, which function it continues to
serve today.532 The 1944 Treaty expanded the duties of the IBC to include water management
and the planning and construction of river works thereby changing the IBC to the International
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC).533
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The extraordinary aspect of the IBWC is the vesting of authority to make decisions on
topics not covered in the 1944 Treaty, in essence amending the Treaty. The decisions of the
IBWC are recorded in Minutes. Article 25 sets forth the import of the Minutes:
Decisions of the Commission shall be recorded in the form of Minutes….Except where
the specific approval of the two Governments is required by any provision of this Treaty,
if one of the Governments fails to communicate to the Commission its approval or
disapproval of a decision of the Commission within thirty days…the Minute in question
and the decisions which it contains shall be considered to be approved by that
Government. The Commissioners, within the limits of their respective jurisdictions, shall
execute the decisions of the Commission that are approved by both Governments.
(emphasis added)
If either Government disapproves a decision of the Commission the two Governments
shall take cognizance of the matter, and if an agreement regarding such matter is reached
between the two Governments, the agreement shall be communicated to the
Commissioners, who shall take such further proceedings as may be necessary to carry out
such agreement.534
To date the IBWC has entered 313 Minutes on a wide range of topics. Recent Minutes
have focused on water and sanitation projects within border communities (authorizing
transboundary construction and allocating costs) and on ecological improvements particularly in
the limotroph section of the River.535
The most often cited series of Minutes address salinity levels of the water from the
Colorado River as it reaches Mexico. Water quality is not addressed in the Treaty and Mexico,
located at the end of the River, suffers the effects of deteriorating water quality. At the March
22, 1965 meeting of the IBWC the commissioners complied with the “instructions” from their
respective governments contained in Presidential Communiqués dated March 16, 1962, June 30,
1962 and February 22, 1964 “to reach a permanent and effective solution” to the problems of
534
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salinity of the Colorado River at the northern border of Mexico. In Minute 218,
Recommendations on the Colorado River Salinity Problem, the Commissioners set forth a 5 year
plan for construction of drains for saline waters, established a system of accounting to comply
with the 1944 Treaty allocations and set forth the responsibilities for construction and payment
of new works.
In 1972 the Commission again took up the matter of salinity “in accordance with the
instructions which the two Governments issued to their respective commissioners pursuant to the
understanding between President Richard Nixon and President Luis Echeverria A., expressed in
their Joint Communique.” In this communiqué, reproduced in Minute 241, the Mexican
government states that the water quality at the northern border of Mexico should be the same
quality as the water delivered to California from the diversion works upstream at Imperial Dam.
The President of the United States expressed his concern that this was a “highly complex
problem” and expressed his desire to find a “definitive, equitable and just solution” but did not
agree with the President of Mexico that the water quality at the Mexican border should be the
same as delivered to Imperial Valley, California. Based on these instructions the Commission
developed maximum levels of salinity and a means to manage highly saline waste water drainage
within the United States to reach these levels. This includes water accounting procedures and
cost accounting for construction of new works.536 Again, this Minute had a limited duration of
five years.
Borrowing from the language of the Presidential Communiqués reproduced in Minutes
218 and 241 the Commission issued Minute 242 on August 30, 1973 entitled “Permanent and
definitive solution to the international problem of the salinity of the Colorado River.” Minute
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242 calls for construction of permanent works and sets the maximum level for salinity so that
“the approximately 1,360,000 acre-feet (1,677,545,000 cubic meters) delivered to Mexico
upstream of Morelos Dam, have an annual average salinity of no more than 115 p.p.m. +/- 30
p.p.m. U.S. count (121 p.p.m. +/- 30 p.p.m. Mexican count) over the annual average salinity of
Colorado River waters which arrive at Imperial Dam….” Minute 242 describes the measures to
be taken to meet this water quality standard. In addition, the Minute documents that the United
States will provide assistance to Mexico in order to rehabilitate the irrigated lands within the
Mexicali Valley which were inundated with the saline waters.537 At the time each state
acknowledged this problem the IBWC used its authority to expeditiously address the salinity
problems.
While the 1944 Treaty vests independent authority in the Commission, the Commission
does not always exercise that authority independently. For example, Minutes 218 and 241
dealing with salinity state respectively that the Minutes must be “specifically” and “expressly”
approved by both Governments.538 Minute 242, “the permanent and definitive solution of the
salinity problem” provides that it “is subject to the express approval of both Governments by
exchange of Notes.”539 However, absent language in the Minute requiring express approval, the
Minutes take effect 30 days from issuance absent disapproval of one of the governments. The
IBWC has the authority to act on a wide range of border issues. It is, however, dependant on its
commissioners to take action. Scholars from both states have called for more active leadership
from the IBWC on water management issues.540
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In contrast to this quasi-independent international institution, the next section discusses
management of the lower basin within the United States by the federal government through the
Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation.
Lower Basin: United States Bureau of Reclamation	
  
The 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA)541 authorized the Secretary of Interior to
manage the delivery of water and power from Colorado River works constructed with federal
funds. Rights to utilize the waters of the Colorado River acquired after passage of the Boulder
Canyon Project Act require a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation, the agency designated by
the Secretary of Interior. The Bureau collects data and establishes operating procedures in
accord with the 1922 Compact, the BCPA, the Supreme Court decisions in Arizona v.
California542 and other federal laws. In addition, the Bureau is charged with operation of river
works in order to deliver water.
The 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act543 authorized and funded construction of
additional river works and charged the Secretary to develop criteria for coordinated long-range
operation of the Colorado River reservoirs through Annual Operating Plans. The Annual
Operating Plans provide for delivery of water for use within each lower basin state as permitted
within the allocations established in the 1922 Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
In 2001 the Secretary approved Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines setting forth
the process for allocating system water that is “surplus” to the compact and Treaty
requirements.544 In 2007 the Secretary approved “Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and
REG. 929 (2005) and Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into Institutional Responsiveness
and Planning: The Case of Mexico and the United States, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 397 (1993).
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Coordinated Operations for Lakes Powell and Mead” which set forth management criteria for
years when the supply is not sufficient to deliver the full volumetric allocations to the states and
to Mexico.545 The Surplus and Shortage Guidelines also include criteria for coordinated releases
from the major reservoirs. The record of decision adopting the shortage guidelines was issued by
the Secretary in December 2007 after an extensive environmental assessment including
stakeholder and public participation. The Secretary recognized the need to manage the system to
account for the current multi-year drought and to adapt to longer range climate change conditions
in a manner acceptable to the states party to the Colorado River Compact.
This process is effective in part because of the authority of the federal government and
the availability of recourse by aggrieved parties to the United States federal courts. However,
the difficulty of negotiating an agreement to determine the distribution of a shrinking supply in
conditions of increasing demand should not be underestimated. The technical evaluation by the
Bureau along with submission of its own proposals moved the process from a politicized conflict
to an agreed upon technical resolution.
However, absent new federal legislation, the Secretary does not have the authority to alter
the basin allocations among perfected rights holders or among the states.546 Nor may the
Secretary alter the requirements of beneficial use or the preference given to agriculture and
domestic uses in the 1922 Compact.547 However, each of the state governments has the authority
to regulate how its share of water is utilized.548 As the resource becomes more scarce
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mechanisms are being developed for market transfers and other means for re-allocation among
users.549
Upper Basin Commission	
  
The 1948 Upper Basin Compact established the Upper Basin Commission.550 The
Commission is composed of one representative from each upper division state, Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, and a representative appointed by the President of the United States
who serves as the presiding officer. The Commission is the administrative body for the upper
basin with powers to establish gaging stations, forecast water availability, and make findings for
water deliveries and storage losses. The Commission quantifies the volume of water allocated to
each state’s percentage share of beneficial use. The Commission also determines if curtailment
is necessary to meet the Upper Basin obligation under the 1922 Compact to deliver water at Lee
Ferry for use in the Lower Basin. In the past decade, drought conditions affecting supply and
increased development within the upper basin have brought these accounting measures to
prominence in the basin management.
Conclusion	
  	
  
Multiple institutions manage the Colorado River basin loosely coordinated through the
federal projects administered by the Secretary of Interior through the Bureau of Reclamation. In
addition to the three major institutions discussed above, the tributaries with separate compacts or
sub-compacts have their own institutions and management structures. The Law of the River, the
complex combination of agreements, legislation and judicial opinions, provides the framework
within which the institutions function. The United States Supreme Court offers an ultimate
549

See generally NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER, MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, GARY D.
WEATHERFORD & F. LEE BROWN, eds. (1986) and Robert Glennon & Michael J. Pearce, Transferring Mainstem
Colorado River Rights: The Arizona Experience, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (2007).
550
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 1948, Art. VIII, 63 Stat. 31 (1949) available at
www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf.

≈159≈

forum for interstate dispute resolution. However, increased drought, climate change affecting
snow pack evaporation rates and agriculture requirements are stressing the resource. In addition
the basin includes the regions and cities within the United States with some of the fastest
growing populations.551
Scholars and practitioners have called for a basin-wide international and interstate
commission, a lower basin commission and for more federal oversight of water use.552 These
have not garnered sufficient political support to move forward. However, as this basin continues
to experience explosive growth, increasing pollution, and new demands for water, the existing
institutions will continue to be challenged by the limits of their jurisdiction and the need for
basin-wide management solutions.
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Chapter	
  Nine:	
  Senegal	
  River	
  
The legal instruments establishing L’Organsation Pour la Mise en Valeur de Fleuve
Senegal553 were lauded for establishing the most progressive and cooperative river management
regime of its time.554 Yet development which proceeded as planned under this legal regime
resulted in one of West Africa’s largest ecological disasters. 555 The lack of attention to local
uses was a primary cause of the problems.
The Senegal River originates in the Fouta Djallon Mountains of Guinea and is formed
when the Bafing and the Bakoye (Semefé) Rivers meet near Bafoulabé, Mali. The third major
tributary, the Falémé, also originates in the Fouta Djallon Mountains of Guinea and joins the
Senegal near Bakel, Senegal. The Falémé forms the border between Mali and Senegal before
joining the mainstem. Another tributary, the Karakoa River forms the border between Mali and
Mauritania. The Senegal River forms the border between Senegal and Mauritania from upstream
of Bakel to the mouth at the Atlantic.
The Senegal flows from the mountain ranges, through steep gorges and over falls until it
reaches Kayes where it becomes a semi-arid meandering river. It is a major asset to the basin
providing navigation to land locked Mauritania, hydropower, irrigation and fisheries. The
damming of the river in the 1980’s downstream at Diama to prevent salt water intrusion in the
553
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dry season and upstream at Manantali for storage and hydropower provided mixed benefits and
problems for the basin and its riparian population.556
The four riparian states in western Africa, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, formed
the first Senegal River basin institution in 1963, soon after independence. Since then the
structure, name and purpose of the institution has changed, however, the existence of this initial
institution provided a forum for the leaders of each basin state to meet and to make changes to
the framework of their agreements.
Agreements 1963-1978
The four basin states entered a Convention for the development of the Senegal River on
July 26, 1963 at Bamako, Mali.557 The states declared the Senegal an international river and
formed an Inter-State Committee whose purpose was to promote and coordinate research and the
development of works relating to the river.
The 1963 Bamako Convention was amended in 1964 with the addition of requirements
for river and riparian development.558 Article 1 provides: “The Parties express their desire to
develop close co-operation in order to promote the rational utilization of the resources of the
Senegal River basin and to ensure freedom of navigation and equality of treatment of its
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users.”559 Article 11 includes provisions for the construction of works, navigation, agricultural
and industrial uses, monitoring the condition of the flora and fauna and protection of the water
quality.560
Programs or works proposed by one state are required to be approved by the Committee
whose decisions were binding on all states. Through the 1964 Convention the Committee took
on added functions and responsibilities to be administered through Sectoral Commissions,
including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

developing rules for application of the principles contained in the Convention;
assembling basic data on the river basin;
disseminating the data to all basin states;
examining projects submitted by one state and “studying and executing” projects
requested by a state;
promoting harmonious relations among the states;
regulating transportation along the river including roads and railways; and
seeking financial assistance.
A Secretariat was established to be an organ of investigation and liaison with the

Committee.561 The Presidency of the Committee rotates among the states.562 Financing for the
Committee is from the member states and foreign aid.563
In 1965 the Conference of the Heads of the Senegal Riparian States passed a resolution
for organization of a new institution.564 This resolution resulted in the 1968 Statute of the
Organization of the Senegal Riparian States (OERS).565 The OERS has an expanded purpose
beyond river management to “establishment of the West African Regional Group of States, with
559
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a view to implementing African unity.”566 With this purpose the OERS harmonizes development
plans and coordinates development in the following areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

“agriculture and animal husbandry,
education, training and information,
public health,
industrial development,
transport and telecommunications,
trade, and
judicial co-operation and harmonization of civil and commercial legislation.”567

The institutional structure is expanded to include a Conference of Heads of State and
Government, a Council of Ministers and an Inter-Parliamentary Commission. In addition, a
Secretariat was created under the Council of Ministers to include an Executive Secretariat and
three General Secretariats for Development of the Senegal River Basin, for Planning and
Development and for Educational, Cultural and Social Affairs. All decisions of the Conference
of Heads of State and Government are binding on the member states.
Parnall and Utton report that the OERS was not effective because its purpose was too
broad, it was unable to obtain financing and Guinea, the upper-most state in the basin withdrew
from membership.568
In 1972 the OERS was formally dissolved with the formation of the Organization for the
Development of the River Senegal (l’Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal
(OMVS)) by the three basin states of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. Guinea remained an
observer to the OMVS. Two Conventions were entered on March 11, 1972 the Statute of the
River Senegal569 which sets forth the principles of cooperation and policies for development and
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the Convention Creating the Organization for the Development of the River Senegal570 which
establishes the organs and sets forth the authority and responsibilities of each organ of the
OMVS.
Anticipating construction of river works, the three Member States entered the Convention
Relating to the Legal Status of Common Works on December 21, 1978.571 This Convention
grants common ownership of river works to each Member State. Included in the Convention are
restrictions on state taxation and regulation and provisions for open access. Soon after the
Works Convention entered into force construction of two dams began. The Manantali Dam is
upstream on the Bafing and the Diama Dam is downstream near Saint Louis, Senegal. The
OMVS goals for these two dams were very specific; hydropower of 800 gigawatt-hours per year
for nine out of ten years with 1,500 km of transport line to the three member states, increased
irrigation in Mauritania and Senegal to 375,000 hectares with two rice crops per year, and a yearround river transportation corridor to Mali.572 The downstream Diama Dam was developed to
prevent salt water intrusion and to create a permanent water body within the River.
Each of the institutions formed throughout the years is founded on the sovereign equality
of states. The states within this basin have a synergy of interests that permits development to
proceed with a high level of cooperation. The upstream state of Mali is landlocked and needs a
transportation corridor to the sea. Mauritania and the other basin states need power and Senegal
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and Mauritania are interested in increased irrigation. All states were motivated by the desperate
food shortages resulting from the drought during the 1970s. The level of cooperation and river
basin institutions are lauded as exemplary by international legal scholars.573

Problems	
  Associated	
  with	
  Basin	
  	
  
Manantali Dam became operational in 1986 and Diama Dam was completed in 1988.574
Soon thereafter the riverine population within the lower basin faced devastating consequences.
The increase in water borne disease and the influx of invasive species may not have been able to
be anticipated however, the impact on the existing local uses of the river were given inadequate
consideration during the planning for river development and little consideration in the operation
of the dams.575
The local riverine population in Senegal and Mauritania practiced recession agriculture
for centuries. During the rainy season the lands within the flood plain were inundated. As the
water receded cereal crops were planted in the moist and nutrient rich soil. The people moved to
higher ground where the acacia trees provided wood for shelter and charcoal and the livestock
browsed on native vegetation. They returned to the river for fishing and to harvest the crops.
The livestock then fed on the plant stubble. This annual cycle was disrupted by dam
construction and clearing to expand irrigated agriculture.576
Reports indicate that the operational plans for the dams included an annual release to
simulate the rainy season floods however, this did not occur.577 Some years there was not a

573

See Parnall & Utton and ILC Third Report supra note ____.
Newton supra note ___.
575
CODATA supra note ___; see Vick supra note ___, 216-219.
576
US AID, The Future of the Senegal River Basin: Making the Right Decisions Now (May 28, 2003) available at
http://rmportal.net/library/files/srbpamphlet.pdf/view?searchterm=None .
577
Id.
574

≈166≈

release and at other times releases occurred at times that destroyed seedling crops.578 In addition
the acacia forests were cleared for expanded rice planting. Most of the livestock died without the
feed provided by the stubble from the cereal crops or became weakened and unable to withstand
the parasites. Native fish populations were destroyed without access to the sea for spawning.
The people suffered a devastating increase in water boarne diseases. Nearly all aspects of local
water use within the flood plain were destroyed.579
In response to these negative consequences the OMVS established environmental
monitoring through the Programme d’Atténuation et de Suivi des Impacts sur l’Environnement
(PASIE). The results from PASIE and from independent studies led OMVS to the adoption of a
Water Charter in 2002.
2002 Water Charter
The 2002 Water Charter 580 incorporates the latest concepts of international water law in
a manner consistent with the history institutional development of the basin. The Preamble
recites the historic documents relevant to the Member States and the regulation of the river
beginning with the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitutive Act of the African Union
and including the basin Conventions and management agreements. The Preamble states that the
Member States are conscious of customary international law regarding utilization of an
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international watercourse and the principles of the 1997 UN Convention and the 1992 Rio
Declaration.581
Building on the OMVS management of the river, the 2002 Water Charter allocates water
among sectors, not among states. The cooperation of the basin states was established in 1963
and the river works relinquished to common ownership in 1978 making allocations to states
incongruous with the basin history. The principle of equitable utilization is incorporated in the
2002 Water Charter but in the context of utilization by sectors. Article 8 provides that the water
resource will be used in an equitable manner to satisfy not the needs of the respective states but
the potable water needs of the population, the needs of agriculture, energy production, industry
and navigation.
Article 3 provides the following general principles for distributing water:
•
•
•
•
•

“the obligation to guarantee a balanced management of the water resource;
the equitable and reasonable use of the River’s water;
the obligation to preserve the environment;
the obligation to negotiate in case of conflict;
the obligation of each riparian State to inform other riparian States before engaging in
any activity or project likely to have an impact on water availability and/or the possibility
to implement future projects.”582

The objectives go on to state that the guiding principles will “guarantee to the
populations…the full pleasure of the resource, with respect to the safety of the people and the
works, as well as the basic human right to clean water, in the perspective of sustainable
development.”583
Article 5 establishes principles for the allocation of water among the sectors relying upon
the river. These principles include broad concepts of cooperation, security, prevention of flight
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from rural areas, food security, and strengthening economies against climatic variations. The
principles of integrated water resource management are also incorporated in Article 5. The
specifics of water allocation among the sectors are contained in Annexes to the Water Charter
which may be revised at a technical level to meet changing conditions.584
Part 4 beginning with Article 16 provides for the protection and preservation of the
River’s ecosystems. The contracting States commit to protect the resources through national
legislation and jointly through the OMVS. In addition “[T]hey will take measures to prevent,
reduce or control events or conditions resulting from natural disasters or human activities likely
to harm other States, the environment of the river and human health or safety.”585
The protection of the population and establishing the priority of water for vital human
needs586 are significant contributions of the Water Charter. However, the opportunity for public
participation remains limited. Article 23 provides that the status of “observer” may be accorded
to representatives of users, local communities, non-governmental organizations and
decentralized management committees. The process of obtaining “observer” status requires a
recommendation from the High Commission and action by the Council of Ministers. The
“observer” may then attend meetings of the Permanent Water Commission.
Conclusion
The institutions of the Senegal River Basin are remarkable for their cooperation and
advancement of international water law. They are top down institutions negotiated at the highest
levels of government with goals to serve the state governments. There were devastating and
irreversible consequences at the local level. The 2002 Water Charter takes significant steps to
incorporate the needs of the local populations dependent on the Senegal River within the
584
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operational principles and management goals yet lacks a regularized system for local stakeholder
participation in basin decision making.
The cooperation established in the first institution in 1963 formed the basis for continuing
communication, exchange of data and cooperation through multiple agreements leading to the
2002 Water charter. The basin institutions provide a forum for broad discussions about
development within the basin. With the accession of Guinea to the OMVS and the agreements in
the 2002 Water Charter all basin states are once again bound together by the legal instruments
which provide the mechanisms to adapt to a changing future.

≈170≈

Chapter	
  Ten:	
  Utton	
  Center	
  Model	
  Interstate	
  Water	
  Compact	
  

The Utton Transboundary Resources Center587 published a Model Interstate Water

Compact588 in October, 2006 following three years of collaboration among the leading
academics and practitioners of transboundary water law.589 The model compact was developed
to “be used as the basis for forging agreements between states regarding their shared water
resources and for dealing with issues not considered in current compacts.”590 These issues
include coordination of water quality for the watercourse among all the basin states, alternatives
to litigation for dispute resolution, and an apportionment of water for ecological and
environmental purposes.
The principal purpose of the Model Compact is to respond to the Supreme Court’s
repeated admonition to contesting states that the negotiation of their respective ‘equitable
shares’ of interstate regional water resources and resolution of other disputes regarding
such resources is a far better approach than a judicially imposed ‘equitable
apportionment’ or other judicial decree.591 (citations omitted).
To accomplish this purpose the Model Compact recognizes in the Preamble the realities
of interstate waters within the United States. The concepts, however, are equally applicable to
international watercourses.
•
•
•

The water resources “are or may become valuable for a variety of beneficial
purposes;”
The “optimum use and protection of the Basin’s water related values” are best
realized by a basin wide approach;
The “equitable sharing and sustainable management of the Basin’s water
resources can best be accomplished and equitably adjusted when necessary by the
Basin states jointly by agreement;”
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•

•

The “need for integrated, adaptive water resource management, specifically the
need for management decisions affecting the watershed to be made at the
watershed level” is critical “to the sustainable management of the water resources
of the …Basin;” and
Development projects and water management programs “should be consistent
with regional water resource management programs.”592

Given these goals and purposes the Model Compact apportions water among uses, among
users, and among states. The apportionment scheme is discussed below.

Apportionment	
  
The “first cut” of water is for ecosystem protection and preservation.593 The parties agree
to set forth in an annex the amounts of water required for the different reaches of the watercourse
during different seasons to “maintain a healthy and productive Basinwide ecosystem.”594 For
watercourses within the United States this water is primarily to satisfy the habitat protection
requirements of the Endangered Species Act.595
The next allocation of water is to “satisfy the use requirements of all perfected water
rights derived from federal, state or tribal law.”596 The Model Compact does not allocate water
to particular users, but apportions the water among the states in sufficient amounts to satisfy the
“perfected water rights” within each state. A “perfected water right” is one which is “acquired in
accordance with state law which has been exercised by the actual diversion and/or beneficial use
of a specific quantity of water in accordance with state law….”597 These rights together with
water for ecosystem preservation determine the base apportionment to each state. The amount is
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then converted to percentages of flow volumes.598 Percentages were selected for the ease in
measurement and monitoring and the ease with which reductions may be made during times of
shortages of supply.
The volume necessary to satisfy the base apportionment may exceed the available supply
of the watercourse, a condition of “over appropriation.” The Commentary addresses this issue
by stating that the method developed to apportion the waters during years of shortage should be
looked to as guidance for the negotiators of a compact under these conditions.599 In these
conditions the water is apportioned by a commission using the percentages determined by the
ratio of ecosystem and perfected rights for each state. The apportionment to each state is
reduced if the “safe annual yield” is less than average. Intrastate allocation of each state’s share
is determined by the state, i.e. state law is used to allocate water among each of the holders of
perfected rights. This seems straight forward, however, during shortage conditions, it is likely
that a market will develop for intra- and inter-state transfers.
The volume necessary to satisfy base apportionments may be less than the supply of the
basin. In this circumstance the commentary suggests several alternative allocation methods that
the negotiators may decide upon. These include dividing the water according to the percentage
shares for base apportionments, giving each state the same volumetric amount, or authorizing the
Commission established by the Compact to allocate the water using criteria agreed upon.600
The final allocation is of “supplemental” waters. The Model Compact includes a
calculation of estimated safe annual yield, which is defined as “the amount of water that can be
withdrawn annually from a surface or sub-surface water resource without serious water quality,
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net storage, environmental or social consequences.”601 This is calculated using an analysis of the
average annual and seasonal flows on record, the wettest 10 year period and the driest 10 year
period. The Commission determines the amount of water “reasonably likely to be available” for
a five year period and determines the amount above the base apportionment, ecosystem
preservation and perfected water rights, and makes supplemental apportionments. The
supplemental apportionments are made on a five year term and are subject to renewal.
The measure for all uses within the basin is “reasonable beneficial use.” Few states
within the United States have enforced a standard for water use that limits quantity for right’s
holders, however, as demand continues to increase this standard will play an increasing role in
water management. It is a flexible and adaptive standard incorporating both the amount of water
in the term “reasonable” and the use of that water within the term “beneficial.” “The authors [of
the Model Compact] are convinced that the principal long-term source of ‘new’ water for
expanding populations and environmental values will come from increased conservation efforts.
A major component of this effort must necessarily be more aggressive enforcement of a clearly
defined reasonable beneficial use standard.”602
The group of scholars and practitioners who developed the Model Compact determined
that multiple methods of apportionment were needed to meet the varied utilization of an
interstate stream. Ecosystem preservation and existing uses are protected with base
apportionments that are quantified and then converted to percentages of the estimated safe
annual yield. Supplemental apportionments are based on hydrological data and subject to
conditions imposed by the Commission which may include conservation requirements and
payment of a market value for the water. All uses within the states in the basin are limited to
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reasonable beneficial use with a mechanism to enforce rules against waste, unreasonable, or
unbeneficial uses. The Model Agreement also permits marketing the apportionments among the
basin states as a means of achieving flexibility to meet changing circumstances.603
Institutions
The Model Compact calls for the formation of a Commission to implement, supervise
and enforce the provisions of the Compact among the states.604 The Commission members are
the highest elected officials of each basin state or their representatives. The authority of the
Commission is very broad. The Commentary explains that all possible functions are included
with the intent that particular basins will tailor the authorities to meet the particular basin needs.
The Commission duties are to “exercise final authority and responsibility for (a) the equitable,
efficient, and sustainable
use of the water apportionments; (b) the management of the water quality programs under this
Compact; and (c) the management of the water resources programs under this Compact.”
The Commission is supported by a Council of two high ranking water management and
water quality officials from each state, two tribal representatives and two federal representatives.
The Council has the primary responsibility for approving water allocations and water quality
programs at the state level.
The Commission and the Council are supported by a Division of Scientific Analysis. The
Division is composed of an equal number of representatives from each state with technical
expertise in water management, water quality, economics, fish and wildlife and other matters of
importance to the management of the Basin.605

603

Model Compact Art. V cmt, 47 Nat. Resources J at 64-75. at 44-58. The Model Compact also includes
provisions for maintaining the water quality of the basin. See, Id., Art. VI, 47 Nat. Resources J at 76.
604
Model Compact Art. IV (A), 47 Nat. Resources J at 41.
605
Model Compact supra note __ Art. IV (D), 47 Nat. Resources J at 53.

≈175≈

This structure is explained in the Commentary as vesting decision making authority with
the elected officials of the basin governments. The Council consists of the agency heads from
basin governments and is responsible for policy decisions. The Science Division has equal
authority to the Council over scientific and technical issues in order to implement the agreed
upon policies.
Conclusion	
  
The Model Compact is included in this discussion for its comprehensive treatment of
transboundary water issues. The group of experts who drafted and commented on the Model
Compact brought varied and extensive experience to its development. It is as comprehensive a
management tool as can be designed. It is geared toward future development while protecting
existing uses. Unlike existing compacts within the United States, it includes the tribal
governments within the basin and the United States. Its provisions are worthy of study and
consideration any transboundary agreement.
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Chapter	
  Eleven:	
  Three	
  International	
  Watercourses	
  without	
  
Agreements	
  	
  
Three international watercourses without basin-wide agreements are examined in this
section: the Nile, Amu Darya/Syr Darya, and the Tigris/Euphrates.	
  606 The examination uses
four criteria; 1) communication among the basin states, 2) data gathering and exchange of
information, 3) common goals and agreement on management principles and 4) the institutional
authority and capacity to implement basin goals and management principles.
The four criteria are hierarchical in that communication is the platform upon which the
states may exchange data and information. The data and information about the basin are
essential to setting common goals and management principles. Any basin institutions use these
to achieve management flexibility.
Nile	
  
The Nile is one of the most famous rivers in the world. It forms a basin of approximately
1,170,000 square miles (3,030,286 km2).607 It is comprised of the Blue Nile with headwaters in
Eritria and Ethiopia and the White Nile with headwaters historically thought to be Lake Victoria
but now considered the Kagera River whose headwaters are in Burundi. The two branches have
very different characteristics and flow patterns before joining in a confluence in Khartoum,
Sudan. The Nile then flows through Sudan and Egypt before forming the large delta region at
the Mediterranean.
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The states within the Nile basin are parties to numerous agreements. Of note are the
agreement in 1929 between Egypt and Great Britain/Sudan608 and the 1959609 agreement
between Egypt and Sudan dividing the waters of the Nile;610 and the more recent agreements for
management of the Kagera River basin611 and for the coordinated and sustainable management
of Lake Victoria.612
Egypt is the dominate state within the basin having used the waters of the Nile for
irrigation for an estimated 5000 years. Experts anticipate that the population in the basin may
increase by 100% during the next 50 years further increasing the water stress within the basin.613
The upstream states are looking forward to future development of the Nile while the downstream
states are interested in protecting existing development and looking forward to expanding
development to meet future needs. This creates a situation where the upstream states view water
security as the ability to meet development potential and the more highly developed downstream
states view water security as the protection of existing uses and the recognition of prior
agreements.
It has been said that nothing flows among the Nile basin states except water.614 This
truism is no longer valid though linkages of trade and transportation among the basin states
608
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remain limited. Communication and the exchange of water data within the basin now occur on a
regular basis through the efforts of the Water Ministers of the Nile basin states.
Communication among the Nile Basin states began at the technical level through the
Hydrometeorological Survey of the Catchments of lakes Victoria, Kyoga and Albert (Hydromet)
(1967-1992). Hydromet was succeeded by the Technical Cooperation Committee for the
Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE)
(1992-1999). A Council of [Water] Ministers of 9 of the 10 basin states formed the Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI) which continues the work of the TECCONILE.615
The NBI developed a shared vision “[t]o achieve sustainable socio-economic
development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water
resources.” Creation of a shared vision was a major undertaking. It provides agreed upon
common goals and principles for management of the basin. The states agree that socio-economic
development must be sustainable, that the states are to equitably utilize the water resources and
equitably utilize the benefits of the water resources which are common to the basin states.
The Shared Vision is implemented through cooperative programs, stakeholder
involvement and education. The Council of Ministers agreed upon the complete text of a
Cooperative Framework Agreement, a basin-wide Cooperative Framework.616 However, Egypt
maintains that a provision regarding historical uses remain in the text of the Cooperative
Framework Agreement. The Ministers from the other states agreed to address the issue at a later
time in an annex. With this most recent action the Cooperative Framework is before the
governments of the basin states for consideration.
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Common goals are articulated by the NBI at a project specific level but the principles for
addressing future water scarcity created by population growth, climate change, and demand for
increased food production have not been addressed. The NBI does not have the requisite
authority to address change until the states enter a basin-wide agreement which vests such
authority.617
Amu Darya/Syr Darya	
  
The Amu Darya and Syr Darya feed the Aral Sea. The Amu Darya enters the southern
Aral Sea after flowing 1490 miles (2400 km) from the headwaters Vakhsh and Panj Rivers in
Tajikistan and Kyrgystan.618 The Syr Darya rises in the mountains of Kyrgystan and flows1550
miles (2500km) through the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Usbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Most of the time water from the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya does not reach the Aral Sea
creating what has been described as the world’s worst environmental disaster.619
Most of the current development within the Amu Darya/Syr Darya basin occurred when
the region was part of the former Soviet Union. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the
formation of separate states resulted in concentrated development in upstream states and the
consequences of that development felt as environmental and economic harm in the downstream
states. Population growth during the next 50 years is projected to be much greater upstream
exacerbating the upstream-downstream disparities and water stress.620
The post-Soviet states within the basin entered the first agreement regarding water in
1992. This agreement recognized and confirmed the legal status of water allocations as they
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existed under the Soviet regime621 and created the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination
(ICWC) to manage transboundary waters and assume the responsibilities from the former
Ministry of Water Resources of the USSR.622 The ICWC continues the policies of the Soviet
Basin Water Organizations for Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Numerous other institutions and
organizations have been established to address the environmental crisis of the Aral Sea. These
organizations provide opportunities for communication and data exchange and for sharing
information about the operation of existing works but do not address management of the basin.
The basin states have not agreed upon common goals or principles for water use. Each
state developed water laws reflective of their upstream or downstream position and in support of
the major water sectors within their respective territories.623 The existing institutions do not have
the authority to change water use within any state or to change the regulation of works on the
international waters. These remain in the management of individual states or private and sectoral
groups. Regional economics and markets for water remain major issues preventing agreement
among basin states.
Euphrates/Tigris	
  
The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers both originate in Turkey join at the Shatt-al-Arab
waterway a short distance before flowing into the Persian Gulf. The Tigris forms the border
between Turkey and Syria before flowing through Iraq where it receives a contribution of water
from the Kuran River which originates in Iran. The Euphrates River also originates in Turkey
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and flows south through Syria and Iraq. The region is characterized by war and political struggle
at this time of political occupation of Iraq by the United States, Kurdish efforts at independence
from Iraq and Turkey and Syrian conflict with its neighbours.
The upstream state of Turkey is the water hegemon in the basin with control of large
multipurpose dams and plans for more works as part of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).
These projects include the Ataturk Dam, the ninth largest in the world624and the Birecik Dam.
Turkey customarily provides notice to downstream states that major works are underway,
but there is not cooperation or coordination for planned measures and water diversions that
impact the entire basin. The lack of cooperation led to several water related crisis including
complete cessation of the flow of the Euphrates River to fill Ataturk Reservoir625 and formal
objections lodged by both Syria and Iraq to construction of Birecik dam.
Several decades ago the states within the basin participated in discussions. The first
technical meeting among the major basin states of Turkey, Syria and Iraq was held in 1965 to
discuss dam construction and operation. From 1965 until circa 1992 a Joint Technical
Committee (JTC) met to exchange data and to develop a tripartite river basin agreement. In
1992, when an agreement had not been reached, the JTC discontinued meeting. At this time,
there is not a regularized exchange of basic data on precipitation, water use, or water quality.
Recent news reports indicate this may be changing. Regional newspapers reported that 18
representatives from Turkey, Syria and Iraq held a technical meeting of in March 2008 for the
purpose of forming a basin water institute.626
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Major construction continues within the basin without an agreement among the states.
The states have different views on basic principles. Turkey asserts sovereign rights to develop
water resources within its territory627 and has claimed that the Euphrates and Tigris are not
international rivers because neither forms a boundary between two states.628 In addition, Turkey
considers the Euphrates and Tigris to be one watercourse system and requires that negotiation
address the entire basin.
On the other hand, Iraq and Syria have asserted that the Euphrates and the Tigris should
be treated as separate rivers for purpose of negotiations. Iraq and Syria assert rights to
volumetric allocations and want “guaranteed” delivery downstream. If these basic differences
are not sufficient to foreclose an agreement, negotiators have linked Kurdish separatists activities
with the water negotiations further increasing distrust among the states.629
The reports of formation of a basin water institute are encouraging in that the states are
communicating. We do not know if the water institute will come to fruition providing a regular
mechanism for communication, data gathering and exchange of information.
Conclusion 	
  
The three basins discussed herein, are examples of the many basins throughout the world
without basin-wide agreements. As we face water stress from increased population and
increased standards of living which require increased water for food production we must work to
allocate water resources carefully and according to agreed upon goals and principles. It may
sound simple, but as is illustrated in the Euphrates/Tigris basin, communication is the first step
and not as easy as it sounds.
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The agreements among the Senegal basin states offer examples of the introduction of key
water sharing principles in incremental steps. The first agreement in 1963 included broad
development goals and established a basin-wide institution. It is through this institution that
communication and data sharing took place to permit cooperation for the development of the
multi-purpose dams for the benefit of all states. Different organizational structures and different
development principles were adopted over a period of 40 years culminating in the 2002 Water
Charter. It is the spirit of cooperation among the states based on an early identification of shared
benefits that permits the institutions to develop along with the river resources.
The Amu/Syr Darya basin is dominated by upstream irrigation interests creating
ecological damage and water shortages downstream. The Senegal Basin agreements may offer
guidance in this basin as well. The water sharing arrangement in the Senegal is based on use by
sectors, not a division among states. If sector allocations are agreed upon a provision permitting
an analysis of reasonableness is needed. The 1997 UN Convention provides at Article 5 that
states shall use an international watercourse in “an equitable and reasonable manner” with a
“view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization and benefits therefrom.”630The Model
Compact requires states to enforce a standard of “reasonable beneficial use” of its apportionment
from the transboundary resource. This is defined as “the application of water to a beneficial use
in an amount reasonably necessary to satisfy such use….”631 The Commission created under the
Model Compact has the authority to reduce the state apportionment in the event of a finding that
the state is not enforcing this standard.632 This standard has been in effect in the United States
since the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and though there has not been significant
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enforcement, it is a widely recognized standard.633 It is a standard such as this, and the authority
to enforce it, that will create water savings and conservation within a basin such as the Amu/Syr
Darya that is over-appropriated.
Recent reports from the Tigris/Euphrates basin indicate an increased willingness to share
technical information. The upstream hegemonic position of Turkey makes them a critical
participant in negotiations. There are sub-basin bilateral agreements among the states which may
provide a starting point for negotiations. The GAP Ministry in Turkey and the Irrigation
Ministry in Syria entered an agreement in 2001 for training and exchange of experts. Iran and
Iraq entered an Agreement in 1975 regarding the use of Frontier Watercourses. Turkey and Iraq
signed an agreement in 1946 with provisions relative to the regulation of the Tigris and
Euphrates and tributaries. Within the Colorado River basin the “bilateral agreement” between
Colorado and New Mexico for the La Plata River, a small tributary, is incorporated within the
Upper Basin Compact without upsetting the allocations and management regime established 20
years previously.634
A different circumstance is presented in the Nile Basin. Two historic agreements to
which Egypt is a party present circumstances upon which the basin states cannot agree. An
exchange of notes in 1929 between Egypt and the Great Britain provide that use of the waters of
the Nile shall not “infringe Egypt’s natural and historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its
requirements of agricultural extension.”635 In 1959 Egypt and Sudan entered an agreement to
fully utilize the waters of the Nile and to agree on a unified position in negotiations over the Nile

633

Id., Art V(G)cmt., 47 Nat. Resources J. at 73-75.
Upper Colorado Basin Compact, Art. supra note __.
635
Exchanges of Notes between the U.K. and Egypt in regard to the Use of the Waters of the River Nile for
Irrigation Purposes, Cairo, May 7, 1929, 93 L.N.T.S. pg. 44.
634

≈185≈

waters.636 Unlike the tributary agreements within the Colorado River basin and the bilateral
agreements on the Tigris/Euphrates Rivers, the 1959 agreement regarding the Nile allocates the
full flow of the river between the two states. To give this agreement full effect arguably prevents
development in other basin states. During the negotiations for a Cooperative Framework
Agreement it is the treatment of “historic” agreements that creates a conflict among the states.
The law of treaties and the succession of states all become involved in these discussions. At the
meeting of the Council of Water Ministers on May 22, 2009 the Ministers reached agreement on
the text of the Cooperative Framework Agreement except for the provisions relating historic
rights and uses.637
The Model Compact contains provisions for the protection of existing uses, however, this
assumes that the basin is not yet over-allocated or in extreme water stress like the Nile basin.
Egypt is the hegemonic state within the Nile Basin and appears to be forcing the other basin
states to proceed without their participation. The resolution of the issue of historic agreements
may be resolved through judicial or other means.

Conclusion	
  to	
  Part	
  III	
  
	
  
The simplest things may be the most effective for basin-wide management:
communication, coordinating watercourse data and the exchange of information on water and
land use. Yet it is this information that may be difficult for states to disclose even though it is
critical to basin-wide equitable and reasonable utilization. Through negotiated agreements
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institutions may be formed which provide a regular and routine forum for communication and
exchange of information.
Agreements and institutions may be as complex as those governing the Colorado River or
as progressive in their ownership of river works as the OMVS in the Senegal basin or still in the
formative stages as in the Nile Basin. However, basin-wide institutions are key to avoidance of
environmental catastrophe and adjusting to changing natural and human conditions.
The legal structure of the Colorado River basin and that of the Senegal Basin offer
interesting contrasts. Within the Colorado system most local water uses are based on the
principle of prior appropriation which is incorporated into state law. More recently reserved
rights for federal lands including those held in trust for Indian tribes have been quantified and
incorporated within the federal management of the main stream and the state management of
local water uses. In the Colorado system the states and the federal government negotiated
volumetric allocations of water with general principles for the allocation of surplus water and
adjusted allocations in times of shortage. It is these general principles that have been called upon
to adapt to change within the basin. The technical institution for river management, the federal
Bureau of Reclamation, developed in cooperation with the states, criteria for water allocation
when the volume of water is not sufficient to meet the volumetric allocations. This process
included opportunities for participation by all users and stakeholders within the portion of the
basin affected by shortages. The participation took place not under the provisions of any water
agreement but under the requirements of a different federal law, the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)638 which mandates that an environmental impact statement be prepared for
major federal actions. It is the NEPA requirements that brought stakeholders and the public into
the decision making process.
638
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The Colorado Basin is over-allocated with each user having a stake in its management.
Adoption of the shortage criteria was the result of extensive data collection and years of
negotiations among the basin states and major stakeholders. It was precipitated by a common
understanding of the necessity for a change in river management to meet the changed
circumstances of drought within the basin.
The Senegal Basin presents a different set of circumstances and a different response. In
1963 the top levels of government of the basin states viewed the River as a path to development.
The concepts of what to do were accepted early, hydropower production, increased irrigation and
navigation, and the institutions were formed to accomplish these goals. As the governments
developed so did the institutions and this is reflected in the sequence of basin agreements. The
adverse consequences of dam development are not unique to the Senegal River. What was
unique was the fact that this occurred in the late twentieth century and not the nineteenth century
and that the negative consequences came close to defeating the basin development goals. The
effect of having an existing institution for data collection and cooperation resulted in the PASIE
data gathering and the changes made through the 2002 Water Charter which incorporates the
latest developments in management of international watercourses.
Within the Senegal Basin the local water uses were not protected by law and not given
consideration when “bigger and better” plans for the watercourse were developed at the top
levels of government. At the time of dam construction the local users did not have a voice. The
consequences had an impact back up to the states in decreased food production, displaced
population, food scarcity and increased disease. These remain major concerns within the basin
ten years after dam construction. The strength and support of the basin institutions provide a
process to address the devastation cooperatively and the capacity to implement change.
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The basins without basin agreements are at various stages of cooperation and
negotiations. The role of users and local laws and the sustainability of the watercourse as a
natural system must be included in the international negotiations. The 1997 UN Convention and
the Model Compact are a starting points.
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Overall	
  Conclusion	
  
Water law may be viewed as the set of rules for human interaction with the hydrologic
cycle. Water law promotes the particular policies in place at the time the laws are developed.
Water laws that develop at the local level, from the bottom up, were examined in Part One.
These include prior appropriation which promotes settlement and irrigation of arid lands:639
acequias promoting community development,640 and subaks641 supporting food production and
cultural cohesiveness. Water law includes customs such as those by which the mayordomo
opens the headgates in New Mexico and the rice societies that encourage and support cultivation
and prayer in Bali and Sri Lanka. Water law includes the statutes and regulations adopted at
multiple levels of government to promote, limit, and protect water uses. These laws reflect the
preferences of the societies in which they develop.
Water law also includes compacts and treaties entered at the highest levels of government
in order to utilize transboundary waters, resolve conflicts, and promote goodwill. This body of
law includes the international principles that have crystallized as customary international law
binding on all states. Each level of water law is applied to the same watercourse at the same
time. It is the duty of water planners, water managers, and the negotiators of watercourse
agreements to know and understand the plurality of laws that simultaneously regulate a single
source of water.
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Effective domestic water institutions are as important to managing an international
watercourse as are the basin institutions among states. A basin-wide treaty is only effective if all
users adhere to it.
This dissertation explores water law at the bottom and at the top of a legal pluralistic
system. Each water use and each water law within a hydrologic basin affects all others. One
cannot forget local laws when negotiating an international agreement and one cannot ignore
international agreements when allocating local resources. All must be integrated within a
management system in order to obtain optimal and sustainable development of hydraulic basins
for our welfare and survival.
How can this occur? First, the sooner water sharing institutions are established and water
sharing agreements negotiated the better are the chances of resolving or preventing international
water disputes. The OMVS in the Senegal Basin demonstrates that new data, changing
circumstances and unintended consequences may be resolved through existing institutions.642
Second, strong domestic institutions help address change. The basin institution regulating
the Colorado River is addressing drought and climate change by adopting shortage criteria for
operations in the lower basin.643 Third, the effectiveness of an institution is determined by the
extent of its authority. The International Boundary and Water Commission created by the United
States and Mexico has broad decision making authority absent objection by the State Parties.
However, these institutions do not have authority to regulate water users.
One intra-state dispute between a state official and water users illustrates the complexity
of integrating water law among interstate agreements, institutions, and users.
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Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Company644
Hinderlider involves a dispute between an irrigation company and the Colorado State
Engineer over use of the La Plata River. M.C. Hinderlider is the Colorado State Engineer
charged with administering the waters of the state and with administering the terms of the La
Plata River Compact with the state of New Mexico. The plaintiffs are corporate owners of a
ditch used to divert water to irrigate land in southern Colorado. The La Plata River is a small
watershed which originates in the mountains of southwestern Colorado and flows south into New
Mexico before joining the San Juan River near Farmington, New Mexico645 which then flows
into the Colorado River. The flow is dependent on snowmelt from the La Plata Mountains in
Colorado646 and fluctuates between high flows in the spring and low flows in the late summer
and fall.
In 1922 the states of Colorado and New Mexico entered the La Plata River Compact
which apportions the water using three different mechanisms depending on the seasonal
fluctuations.647 This is a simple compact648 apportioning the flow of this small stream as equally
as possible between the states. Gaging stations are installed and allocations are made based on
the availability of water. The natural characteristics of the river are incorporated in the terms of
the Compact649 and the State Engineers of Colorado and New Mexico are authorized to adjust
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the flow to permit maximum beneficial use of water in each state. Article II(3), the provision in
question, calls for “rotating” water deliveries between the states during low flows:
[W]henever the flow of the river is so low that in the judgment of the state engineers of
the states, the greatest beneficial use of its waters may be secured by distributing all of its
waters successively to the lands in each state in alternating periods, in lieu of delivery of
water as provided in the second paragraph of this article, [one-half of the mean flow at
the Hesperus station for the preceding day, but not to exceed one hundred cubic feet per
second;] the use of the waters may be so rotated between the two states in such manner,
for such periods, and to continue for such time as the state engineers may jointly
determine….650
This provision permits the maximum amount of water to be used in each state during low flows
when the percentage of conveyance loss is the greatest.
When State Engineer Hinderlider implemented Article II(3) of the Compact by shutting
the headgates in Colorado the La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Company (Ditch
Company) sued him. Plaintiffs asserted several legal theories each of which was based on
protecting the state law water rights of the Ditch Company as they were perfected, adjudicated,
and decreed according to the prior appropriation laws of the state of Colorado. The basic
conflict was between the prior appropriation water rights of the user and the interstate equitable
apportionment effectuated by the La Plata River Compact.
The Hinderlider case provides a fitting example of the contentious relationship between
water laws which develop from the bottom-up, such as the doctrine of prior appropriation which
is the basis of the Ditch Company’s rights, and water law which emanates from the top-down,
such as the equitable apportionment contained in the La Plata River Compact. In addition, the
institutional arrangement created by the La Plata River Compact is worth examining for the
potential conflict created when one state officer is charged both with enforcement of local law
and with administration of the Compact.
650
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The La Plata River Compact provides that the State Engineers from each state must
cooperate in the installation and operation of the gaging stations and the “exchange of records
and data and publication of facts.”651 They are authorized to adjust the allocation during periods
of low flow,652 and they “may formulate rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of
[the] compact, which, when signed and promulgated by them, shall be binding until amended by
agreement between them or until terminated by written notice from one to the other.”653
Mr. Hinderlider was an officer of the state of Colorado. The Ditch Company sued Mr.
Hinderlider in state court for taking its right to water when he shut their headgate in violation of
the state court water decree. Mr. Hinderlider prevailed at the trial court by asserting compliance
with the requirements of the Compact. The Ditch Company succeeded in having that decision
overturned by the Colorado State Supreme Court after which Mr. Hinderlider was enjoined from
giving effect to Article II(3) of the Compact.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Ditch Company has property rights which are
a freehold interest and that Mr. Hinderlider took those rights without due compensation when he
implemented Article II(3) of the Compact. The Colorado Supreme Court went on to cite
provisions of the Colorado Constitution, the Colorado Water Code and the adjudication decree of
the Colorado state court to support its decision654 all of which it held Mr. Hinderlider violated.
While acknowledging that the Compact is a compromise between conflicting claims of the states
of Colorado and New Mexico, the Colorado Supreme Court took a very strong position for the
protection of the rights of the users. Citing to previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court for equitable apportionment of water the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
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They [equitable apportionment cases655] do not touch the right of a state by compact,
without notice, hearing, or compensation, to take property from one of its citizens and
give it to another state or its citizens as a mere matter of expediency, without regard to
the legality of their claims thereto, and in total disregard of existing constitutional,
statutory, and judicial prohibitions.656
These are strong statements about the state law of Colorado, the law Mr. Hinderlider was
obligated to obey. However, Mr. Hinderlider, represented by the Colorado Attorney General, did
not accept this ruling, and he continued the appeal for an additional five years before eventually
overturning the Colorado Supreme Court in the United States Supreme Court. 657
The holding in Hinderlider provides the underlying principle to determine the
relationship between local water law and interstate or international water law. “As [each state]
possessed the right only to an equitable share of the water in the stream” the local water law
cannot grant or award “any right greater than the equitable share.”658 The local users cannot
obtain or hold rights to use water in a greater amount than the equitable share of the state.
Hinderlider also demonstrates the difficulties inherent in reaching a balance between the
local users and an equitable apportionment among states. Interstate water negotiations are
political processes subject to local as well as interstate pressures which do not abate with the
conclusion of an agreement. The rationality of states to manage a shared watercourse for optimal
and sustainable utilization depends on strong political will and the power to support that will.
Using these basic facts we can hypothetically change key decisions of Mr. Hinderlider to
explore further the relationship between local law and an interstate agreement. The La Plata
River Compact gives the State Engineers of Colorado and New Mexico discretion to manage the
waters of the La Plata River to maximize beneficial use. What if Mr. Hinderlider acquiesced in

655

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907) and Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 (1922).
La Plata supra note 16 at 189 (Colo. 1933).
657
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
658
Id. at 108.
656

≈195≈

the demands of the local users to maximize water availability within the state of Colorado. If he
did not comply with the specific Compact requirements for deliveries of either 100 m3/sec,
Article II (1), or for delivery of one half the flow as measured at the Hesparus gage, Article II
(2), the state of New Mexico could bring an action against Colorado to enforce the terms of the
Compact.
However, if Mr. Hinderlider did not agree with the New Mexico State Engineer to
implement the provisions of Article II (3) permitting water deliveries to rotate between the states,
or if he is enjoined from doing so, it is possible that the first priority users in the upstream state
of Colorado benefit. The decision to maximize beneficial use in both states as permitted by
Article II (3) requires a joint decision based on the professional judgment of the state engineers.
In the absence of agreement, the flow is divided according to Article II (2) with one half for use
in Colorado. The balance of the flow may or may not be sufficient to reach the users in New
Mexico given conveyance losses.
While the Hinderlider case illustrates the importance of measures to provide flexible
management in support of the implementation of an interstate agreement to maximize beneficial
use, additional provisions could strengthen the management mechanisms. The integrity of the
individuals to uphold the letter and spirit of the agreement may be balanced with more specific
provisions limiting individual discretion such as a third decision maker or independent fact
finder.

Historically water law developed at the local level to resolve local allocation of the
resource as that resource became stressed. The principles of equitable apportionment among
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states of the United States developed as a principle of federal common law approximately 100
years ago. Only in the past three decades has international water law crystallized in response to
the increasing stresses placed on international watercourses.
We live in a globalized world in which the political thought about water must grow to
recognize the interconnectedness of all riparian states and that the natural system of a
watercourse disregards political boundaries. Too often water is still considered a local resource
with states asserting sovereignty and attempting to protect local uses without an appreciation of a
broader picture of the natural system within a river basin. Until the political atmosphere at the
local and international levels becomes more aligned with natural conditions it may become
increasingly difficult to conclude water sharing agreements as demand increases, local uses
remain central to national economies, and the resource becomes more stressed.
A watercourse is a single resource, governed and managed according to multiple laws.
These laws must be integrated in order to share this single, vital resource equitably and
reasonably for optimal and sustainable utilization.
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Final Thoughts
This paper used thousands of words to examine legal structures for water allocation from
the bottom up and the top down. The law of international watercourses is still developing as
watercourses around the globe become stressed and uses in one state impact users in other
riparian states. This paper has demonstrated that international law, the law governing the
interaction among states, is not the singular authority governing international watercourses and it
has shown that the users, and the local legal regimes governing use, must be considered.
However, even the most cooperative and inclusive legal regimes and basin institutions and the
most developed local to international laws remain incomplete and unacceptably inadequate if
people within a basin remain without clean water. Above all, water is a vital human need.
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